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T R E A T I S E
CONCERNING
ENTHUSIASME,
A S

It is an Effect of *Nature*: but is
mistaken by many for either *Divine*
Inspiration, or *Diabolicall Possession*.

By *Meric Casaubon*, D. D.

Second edition : revised, and enlarged.



L O N D O N,

Printed by R O G E R D A N I E L , and are to be sold
by *Thomas Iohnson*, at the Golden Key in *St. Paul's*
Church-yard, A N N O 1656.

R. E. A. T. I. S.

CONTAINING

THE HISTORY OF THE

REIGN OF CHARLES THE FIRST

BY JOHN BURNET

Second Edition: revised and enlarged



L O N D O N

Printed by R. O. A. D. A. N. T. L. and J. C. O. B. B. E. T. T. at the Golden Lion in St. Paul's Church-yard, A. M. D. C. C. C. C. C.



TO THE
READER.

I Have been present sometimes at some discourses, and have lighted also upon some relations, in print, concerning Visions and Revelations, that have happened unto some. I did not apprehend them alwaies, as they seemed unto me to do, that were partakers with me of the same whether relations or discourses. But neither was I so confident, that I was in the right, and they in the wrong, as peremptorily to conclude any thing in mine own thoughts: much less so confident, that I could think it needfull, to oppose by words and arguments, what was believed by others, different from mine own opinion. For how indeed should I be confident, that I was in the right, without the diligent examination of severall circumstances, unknown unto me, and as little perchance known unto them that were of another opinion? without which to conclude of particular cases, by generall Rules and Maximes; I knew full well, to be a principall cause of most strifes and confusions, that either disturb the

To the READER.

brains, or divide the hearts of men in this world.

But even when more confident, upon good and perfect knowledge of all circumstances; yet where no manifest danger is, either of impiety towards God, or breach of peace, whether publick or private, among men: I never did think my self bound to oppose; no more then I did think that my opposition would be to much purpose. I am not of the opinion of some ancient Philosophers, that man is the measure of all things, and therefore that whatever appeareth true unto any, is in it self as it appeareth unto him: neither do I think so meanly of any truth, that can be reduced to any reality, whether sensible or unsensible; as to think either Lands, or Jewels, too dear a price for it. However, as all mens brains are not of one temper, naturally; nor all men equally improved by study; nor all led by one interest: so is it, I think, as impossible, by any art, or reason of man, to reduce all men to one belief. I cannot think that the warres of the Giants against the Gods, and their attempt (feigned by the Poets,) of scaling Heaven by heaping high Mountains upon one another; can by any sober man be conceived either more ridiculous, or impossible, then the project of some men (for which also some books have been written lately:) doth appear unto me, of making all men wise. I think my self bound to judge of others as charitably as may be: but though I would, yet I cannot conceive, how any man can, really, promise himself so much, or make boast of it unto others; but he must think himself
either

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either more good, or more wise, then Almighty God. Or if he pretend to act by God, as his instrument, or Deputie: yet even so, more wise, or more successfull then Christ, the Son of God: Who though he was come into the world, as to suffer for men, so to teach men wisdom, without which his sufferings would do them no good; and might have made use of his Omnipotency, had he pleased, to transforme all men, even the dullest of men, in a moment of time, to make them more capable of his instructions: yet thought that way best that he chose; and after many Miracles, by himself and his Apostles; and his heavenly Doctrine, contained in the Gospels, and the writings of his said Apostles; left many men to themselves as before; and was content the world should continue (which it hath already done 1653 yeares since) for a while; though it consisted of men, more bad, then good; more fools, then wise. But this is too much, to them that will not be the better for it: and I do not desire to make sport unto others.

Since my forced retirement into this country life; among those few books which have had the luck to stick to me, not many yeares since I lighted upon one, whereof I can give very little account, if I should be put to it, how I came by it, or it to me; but found it among the rest; the title whereof is, *The life of Sister Katharine of Iesus; Nunne of the Order of our Lady, &c. at Paris, 1628.* The title did not much invite me to read: but being at very good leisure at that time, and turning the leaves to

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satisfie my self with a superficial view; I soon observed somewhat that I thought extraordinary, and further provoked my curiosity. For besides a long dedication to the Queen of *France*, made by a Cardinall; I observed at the end, the Approbations of severall persons: of one Bishop, one Arch-bishop, besides *Sorbonists*, and Doctors of Divinity, no lesse then four: all these approbations, distinct and severall; and some of them very long, and written with great accuratenesse both of style, and matter. I then resolved to read in good earnest. But though I had both will and leasure enough; yea and resolution too, to read unto the end, before I gave it over: yet was my reading often interrupted with different thoughts and contests; which made great impression in my mind. I found the book to be a long contexture of severall strangeraptures and enthusiasms, that had hapned unto a melancholick, or, if

*See the particulars,
at the end of the 3.
Chapter, Of contem-
plative, or philosoph.
Enthus. pa. 119, &c.*

you will, a devout Maid. In this I saw no great matter of wonder: Neither could I observe much in the relation of the particulars, but what as I conceived, rationally, probable; so I might believe, charitably, true. I could observe, as I thought, a perpetuall coherence of naturall causes, in every particular: which gave me good satisfaction. But then that such a judgement should be made, of such an accident, wherein I apprehended so little ground of either doubt or wonder; and this judgement, not the judgement of a woman onely, the Author, as is pretended,

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tended, of the whole relation; but of men of such worth and eminency: this in very deed troubled me very much. I did often reason with my self, against my self: That it was as possible, that what I thought reason, and nature, might be but my phanſy and opinion; as that what by such, and so many, was judged God, and Religion, should be nothing but Nature, and Superſtition: that where the matter was disputable, and liable to error, it was safer to erre with authority, then through singularity. These things and the like I objected to my self: but for all this, the further I read, the more I was unsatisfied & disturbed in mine own thoughts; and could have no rest, untill I did resolve, as soon as any good opportunity should offer it self, to make it my businesse, so farre as I might by best inquisition, throughly to satisſie my self.

This opportunitie, after I had acquitted my self, so farre as in me lay, of some other things, wherein the publick weal of Learning may be more concerned, (whereof I have given an account to my friends:) having offered it self some moneths ago, because nothing else did then offer it self, that I thought more needfull; I thank God, I have satisſied my self. I have, so farre as by private inquisition I could: but then shall I think my self fully satisſied, if after the publication of what I have done to that end, I shall find it satisfactory unto others also, that can judge of these things, and are not engaged; as well as unto my self. However, it is a subject of that consequence, as will be shewed

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in the Preface; and, as all confesse, liable to so much illusion; that no reader, that loveth truth more then appearances, though he do not acknowledge himself satisfied with what I have written; can have just cause nevertheless, to repent that this occasion hath been given him by me, to satisfie himself more fully. It may concern him, he knows not how soon. He may deceive himself; he may be deceived by others; if he be not armed against it. *Pro Iunone nubem*, to embrace a Cloud, or a Foggie for a Deity; it is done by many, but it is a fowl mistake: let him take heed of it.



The



The Contents of the severall Chapters contained in this Treatise.

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
C H A P. VI.


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Of Enthusiasme in generall.

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IT was the opinion of Varro, that learned and voluminous Roman, (to whom whether S. Augustine were more beholding for that use he made of his writings, or he to S. Augustine for preserving so much of him, which otherwise would have been lost, I know not:) but his opinion, I say, recorded

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by

by S. *Augustine* in his third *de Civ. Dei*, ch. 4. That it was expedient for the publick good, that gallant Heroick men should believe themselves, though falsely, (*ex Diis genitos*) to be issued of the Gods, that upon that confidence they might attempt great matters with more courage; prosecute them with more fervency; and accomplish them more luckily: as deeming such confidence and security, though but upon imaginary grounds, a great advantage to good successe. I will not enquire into the reasons of the opinion. There is enough to be said against it, I am sure, (the later part of it especially, which commends security, as probable means to successe;) from reason, if we will go by reason: and there is enough already said against it by best Authors, Historiographers especially, if we will go by authority. I think it very probable that *Varro*, when he delivered it, had *Alexander* the Great in his mind, of whom indeed some such thing is written by some that have written of him; who impute no small portion of his great acts, to his fond belief concerning himself, that he was begotten by *Iupiter*. For that he was in very deed besotted through excessse of self-love, and high conceit of his parts and performances, into that opinion; and that it was not mere policy, to beget himself the more authority and obedience from others; is most probable. And yet in this very case of *Alexander* the Great, both by examination of particulars, and by testimony of good Authors, it might be maintained against *Varro*, that it would have

have advantaged him more to the accomplishment of his purposes and designes, to have contented himself with the title of the Son and Successor of *Philip*, a mortal King, but of immortal memory for divers excellent & princely parts: then to have assumed that unto himself, by which, even among the vulgar, prone enough of themselves to adore a visible Greatness, more than any invisible Deity, he got but little; but unto the better sort he made himself, to some, (who though they made no scruple to give him what titles himself desired, yet could not but scorn him in their hearts, whiles they now looked upon him rather as a juggler, or a mad man, than a Prince,) ridiculous; and to others, (whose fidelity he most wanted, because the most generous of his Subjects) more grievous; whilest he compelled them against their wills and consciences to do that, which some chose rather to die, than to do: and that himself for this very occasion came to a violent untimely death, is the opinion of best Historians.

*See Quintus
Curtius and
others.*

But of this assertion of *Varro*, I will leave every man free to judge as they please. It came in my way casually, and I thought fit to take notice of it, because of the affinity; but it is no part of my business. That which I have here to shew, and to maintain, is, that the opinion of divine Inspiration, which in all ages, and among all men of all professions, Heathens and Christians, hath been a very common opinion in the world; as it hath been

common, so the occasion of so many evils and mischiefs among men, as no other error, or delusion of what kind soever, hath ever been of either more, or greater.

By the opinion of divine Inspiration, I mean a real, though but imaginary, apprehension of it in the parties, upon some ground of nature; a real, not barely pretended, counterfeit, and simulatory, for politick ends. For that hath ever been one of the main crafts & mysteries of government, which the best of heathens sometimes (as well as the worst, more frequently,) the most commended Heroes, in ancient times, upon great attempts and designs, have been glad to use; as anciently, *Minos*, *Theseus*, *Lycurgus*, founders of Commonwealths, and others, for the publick good; the nature of the common people being such, that neither force, nor reason, nor any other means, or considerations whatsoever, have that power with them to make them plyable and obedient, as holy pretensions and interests, though grounded (to more discerning eyes) upon very little probability.

But here I meddle not with policy, but nature; nor with evil men so much, as the evil consequence of the ignorance of naturall causes, which both good and evil are subject unto. My business therefore shall be, as by examples of all professions in all ages, to shew how men have been very prone upon some grounds of nature, producing some extraordinary though not supernaturall effects; really, not hypocritically, but yet falsely and erroneously,

ly, to deem themselves divinely inspired: so secondly, to dig and dive (so farre as may be done with warrantable sobriety) into the deep and dark mysteries of nature, for some reasons, and probable confirmations of such naturall operations, falsely deemed supernaturall. Now what hath been the fruit of mistaken inspirations through ignorance of natural causes, what evils and mischiefs have ensued upon it, what corruptions, confusions, alterations in point of good manners and sound Knowledge, whether naturall or revealed; although it will appear more particularly by several examples and instances upon several heads, to which we have allowed so many several chapters: yet I think it will not be amiss to say somewhat of it here beforehand in generall, whereby the Reader may be the better satisfied, that this is no idle philosophicall speculation, but of main consequence both to truth in highest points, and publick welfare; besides the contentment of private satisfaction in a subject so remote from vulgar cognifance.

It is observed by divers Ancients, but more largely insisted upon by *Plutarch*, then any other that I know, that for divers Ages before *Socrates*, the natural temper of men was somewhat ecstaticall: in their actions, most of them tumid and high; in their expressions, very Poetical and allegorical; in all things very apt to be led by phansie and external appearances; very devout in their kind,

Plut. Περὶ τῆς μὴ χρεῖαν, &c. alibique.

Hence it is that ancient authors, as Aristotle, Strabo, and some others, affirme that Poetrie, in matter of writing and composition,

*was in use long before
prose: which might seem
strange, if not incredible, if
we judge by the disposition
of later times; but of those
times and tempers, not less
probable, then certain.*

but rather superstitious: In most things that they did, more guided by certain suddain instincts and raptures, then by reason; not out of any contempt of it, but because they had it not. In those dayes there was no moral Philosophy: and they were accounted worthy of highest honours, that could utter most sentences that had somewhat of reason in them; which by other men were generally received as Oracles, because they seemed to surpass the wisdom of ordinary men.

There were as many Religions almost as men; for every mans religion was his phansy; and they had most credit and authority, that could best invent, and make best shew. Among so many religions, there were no controversies, but very good agreement and concord; because no reason used either to examine, or to disprove. There was no talk among men, but of dreams, revelations, and apparitions: and they that could so easily phansy God in whatsoever they did phansy, had no reason to mistrust or to question the relations of others, though never so strange, which were so agreeable to their humors and dispositions; and by which themselves were confirmed in their own supposed Enthusiasms. That was the condition of those dayes, (in *Greece* at least, and those parts,) as it is set out by ancient Historiographers, and others; untill the dayes of *Socrates*, who for his innocent heroick life (commended and admired by Christians

as

as well as by Heathens) and his unjust death, (to which he was chiefly condemned for speaking against the Idolatry of his times) might be thought in some measure (as amongst Heathens) to have born the Image of Christ: but certainly not without some mystery, and some preparation of men to Christianity, was so magnified by all men, for being the founder of moral Philosophy, and for bringing the use of *Reason* into request: by which he would have all things tryed, nor any thing believed, or received upon any private account or authority, that should be against *Reason*.

Λογος was the word which he had so frequent in his mouth, and which he so much commended to his auditors and disciples: and Λογος, though in a far different sense I know, is the word by which Christ is styled in the Gospel. And as it is commonly observed, and true, that at the coming of Christ or thereabouts, all Oracles in all parts of the world began to cease; so may we say that even of this somewhat might be thought to be prefigured in *Socrates*, by whose doctrine, as it did increase in the world, (as we know it did in a little time very mightily,) so private inspirations and Enthusiasms began to be out of request, and men became, as more rational every where in their discourse, so more civil and sober in their conversations.

Now those were the times and tempers, that did produce those horrid rites & mysteries, the *Dionysiac*, *Cybeliaca*, *Isiaca*, *Eleusiniaca*, and the like: in the description whereof many ancient Fathers

have been very exact and accurate; it being an argument that did afford matter enough to any mans wit or rhetorick; the senselesse on the one side, and the beastlinesse, wickednesse on the other, of those things that were there performed and observed under the name of Religion, being beyond any exaggeration, nay, beyond any sober mans imagination. Had we not seen the like in these latter dayes upon the same ground of Enthusiasms and divine revelations acted and revived, it cannot almost be expected that any man should have belief enough to credit such relations. I shall my self willingly forbear particulars, which no modest reader can read without some reluctancy. There is enough, and more then enough of that stuffe, in those Authors I have already mentioned. But I had rather appeal to heathens themselves herein, for the truth of such things, of themselves so incredible, then to Christians; who might be thought partiall. *Seneca* hath done pretty well upon this argument, in setting out the horror of these mysteries, in those fragments of his *Contra superstitiones*, preserved by *S. Augustine* in his books *De Civ. Dei* [l. 6. c. 10.] But *Livie* the *Roman* Historian, farre more particularly, in his *twenty ninth* Book; who although he speak onely of the *Dionysiaca*, or *Bacchanalia*, as they were clancularly kept at *Rome*; yet what he writes of them, is for the most part generally true of all those hidden mysteries, well called *Opertanea*. They were not instituted all at one time, nor by one man: they differed in some certain

tain rites and ceremonies : but in point of brutishness and licentiousness otherwise, so like, that though we distinguish the founders by names, yet we must needs acknowledge them all guided by one Spirit, stiled in the Gospel *an unclean Spirit* : not as *unclean* by nature, which we know he is not; but as the author of all uncleanness among men; as an enemy, since his fall, both to God and man. Now that these mysteries were devised at first by men, who professed themselves, and were generally supposed by others, to be inspired, is most certain. Whether they themselves did really believe it, is not easie to determine. But by that time we have gone through what we purpose here upon this subject, of the several kinds and causes of Enthusiasms, we may speak of it perchance with more confidence, and not fear to offend any judicious Reader.

The first instituter of mysteries among heathens, according to some, (but indeed rather propagator and improver, then first author) was one *Orpheus*, a mere fanatick, as in our Chapter of *Corybanticall* Enthusiasme shall be more fully declared: and *Diog. Laertius* judgeth of him rightly, that he did not deserve the name of a Philosopher, that had made the Gods (by his strange Fictions and relations of them) more vile then the vilest of men. Yet many others for his great antiquity, and because they were glad to entertain any traditions, upon which they might ground a divine worship, which must presuppose the being of a God, and
im-

immortality of the soul, both which might be proved by *Orpheus*; speak of him with great respect. *Plato* plainly of him, and some other ancient *Theologues*, that they were *progenies Deorum*, (as he is interpreted by *Tullie*,) and that men were bound to believe them whatsoever they said, upon that score, without asking any further reason. A man would wonder that so wise a Philosopher as *Plato*, whose discourses otherwise, where he treateth of vertue and godlinesse, relish so much of sound reason, and have had such influence upon rational men in all ages; should adscribe so much to the authors of such abominable superstitions. But besides what hath already been said, that out of his good will to Religion, he was loth to question his authority, upon which, as divine, many of his dayes grounded their belief of a God, a judgement, and the like; and that himself nevertheless in some places, doth not stick to shew his dislike of some main points of *Orpheus* his Divinity: after all this I must acknowledge, which no man that hath read him can deny, that *Plato* himself naturally, had much in him of an Enthusiast. His writings, I am sure, have really made many so, as we shall afterwards in due place declare.

Now for Poets in generall, it clearly appears by ancient authors, that unto the common people: at least, if not unto the wiser, (though unto them too for the most part, by their own testimonies,) they were as it were their sacred Writ and records, from which they did derive their Divinity, and their

their belief concerning the Gods; as who, and how to be worshipped, how pleased and pacified, by what prayers and ceremonies; and whatsoever doth come within the compasse of Religion. All which was upon this ground, that there could be no true Poet, but must be divinely inspired; and if divinely inspired, certainly to be believed. This we find even by Philosophers of best account in those dayes largely disputed and maintained. The two main arguments to induce them to that belief, were, That extraordinary motion of the mind, wherewith all good Poets in all ages have been possesst and agitated; and the testimonie of Poets themselves, who did professe of themselves, that they were inspired, and made particular relations of strange Visions, Raptures, and apparitions to that purpose: as shall be shewed in its proper place and chapter. So that as the beginning, growth and confirmation of Idolatry may be adscribed, as by many it is, unto Poets, and their authority; so to supposed Enthusiasms and Inspirations also, upon which that authority was chiefly grounded.

I know that what is here delivered concerning those ancient Poets and Philosophers, of greatest antiquity, as of *Orpheus* particularly, is subject to much opposition, because of that respect, and Veneration almost, that both his name, and some fragments of his have found with many, whose names ought to be venerable unto all. I said, fragments; for as for those entire pieces that go under his name, his Hymns or Prayers, his *Argonauts*,
his

his Treatise of the vertue of Stones, &c. as full off superstition and grossest idolatry as may be; it is generally agreed upon, that they are falsely adscribed unto him. I will not here take the advantage of *Aristotle's* opinion, as it is affirmed by *Tully*, that there never was any such man really as *Orpheus*: though it appear clearly by *Plato*, which would make a man the more suspicious, that there were many in his time who made great profit of that common error, that *Orpheus* and his mates, *Linus* and *Musæus*, were descended of the Gods: whereof the poor ignorant multitude being thoroughly possessed, they were the more inclinable to purchase those pretended *Orphical* charms and expiations, by which the guilt of any sin might be taken away. For such they carried with them up and down the countrey, as things of that nature use to be carried: and so made a great prey of the peoples credulity. But granting that such a man hath been (whether Poet or Theologue) it will concern me, that it may be known, that I am not the first, or onely that have so judged of him. Let the

Primi ergo inter Græcos superstitionum magistri illi, Theologi ab his dicti, Poetaeque, qui Deorum genealogias decantaverunt, mysteriaque & numinum cultum tradiderunt, sapientiæ nomine celebrantur, cum hi in nulla sapientiæ parte operam posuisse sint dicendi: suate vero personaeque illam quæ politica dicitur, coluisse videantur, &c. Petrus Valentia in De iudicio erga verum ex ipsis primis

reader therefore if he please, read in the note somewhat that may satisfie him that it is not so. I content my self with the judgement of one: but if the Reader can weigh that one with good judgement, he may think perchance the judgement of that

that one as considerable as the authority of many others.

¶ Of detestable Sects and Heresies, upon this very ground of Divine Inspiration, by which Christianity hath been divided, defamed, impaired, and stopt in his course, Ecclesiasticall Histories are full: they especially that have written of Heresies, as *Epiphanius*, *Augustine*, and the like, will afford examples of all kind. But that which is much to be wondered at and lamented, is, that some men, otherwise of great worth and ability, through mere ignorance of naturall causes have been seduced by supposed raptures and Enthusiasms, and made shipwrack of the true faith, which before they professed. I dare say, and I hope it will not seem strange to them that shall well ponder what we have to say of naturall raptures and visions, (where also *Tertullian* shall be mentioned again,) that *Tertullian* had never been an Heretick, had he been a better Naturalist: and yet *Tertullian* such a man for life and learning otherwise, as can hardly be paralleld by any one of those times; in whom the Church had as great losse, and lamented it as much, (see but *Vincentius Lyrinensis* of him;) as almost it ever had in any one man.

I never affected to be the Author of Paradoxes and strange Tenents: this age, I know, gives liberty enough and encouragement to any that is so minded; when nothing almost is accounted true, but what is new; and in opposition to antiquity. However, as I do not affect Paradoxes; so would

I not be afraid to say somewhat (if upon probable grounds) that perchance hath not yet been said, or thought upon: especially, when *more Academico*, that is, by way of proposal unto further consideration; not of peremptory affirmation, or determination. What progresse *Mahometisme* hath made in the world, cannot be unknown to any that know any thing of the world, beyond the very place of their own birth and abode. Certain enough it is, that the best and greatest part of the world (*America* being laid aside) is now possessed by it. What the first occasion and beginning of it was, is not so certainly known perchance. We are commonly told that *Mahomet* did assume to himself divine authority by feigned Enthusiasmes. by false, we are sure enough, as to Divine Authority: but whether feigned, I make some question; and whether himself, and those about him, that helped to promote his phrensies, were not at first really beguiled themselves, before they began to seduce others. It shall be mentioned again, when we speak of raptures and extasies from natural causes, and bring examples; which will be in the Chapter of Contemplative or Philosophical Enthusiasmes.

So much here in general, that the Reader may the better understand my aim, which is the first thing in every work to be considered of, and so may the better know what to expect, if he shall think it worth his pains to read unto the end; un-
till

till which done, it is but reason that I should desire him to suspend his judgement. It may be thought a curious argument; which I cannot deny, and might well deserve greater abilities. Yet I myself thought it not so curious, as profitable, which made me to adventure upon it. And that our proceedings may be the more clear and methodical, I shall begin with the consideration of the word itself, and in the multiplicity of different uses and acceptions, (as in most others) pitch upon one that may fit our purpose, and may be a good help also to keep us within our bounds, in case the affinity of the matter, or ambiguity of the word and title, should tempt us to digresse, or lead us out unawares.

Enthusiasme; In Greek (from whence we have the English) ἐνθεσιασμός. Now as τὸ ἔμψυχον is that which is replenished with wind; & τὸ ἔμψυχον, with wisdom: so, saith *Plutarch*, must ἐνθεσιασμός in the subject where it is, import a [full] participation & communion of Divine power. We must not expect from Philosophers, that they should be very exact Grammarians; for it will not hold in all words that are of that forme. as for example, ἐμβρόντη; it implies an effect of the thunder indeed, but not a participation (at least not active, but passive) of the power: in ἐμούλη, it is a mere relation; but in ἐμπυρ, I confesse, ἐμπυρ, ἐμμιλ (about which last, there hath been no little question among *Dioscorides* his interpreters :) and divers others, it doth imply both participation and plenitude.

But

But besides; ἐνθουσιασμός doth not so properly answer to ἐμπνεν & ἔμφορον, as ἐνδεος, or ἐνδεον rather. But this is not a thing long to be stood upon. What *enthusiasme* properly is, will be said at the beginning of the next Chapter; and so taken, *Plutarch's* observation may passe well enough. It will be more to our purpose to take notice of *Plato's* distinction of *μανία*, or ἐνθουσιασμός *Enthusiasme*, (for in *Plato's* language they are all one, & he hath a long dispute about it, to prove that it must be so:) by the same *Plutarch* mentioned in the same place. It is in *Plato's* Dialogue which is called *Phædrus*, where he doth constitute four *species* of *Enthusiasms*: *μαντικόν*, (as himself doth afterwards in the same Dialogue briefly rehearse them,) *τελεστικόν*, *ποιητικόν*, and *ἐρωτικόν*. *Plato's* words are so obscure, that it would take us much time to make him intelligible: which I doubt to most that will read this, will neither be pleasing nor profitable. If any studious of *Plato*, shall desire private satisfaction, I shall hope that it may be given to their own good liking. I shall therefore spare that labour, & content my self with *Plutarch's* division; which, although he mention *Plato*, yet I am sure is not the same, neither for the number, nor definition of particulars. I will therefore take it as from *Plutarch*, rather then from *Plato*, whom he quotes. According to *Plutarch* then, there be five kinds of *Enthusiasms*: *Divinatory*, *Bacchical*, (or *Corybantical*,) *Poetical*, (under which he comprehends *Musical* also,) *Martial*, and *Eroticall*, or *amatorie*. All these, besides that kinde of *Enthusiasme* which proceeds

from

from diftemper of body, which both by *Plato* and *Plutarch* is particularly mentioned and excluded. *Plutarch* gives us no other definition of *Enthufiasme* in general, but this, That it is a participation of an extrinfecal & divine power : which is very light and superficial. He faith all thofe kinds have one common name, ἐνθεουαζικὸν πάθος. which whether fo generally true, (except I my felf miftake him, which I think I do not,) I doubt. For I find that fome Greek Phyficians challenge unto themfelves that expreffion, ἐνθεουαζικὸν πάθος, (except we could make a difference of ἐνθεουαζικὸν and ἐνθεουαζικὸν, ,) as proper to themfelves: and they make it a difeafe of the body, which we faid before was excluded by *Plutarch*, and no fuch thing as *Plutarch* would have; but merely imaginary, through the diftemper of the phanfy. *Actuarius* (not very ancient I confeffe) makes it a kind of melancholy, which begins in imaginary *Enthufiafms*; but commonly ends, he faith, in real madneffe. Τὸ δὲ τῶν ἐνθεουαζικῶν πάθος, &c. as I find him fet out by *Hen. Stephen*.

But here I muft crave, though it will not much conduce to that we mainly drive at, the benefit of all indifferently, that I may for Phyficians fakes, being bound to honour the profeflion for the benefit I have received thereby, infift a while upon that definition of *Enthufiasme* which I find in thofe ὁροι, or Collection of *Medicinal Definitions*, which hath been received among many for *Galens*, but difclaimed by the greater part to be his; however by fome adfcribed to a much more an-

cient Authour. His words, whoever he be, be these:

Ἐνθουσιασμός ἐστὶ, καθάπερ ἐξίστανται τινὲς ὅτι τὸ ὑποθυμιώμενον ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς
ἱερῶντες, ἢ τυμπάνων, ἢ αὐλῶν, ἢ συμβόλων ἀκρόσυντες. So are the words

set out by *Hen. Stephen* in his collections of physicall words and Definitions. In my edition of those definitions, which is the *Basil* edition in 8 . 1537. instead of ὑποθυμιώμενον, it is printed ὑποθυμοιμένον: which is all the difference. Most it seems have stumbled at this word. For though I find the place quoted by more then one Physician; yet not in any have I found the word rendred, but fairly passed over.

Which is not much to be wondred at in them that make no profession of extraordinary knowledge of the Tongues; when *Hen. Stephen* himself, to whose learned and Herculean labours the Greek tongue hath been so much beholding, he also doth passe it over in his translation of the words; which is this: *Enthusiasmus, est velut cum quidam de statu mentis dejiciuntur in Sacris, si quid intueantur: aut si tympanorum, aut tibiaram sonum, aut signa quaedam auribus percipiant.*

Of the word ὀπθυμιῶν or ὑποθυμιῶν, by it self, what it signifieth; as particularly, and most properly to burn, or offer incense, or more generally to smoke, &c. there is no question to be made: but what it should do here in matter of divination or enthusiasm is all the question. But for the first, it will easily be resolved: For *Eustathius* (not to mention others) upon the last of *Homers* Iliads, doth plainly resolve us, that there was a kind of divination, very frequent amongst the ancients, by burning or offering

ring up of incense: and he hath the very word here in question. Εἰσὶ δὲ θυσιῶντες ἄνθρωποι (saith he) καὶ τοῦ παλαιῆς, ποιεῖ ὧν δηλοῖ καὶ ἡ Ὀδυσσεΐα, οἱ διὰ τῶν ὀπιθυμιῶν μαλ' ἀνέμωροι. But neither in him nor any other do I find the particulars of this divination, as it was used in those ancient times: onely that the same were also called ἐμπυραιοσῶποι, and λιθανομαντεῖς. *Dio Cassius*, an ancient grave Historian, once a Consul himself, of great command & authority, in his 41. Book, in the description of *Apollonia* a city of *Macedonia*, describes the Oracle, or manner of divination then used in the *Nymphæum* of it. The manner of it was, to observe the time of the casting of the incense into the fire, and to accompany it with earnest prayers & supplications, or vows: & in case it took fire well, the request, (if it were a matter of request) or question was resolved in the affirmative, that it should come to passe: If on the contrary, it neither would take fire of it self, nor endure it, but start back when it was cast into it; (as they write, it would,) it was a certain token that the matter was not feasible. It was open to all manner of questions (saith *Dio*;) but of death onely, and of marriage, it was not to be consulted. Here is no *Enthusiasme* at all in this. But that there were divers kinds of this *Λιθανομαντεία*, or *incense-divination*, is sure enough: and the word ὀπιθυῖν in the definition we are upon, is a clear indication, that this here spoken of was attended, if not altogether atchieved, with strange sights and visions, which for the time did alienate the mind of the beholder. ὄρα and ὄραμα, are proper words to that purpose,

pose, as by *Macrobius* and divers others may appear. As for the following words in the definition, *ἢ τυμπάνων*, &c. as no man, I think, will make any question but that the *furor Corybanticus*, or Bacchical Enthusiasms are thereby intended: so upon some further consideration I think it will be granted, that instead of *κυμβόλων* (as I find it every where printed) it should be read *κυμβάλων* *cymbals*; those three words, *αὐλοῖ, τύμπανα, κύμβαλα*, being often joyned together not upon this occasion onely: but upon this occasion, and this particular subject of *Corybantic Enthusiasms*, no word being more frequent or proper in ancient Authors, Poets, and others, then this very word *cymbalum*. *Apuleius* speaking of these *barbara sacra*, saith that they most consisted of *Cymbalistis, Tympanistis, and Choraulis*: (*De Deo Socratis*, p. 49.) where we have them all three; and the *Cymbals* in the first place. *Ovid* calleth them *tinnulæ* *Metam. lib. 4.*

*Tympana cum subito non apparentia raucis
Obstrepuere sonis; & adunco tibia cornu,
Tinnulaque æra sonant.*—————

Where we have them all, in the same order as we find them in the Definitions; *tympana, tibia*, and *tinnula æra* or *cymbala*. Many more places might be added, for confirmation. I will content my self, with one more. What is here called *ἐνθουσιασμός* by *Galen*: is, in a Greek Epigram of the *Anthologie*, more properly termed *χαλκότηρυγία*: that is, a madnesse, occasioned by the sound of (*Brasse*, for the most part,) instru-

instruments. Which are named, κύμβαλα ὀξύφθογγα: (that is, *tinnula ara*:) αὐλοὶ βαρύφθογοι: τύμπανα ἡχέοντα. No man can doubt of the necessitie of our correction: without which (apparent necessitie I meane,) I with none would attempt any corrections of books, of which (through the rashnesse of undertakers) there comes usually more hurt then good. That the Heathens otherwaies in their mysteries had their *symbola* properly so called, & how much they adscribed unto them, we know well enough: divers have written of them; but not any thing that I know of, that can be pertinent to this place. Of musical *Enthusiasme* in generall we shall treat in it's proper place, and there again give some further light perchance to these words. So much shall serve concerning this definition, whoever be the author of it: whose purpose onely was certainly to define *Enthusiasme*, not in it's full latitude, but as incidentall to corporall diseases, or a disease it self, as it falls out some times: as will appear, when we treat of musical *Enthusiasms*.

I would not be too long upon this generall *Protheoria*, by heaping multitude of places out of ancient Authors, to shew the use of the word; which places, many of them at least, I shall afterwards have occasion to produce under their proper heads, to which I purposely reserve them. To hasten therefore to some conclusion: Upon this foundation of *Plato*, and *Plutarch's* observations, and that use of the word *Enthusiasme*, very frequent in ancient Authors, I shall thus briefly and plainly endeavour

to state this businesse. *Enthusiasme*, say I, is either naturall, or supernaturall. By supernaturall, I understand a true and reall possession of some extrinsecal superiour power, whether divine, or diabolical, producing effects and operations altogether supernaturall: as some kind of divination, (what I mean, will appear under its proper head,) speaking of strange languages, temporary learning, and the like. By naturall *Enthusiasme*, I understand an extraordinary, transcendent, but naturall fervency, or pregnancy of the soul, spirits, or brain, producing strange effects, apt to be mistaken for supernaturall. I call it a *fervency*; First, because it is the very word (*ardor*) whereby *Latin* Authors do very frequently expresse the Greek *Enthusiasme*. Secondly, because when we come to consider of the naturall causes of *Enthusiasme*, we shall find that it is indeed (in divers kinds of it) a very *ardor*, and nothing else, whereof all men are naturally capable; but whether to be adscribed to a mixture of the elements, & first qualities, in the composition of man, or to some more hidden and remote cause, shall be disputed. Of naturall *Enthusiasme*, (having nothing here to do with supernaturall, but casually for distinction sake, or when the case is doubtfull and disputable,) I shall constitute and consider these severall kinds. First, *Contemplative* and *philosophical*: which as I conceive most naturall unto man; so because of the strange effects, of most consequence to be known. It may seem of a different nature from other kinds, and therefore not put into the number, neither

neither by *Plato*, nor by *Plutarch*. But we fhall find it otherways, when we treat of the caufes of it; and if there be any difference, it fhall be fhewed. A fecond *species* fhall be *Rhetoricall*: A third, *Poeticall* *Enthufiasme*. Of that which *Plato* calls *τελεστιον*, and *Plutarch* *Βανχειον*, we fhall make two *species*, *ευτιμον*, (the word *ευχα* is in *Plato's* description,) that is *Precatorie*, or *Supplicatory*; and *Muficall*, as we ufe the word in ordinary *Englifh*, for mere Melody, whether of Voice or Instruments. *Martiall* *Enthufiasme* fhall be my fixth *species*. *Eroticall*, or *amatory* the feventh. Where I would not be miftaken, as though I intended a difcourfe, (though proper enough to the fubject,) or difquifition concerning the nature of *Love*, as the word is commonly ufed and underftood. Divers have done it; I fhall content my felf with what hath been done by others, Ancients efpecially: I fhall find enough befides to make up a chapter, which may be more fit for me to enquire into. *Mechanicall* *Enthufiasme* fhall be my eighth and laft *species*. Though neither *Plato* nor *Plutarch* mention any fuch, yet others do exprefly; and there is ground enough in the nature of the thing, to give it a particular head and confideration. Among all thefe *species*, I have not as yet fpoken of *Divinatory Enthufiasme*, as one: neither is it altogether the fame cafe. For all the reft, though fomewhat divine or diabolicall, may interpoze in particular cafes, to make a mixt bufinefs, as before intimated; yet generally that they are reducible to nature, there is no queftion to be made.

but of Divinatory *Enthusiasme* some question may be, whether there be any such merely naturall.

Yet because some have taken upon them to shew some naturall causes of all such Divination as hath been heretofore in use among ancient Heathens, I did think fit to take it into consideration, though I doubt when I have said all that I can, I shall leave the case very doubtfull; and though my self may be inclinable to some opinion, yet shall think it fittest and safest to avoid peremptorie Determination. Of Religious *Enthusiasme*, truly and really religious, nothing will be found here; nor any thing, I hope, expected by them that consider my Title, and can make a difference betwixt naturall, and supernaturall; which I shall endeavour as much as I can not to confound.

Our last head, or Chapter, shall be, To consider of the causes of *Enthusiasme* in generall: wherein it will be some work, to find somewhat, that may be rationally satisfactorie: having as yet met with very little in what I have read, to help me. But I will do my endeavour, God willing: and my care shall be, to go no further, then may be warranted by true faith, and sound reason.

This is my Division; and according to my division, the Order that I propose to my self. But that I shall go through all these kinds, at this time especially, is more then I can promise my self. Through all that have any relation unto speech (the greater part,) I shall endeavour, God willing: which if I can compass, I have my chiefest end, as the Reader may under-


understand by that account I give him in my Epistle. Though indeed I think I need not go so far for that, since that (as I take it) I may well reduce to Contemplative Enthufiasme all that I have to say to that book, that was the chief occasion of this undertaking. However the work will be the more compleat, if I can take all those *species* together, that have a common relation.

I thought I had done: but there is somewhat yet I must give an account of in this generall view. Any either ancient or later, which hath written of this argument purposely and by it self, I faithfully professe that I know none but one; and he indeed a principall man, *Aristotles* fellow-disciple, and not unworthy of that society: even *Theophrastus* the Philosopher. That he did write a Treatise *περὶ ἐνθουσιασμοῦ*, it is sure enough: it is mentioned by divers Ancients, and some passages out of it are in *Athenaus* and *Apollonius*. But whether the book at this day be extant, is not in my power, the more is my grief, to give a certain account. When I did read him quoted by *Scaliger* against *Cardan*, *Exercit.* 348. without mention of any other author (*Theophrastus*, in libro, *περὶ ἐνθουσιασμοῦ*, ita demum evenire dicit, &c.) to whom beholding for his quotation, I thought it probable that he might have it out of some Librarie in Manuscript, as there be many such books of Ancients, as yet not published, only so to be found. But when I considered what a diligent ransacker of all such books *Meursius* had been, and that in his Catalogue of *Theophrastus* his works,

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collected out of divers Authors, he made no mention of it as yet extant any where; it made me doubtfull. Neither can I yet say that I am out of all doubt, or hope. However upon further search, finding that what *Scaliger* doth there alledge as out of *Theophrastus*, is no other then what is produced by *Athenæus*; I thought it more probable that *Scaliger* also had it out of *Athenæus*. If any body can give me a further account of it, I shall think my self much beholding to him. But whereas *Meursius* in his notes upon *Apollonius* would correct in *Apollonius*, ἐνθουσιασμε, for ἐνθουσιασμων, as it is printed; I think it not needfull. It is very likely that *Theophrastus* did inscribe his book περὶ ἐνθουσιασμε, in the singular, as it is cited by some Ancients; and as likely, that *Apollonius* or any other might quote it in the plural, because of the different kinds of *Enthusiasme*, of which *Theophrastus*, in all probability, had treated under that Title: as many, I believe, and more too perchance, then these we have proposed here.





CHAP. I I.

Of Divinatorie Enthusiasme.

The Contents.

All true Divination most properly from God. Opinions of Heathens about the causes of Divination. Plutarch corrected. Divination in a more generall sense. Some kinds of it merely naturall, or physicall. Our question here of enthusiastick Divination, particularly, whether any such from Naturall Causes. But first of all, whether any such among Heathens anciently, truly and really. The grounds of the contrary opinion discovered and refuted. Pythones, or Pythonici in the Scriptures and ancient Histories. Pomponatius and Tho. Leonicus noted. The Question rightly stated. First of all, a concurrence of naturall causes in some cases generally granted. Some Enthusiasts not only foretell things future, but also speak strange Languages, through mere naturall distemper, according to the opinion of some Physicians. But the contrary more probable, and why. Antonii Ponte Sancta Cruz, his Prælectiones Vallisolanæ, upon Hippocr. De morbo sacro, commended: and this speaking strange languages, as a matter of very great consequence, more fully examined. That some things of like nature, (in some respects,) as Enthusiastick Divination, and not lesse to be wondred at, are certainly known to proceed from causes that are naturall, though unknown unto men: and some things also, though from causes that are known, not lesse wonderfull in their nature. Instances in both kinds. The power of smelling in Dogs. An Example out of an Author of good credit, of a man, who being blind, was a guide unto many that had eyes, by his smell only, through vast Deserts. The power and nature of the Memorie in man, how incomprehensible, and how much admired by both Divines and Philosophers. The invention of conveying secret thoughts at any distance, whether of place or of time, by writing, how admirable a thing. Their opinion that fetch Divination from the nature of the Intellectus agens, in every man. The opinion of Aristotle in his Problems, (some question about the Author;) of the effects of atra bilis or melancholy, a probable ground of some naturall divination. But after some generall grounds and propositions, the continuall ἐκρίσεις, or emanations of bodies, according to Aristotle and others, and the parturitions of causes, (or foregoing naturall signes of strange

(strange events and alterations,) discernable to some tempers, as also the concatenation of naturall Causes, according to the Stoicks, a more probable ground. The Divination of dying men. A notable observation of Aretæus, an ancient Greek Physician, to this purpose. Enthusiasme by vast prospects, and other naturall objects.

IT is acknowledged, as well by Heathens as by Christians, that absolutely and infallibly to foretell things future, doth belong unto him only, to whom all things passed, present and future are equally present. Men therefore, as many as have taken upon themselves, or have been believed to prophesy (a word used as ordinarily by Heathen as by Christian Authors,) or to foretell, they have been generally deemed and termed θεομάντις, ενθουσιασά, εἰθεαστικός, θεόληπτοι, ενθεοι, καποχοι and the like: all which signifie men inspired by God. And although ενθουσιασμός (Enthusiasme) be used to many purposes, as will appear throughout this whole Discourse; yet it is most properly used to imply Divination, such as is by inspiration. And because such Divination among Heathens was not usually without a temporary alienation of the mind, and distraction of the senses; hence it is that both ενθουσιαν in *Greek*, and *Vaticinari* in *Latin*, is taken sometimes for *deliration* and *idle speaking*.

Of the causes of Divination many Ancients have written very largely and variously. All make ενθουσιασμόν, or divine inspiration, to be the chief and principall. *Tullie's* first Book *De Divinatione* is altogether of that Subject. But that is not my businesse here.

here. Neverthelesse, for their sakes that love and read *Greek* books, (which in very deed, if any, after the Sacred, are best able to make a man wise & learned;) I will produce a place of *Plutarch* to this purpose: not only because it containeth much in few words; but also because in all editions of *Plutarch* which I have seen; as that of *H. Stephen* in 6 vol. in 8°. which I account the best; & that of *Paris*, in *Greek* and *Latine*, of later yeares; it is corruptly exhibited, and marvelously both by the *French* and *Latine* interpreters mistaken, who hardly make sense of those which they have, and leave out part of *Plutarch's* words and sense. *Plato* (saith *Plutarch*) *and the Stoicks bring in* (or assert) *Divination either as from God*, immediately, *ordinarily called* ^a *enthusiastick*; *or from the Divinity* (or divine nature) *of the Soul, which Plato calleth* ^b *ecthusiastick*; or by dreams. I will forbear to say more of it.

*Plutarch. de
placit. phil. l. 5.
c. 1.*

α ενθουσιαστικ.

β ενθουσιαστικ.

Of Divination in generall, (that is, as the word, though not so properly, is often taken, for any foretelling of things future,) that there be many kinds which are merely naturall and physicall, some usuall and ordinary, some more rare, and remote from vulgar knowledge, some proceeding from hidden, though naturall causes, and grounded upon experience only, others known (to the learned at least) by their causes, as well as by experience; they that have written *De Divinatione*, as *Cicero* anciently, *Peucerus* lately, (besides divers others,) will afford

afford store of examples and arguments, if any desire further satisfaction in that point. That which doth here lie upon me to enquire into is, whether any kind of enthusiastick Divination, properly called *ἐνθουσιασμός*, and by *Tully*, *furor*, either now known, or formerly practised, may be accounted naturall. Of such kind of Divination there were among ancient Heathens many sorts, *cum furore* and alienation of mind, all; (such as I intend here at least;) but in other circumstances, as in the carriage of the party possessor, in the manner of the utterance, in the Place, Rites, and Ceremonies belonging to it, very different.

But here I must stop a while, to remove an Objection. For what if all these pretended enthusiastick Divinations, by Oracles, or otherwayes, were but mere Gulleries and Impostures to get money; (as is daily practised to this day, though not in the same kind, in all parts of the world,) and to amaze credulous and superstitious people? Or at the best, the subtle devices and artifices of well-meaning Politicians, to compass great matters for the good of the people, (as must alwaies be presupposed,) and their own good content? That this hath been the opinion of some Ancients, (even Heathens,) and is at this day of many learned Christians, it cannot be denied. But upon some further enquiry into the businesse, I hope I shall be allowed to deliver mine own opinion without offence; which is this: I take it to be a very partiall, or very illiterate account or come off, in a matter (as to the cause) of such both
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consequence and obscurity. First, I call it a partiall account. Amongst Heathens there were divers Sects, for which there was as much strife and emulation, as is now amongst Christians of different opinions. The two grand Sects, were of those that maintained the being of a God, (whether one or more,) and his Providence over the world, on the one side; on the other, those that either absolutely denied the very being of any Deity, (which few durst;) or granting that there is a God, yet denied his Providence, or that he intermedled in humane affairs. Now it was taken for granted on all parts that, *si Divinatio sit, Dii sunt*; if any true (enthusiastically) Divination, then Gods also: if no Gods, no Divination. It is *Tullies* word, that *ista reciprocantur*; that they are *termini convertibiles*, as we say commonly. See also, if you will, *Sextus Empiricus*, contra Mathematicos, Περὶ Θεῶν, that is, *Whether there be any Gods, or no*: and divers others. What ground there is in nature it self for this supposed reciprocation, would be an unnecessary digression: my matter will not oblige me to warrant it true: it is enough for me, if it be granted, as I know it must, by them that have read the writings of ancient Heathens of either side, that it was so generally believed. Now as men that are once ingaged both in inward affection, & in outward profession (which commonly go together) unto a party, are very apt to credit any thing for truth that makes for them; & on the contrary; nay some though they themselves know it to be otherways, yet will do what they can, that what

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is advantagious for their side may be believed by others; such is the wretchednesse of most men, where their affections or interests are once engaged: so doth it manifestly appeare to have happened in this particular businesse. If therefore *Lucian*, a profest Atheist or *Epicure*, who employed what he had of wit and eloquence in deriding all manner of Religions, scoffe and jeare at all miraculous relations, which he hath made the subject of one of his Dialogues, entitled, *Philopseudes*; if he will not admit of any Divination, or Oracles, as proceeding from any kind of enthusiasme; it is not much to be wondred at. If others besides *Lucian* and such profest *Epicures* have done the like in ancient times, somewhat might be said to them too; but that we will not be too long upon it. As for late Authors, I would rather blame their negligence in this point, then suspect their partiality. Certainly, except all ancient Authors, both *Greek & Latin*, did conspire together to make themselves a scorn to their own time, by writing such things as generally known & received, which neverthelesse were but either their own phansies, or the flights of some cunning merchants; and to make a scorn of after times, who upon the warrant of such witnesses, accounted grave and sober, might easily be induced to believe such things, though strange enough otherwaies, when it should be too late to disprove them by any visible search and triall: except, I say, they did of purpose so conspire, so many Authors, of so many different ages, and different countries, Poets, Philosophers,

sophers, Historians, and others; it must needs be, that such Enthusiasms were very frequent in ancient times. Neither was it a jesting matter to some of them, that did offer themselves, or were chosen by others to that ministry, according to the severall rites, ceremonies, and conditions of severall places. *Lucan* perchance, as a Poet, may be thought to deliver it more generally, then truly, when he saith;

————— *Siqua Deus sub pectora venit;
Numinis aut poena est mors immatura recepti,
Aut pretium: quippe stimulo fluctuque furoris
Compages humana labat: pulsusque Deorum
Concutiunt fragiles animos.*—————

Lucan. lib. 5.

He seems to make it a generall case, as though all so inspired (in that particular place at least,) did die soon after. But in his time that Oracle was almost expired; and therefore he might the easier mistake, because so little used. That some died in the fit, or presently after, is not to be doubted; and *Plutarch* in his book *De Def. Oraculorum* writeth very particularly of one of his time that did so. But that which is more strange is, that gravest authors of those times stick not to adscribe a great part of that worldly greatnesse and prosperity, unto which the affairs of *Greece* did once arrive, when severall Common-wealths among them, some together, some successively, as that of the *Athenians*, the *Lacedemonians*, and the like, did flourish; to the

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Oracles.

Oracles, and other kind of divinations of those times. So *Plato* in his *Phædrus*, where he disputes that divine madnesse is to be preferred before humane sobriety and wisdom: *Νῦν ὃ τὰ μέγιστα τῆς ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν*

γίγνεται διὰ μανίας θεῖα μὲντοι δόσι διδομένης. ἥτε γὰρ δὴ ἐν Δελφοῖς ποροῦνται, αἱ τ' ἐν Δωδώνῃ ἱερείαι, μανῆσαι μὲν πόλλα δὴ καὶ καλὰ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἰμῆρσαντο· σωφρονοῦσαι δ', &c. *Plutarch*, though upon ano-

ther occasion, hath the same observation, of the many benefits that did accrew to the *Grecians* by the Oracle at *Delphos*. *λογίζομεν ὅτι ποικίλων ἀγαθῶν τετὶ τὸ μαν-*

τεῖν αἶπρον γίγνεται τοῖς Ἕλλησιν &c. Whence it is that even *Socrates*, the author of the rationall sect of Philosophers, because he would have all things as well in matter of belief as practice brought to the triall of reason; yet even he did allow of the use of Oracles, nay commend it, and thought it necessary *τοῖς μέλλουσιν οἴκους τε καὶ πόλεις καλῶς οὐκῆσθαι*, &c. and judged them no lesse then mad, or strangely besotted, that maintained the contrary. *τοὺς δ' οὐ μὲν τῆς τοιοῦταν ὑπομέτας εἶναι δαιμόνιον,*

ἀλλὰ πάντα τῆς ἀνδραπίνης γράμης, δαιμονῶν ἔφη: as is recorded by * *Xenoph.* A- one of his disciples, * *Xenophon*, a famous *πομπ.* lib. 1. both Philosopher and Historian. And I pray what were the *Pythones*, or *Pythonici*, so called because of the supposed spirit of Divination in them, but Enthusiasts; but that the fit or faculty, because more habituall, was not so strong and visible? They were for the most part of the meanest sort of men, women often, neither so experienced in the world, or so perfected by study, as that any could suspect them to deal cunningly.

Such a one we read of *Acts* 16. 16. and such a one

one is *Alexander* said by some to have had with him in his expedition for the conquest of the East; as is recorded by *Arrianus*: and such another *Marius*, in his expeditions against the *Cimbri*, so terrible unto the *Romans*: *Syrian* women both. *Martha* was her name whom *Plutarch* speaks of.

Yet for all this, and what else might be added to the same purpose, (if it concerned us, and our purpose here to be long upon it,) it is far from me to deny or to doubt, that in the carriage of these things, in all places there was much cunning and juggling, much error and deceit, and perchance some particular places and Oracles, where all that outwardly had a shew of Enthusiasme, was nothing but Art and Imposture. But that all was therefore, is as good as to say, that there is no truth in the world, because nothing in the world that is not lyable to the imposture of men.

But now to the proper businesse of this chapter; Whether any enthusiastick Divination might be accounted merely naturall, or whether altogether either divine or diabolick; that is it we are now to consider of. I shall not here referre my Reader to such as either *Pomponatius*, or *Leonicus*: the first whereof doth not allow of any miracles at all as supernaturall, but takes upon him (blasphemously) to give naturall reasons for all, even for those that were done by *Christ*; the other, if not in all points of *Pomponatius* his faith, yet in this of Divination and some others, a mere *Peripatetick*, without any mixture of Christianity. I have nothing to do with

such; and I think their grounds, for the most part, as contrary to sense and reason, as they are to faith. I would not be so mistaken. Here is no question made of Enthusiastick Divination, either divine or diabolick: but whether any such, as may be thought to proceed from naturall causes. Again, by Enthusiastick Divination we do not here understand a pretended, imaginary, though not hypocritical divination, which hath nothing of truth or reality in it, (except by some chance, among many false sometimes,) saving the boldnesse of the parties who are deluded. That such confidence and delusion is incidental to some kind of distempers of the brains, is certainly known; and we shall meet with some examples, where we shall have occasion to treat of such distempers. We intend such Enthusiastick Divination, as by severall Events, and by due observation of all Circumstances, hath been observed to be true. It is a very obscure point that we are upon, and therefore the Reader must not wonder if I lead him about before I come to any determination. If we had to do with them that are Scholars only, we should be shorter.

First then we shall observe a concurrence of Naturall Causes. This is granted by all Physicians and Naturallists. *Melancholici, maniaci, ecstatici, phrenetici, epileptici, hysterice mulieres*: All these be diseases naturally incidentall to all both men and women; the last only proper to women. as naturally incidentall to all, so curable by naturall means and remedies. Nobody doubts of that. To all these
naturall

naturall diseases and diftempers, enthufiaftick divi-
natory fits are incidentall. I do not fay that it doth
happen very often: that is not materiall, whether
often or feldome. but when it doth happen, as the
disease is cured by naturall means, fo the Enthufi-
asms go away, I will not fay by the fame means, but
at the fame time. That is certain by frequent expe-
rience, and by the acknowledgment of beft Phyfi-
cians, *Sennertus*, *Peucerus*, & divers others whom
I could name. Thofe men and women, which,
when they were fick of thofe diseases, did foretell
divers things which came to paffe accordingly, and
some of them (which I think more wonderfull, as
more remote from naturall caufes,) had fpoken
some *Latin*, some *Greek*, some *Hebrew*, or any o-
ther language, whereof before they had no ufe,
nor skill; when once cured of thefe Diseases, they
return to their former fimplicity and ig-
norance. this is granted by all. Where-
upon some, as *Levinus Lemnius* particu-
larly, do peremptorily conclude that no
other caufe of fuch accidents is to be fought, but na-
turall. *Quos ego pronuncio, faith he, non à malo in-
festoque Genio divexari, nec Demonis instinctu im-
pulsive, sed vi morbi, humorumque ferocia, &c.*

Lev. Lem.
de occul. nat.
mir. l. 2. c. 2.

And he doth endeavour to give some reason
from the nature of the Soul, &c. how fuch a
thing might happen naturally. But his reasons are
no wayes fatisfactory. And that thefe extraordina-
ry operations do rather proceed from the Devil, to
me is a great argument, (befides other reasons,)

because the very self-same things are known to happen to divers that are immediately posselt, without any bodily distemper, other then the very possession, which must needs affect the body more or lesse. Besides what hath been observed out of ancient

Fathers, as S. Jerome and others; *Lucian* hath a relation to that purpose in his *Philopseudes*, or *ἀμυσῶν*; which although (as all other things of that nature, as is before observed,) he seem to re-

Lucian. *Philops. Ald. ed. p. 318.*

Ὁ μὲν γοσῶν, αὐτὸς σιωπᾷ ὁ δαίμων δὲ
ἀποκρίνεται, Ἑλληνίζων, ἢ βαρβαρίζων,
&c. *An id potius vult Lucianus,
pro demoniaci cujusque loco patri-
æ, ita demonem vel Græce, vel
alia quavis linguâ, quæ propria sit
illius loci, respondere?*

ject as a Fable, yet by many probable circumstances might be commended, if not concluded, an History: though not with all those circumstances perchance, wherewith, the better to serve his purpose, he doth endeavour to make it as ridiculous and improbable as he can.

But to passe by divers relations of later times, upon the credit (some of them at least) of very creditable Authors and witnesses; I shall content myself with the testimony of one, a man of exquisite learning, and a curious sifter of the truth in doubtful points; and a man of that integrity, that having got great credit in the world for his skill (among other things) in Iudiciall Astrology, being convicted in his Conscience, as himself relateth, that it was but mere Couzenage and Imposture, he made no scruple to make open recantation, and wrote against it very learnedly. *Georgius Raguseus* is the man:

man: whose words in his second book *De Divinatione*, Epist. 11. *De Oraculis*, are; *Novi ego Venetiis pauperem quandam mulierem*, &c. that is, *I have known at Venice a certain poor woman, which was possest: sometimes she would be stupid and sottish; sometimes she did speak with divers tongues, and discourse of things belonging to the Mathematicks, and Philosophy, yea and to Divinity. I do not write here what I have heard from others, but my self have disputed with her more then once.* Thus he.

But because this is a point of highest consequence, (so judged by the most learned,) against atheisme, to convince them that deny the being of spirituall essences; if any desire a more full and satisfactorie confutation of *Levinus Lemnius* his opinion, they may find it in *Anton. P. Sancta Cruz*, his excellent Commentarie (which he calls *Prælectiones Vallisolitanae*,) upon Hippocrates, (if right Hippocrates,) *De morbo sacro*. And as for them, who in those distempers are reported to have spoken Languages before unknown unto them, because I see that some (otherwise learned and ingenuous,) are not very prone to believe it, it being a thing in very deed, lyable to much imposture; although I do not see what can be excepted, or objected against this one, were there no other; this one example, I say, which we have here out of *Raguseius*: yet to give the Reader, in a matter of such importance, some further satisfaction: to let that passe, which, durst I trust my memory, when I was so young, I could say of a woman possest, in *Sedan*,

(where I then lived, and went to school;) that spake *Hebrew*, and familiarly discoursed in her fitts with some skilfull in that Language: to let that passe, I say, because I dare not trust my memory: what can any man, rationally & discreet, answer to that which *Fernelius* (a man so learned, and religious, and by profession, a Physician, yea so great and famous a Physician, as had generally the name of the first and chiefest of his time;) doth relate of his own knowledge and experience, in his 2. book *De abditis rerum causis*, c. 16. of one, that was his patient, and not his only, but of divers other learned Physicians, who were entertained about him at the same time, and all joyned in the cure: by all whom, he was heard to speak *Greek* in his fitts; which otherwise was altogether unknown unto him. *Forestus* also, in his *Observations*, lib. 10. c. 19. from severall authors, hath divers examples: not to name *Langius*, *Wierius*, and others, Physicians all of fame and credit. *Cornelius à Lapide*, a learned Commentator, of good account among Protestants and Papists, upon the 11. of *Genesis*, (if my collections deceive me not; for I have not the book at this time:) beareth witness, that divers *anabaptists*, (a name so generall, that it may include the most notorious sectaries of our times) *bolò & symbolo Diaboli accepto*; that is, as I understand him, when by the instinct of the Devil, (though upon pretence commonly of great holiness and piety,) they have enter'd themselves into that profession; *Græce interdum & Hebraice statim loquuntur*, &c. they (some of them) begin presently

ly to speak, some Greek, some Hebrew, and to interpret the Scripture. Psellus, a very learned man, and Philosopher, a great writer, in a Treatise of his, *Περί ἐνεργείας δαιμόνων*, that is, *Of the power, or operation of Devils, and demons*; hath a very particular relation of a woman, that was possesst, and in her fits, spake the Armenian tongue, very readily, to which, being a Grecian, she was otherwise altogether a stranger. These instances, I hope, in this place may suffice: being indeed more then my subject of it self, did engage me to: but that in a matter of such concernment, I was willing to take this opportunitie. To return then, from whence we digressed.

Though we do not adscribe such wonderfull effects to bare nature; yet it is somewhat, that best Physicians acknowledge such a preparation and disposition of the body, through distemper of humors, which giveth great advantage to the Devil to work upon; which distemper being cured by physicall drugs and potions, the Devil is driven away, and hath no more power over the same bodies. Neither do I think Divination, in some kind at least, (as by and by shall be shewed) so supernaturall an operation, as the speaking of Languages, (without any teaching,) and use of Sciences is. If a man examine all those wayes of enthusiastick Divination that have been heretofore in use, which were not a few in number, and in many circumstances very different; he may observe in some of the chiefeest, a manifest concurrence of some naturall causes preparing or disposing the bodies for such

such impressions and operations; if no more. I would insist in some particulars, but that I would not be too long upon this point, as of least consideration to our main scope and argument. The Reader (if a Scholar, and acquainted with books,) may satisfy himself if he please, reading but *Iamblichus De mysteriis Egypt.* where he describes (in one of those chapters) very particularly the manner of three Oracles, the *Colophonian*, *Delphick*, and *Branchidicum*. *Iamblichus* himself, I know, is much against it, that any naturall thing should be conceived as a partiall or concurrent cause. but the understanding Reader may make his own observations upon divers particulars neverthelesse. However, our disquisition is not of Oracles in particular, wherein I should easily grant other causes then naturall; but of enthusiastick Divination, of what kind soever, in generall; whether any such, &c. Well, so much we have got by this first observation, that natural causes may contribute very much towards it, if not wholly sufficient to produce this effect.

Secondly, because the question is not (so properly) whether any manifest, or very probable naturall cause can be shewed; but whether it be against all reason, whether manifest or probable, to believe that some kind of enthusiastick Divination may proceed from causes that are naturall, though it be beyond the reach of man to find them, as in many other things whereof no question is: this, I say, being the true state of the Question,

stion, before we come to the consideration of particular reasons and causes, I think it necessary for their sakes that are not used to the speculation of Nature and her secrets, to insist a while upon some such things as are certainly known (though from causes to most men unknown and incomprehensible,) to be naturall: and some such things also which in themselves, if well considered, deserve no lesse admiration, though the causes be not unknown. This will be a very good way, as I conceive, to prepare men not versed in such speculations, not to cast off presently for ridiculous or impossible, all things the reason whereof they cannot understand.

I will not take the advantage of Natures amplitude in this kind, as full of wonders, as it is of objects, if rationally & philosophically looked upon. It is sure enough, that there is not any one of natures works, how mean soever and ordinary to vulgar sight and eyes, but may afford somewhat in the cause whereof the reason of the most rationall and understanding may be posed. I will confine my self to such things, generally known, and such as may have some reference to our present occasion. That which I shall first propose to be considered is, that quicknesse and exactnesse of some senses in some dumb creatures, so far exceeding that proportion wherewith nature hath endowed Man. As for example; Who knows not that Hounds and Dogs excell in smell beyond all comparison? Hunters, they that have written of it, as
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some Ancients, and they that practise it daily, tell of strange things in that kind; but who doth not daily observe it in every ordinary Curre? Who knows not, that by their bare smell they can discern their Master among thousands, (an argument of their exactness in dijudicating of different smells, among so many of one kind;) and how they will trace their steps throughout a whole Country, and find their own way home at a vast distance, by the same faculty? Naturalists tell us, that the reason of their excellency in that sense is, because the *nervus odoris* is very great: greater (they say) in a Dog, then it is in an Ox. Whether that be it or no, I shall not here dispute. But suppose that a man, (as many things happen to men naturally, contrary to the common course of nature,) suppose, I say, that a man, unknown to others, should be born to such a perfection of sense; might not he, by the advantage of reason to boot, do strange things, think we, to the admiration of all men that should not know the cause? as for example, disclose Secrets, which no man would think possible, except he were a Witch; to tell who came to his house, though he saw them not, and from whence; and in a good measure, what should be done in it, by day or by night, though he stirred not from one place? All this, and many such things, by the advantage of that one sense heightened to that perfection, joyned with humane ratiocination and wit, he might do; for which I believe he would be no lesse admired, (and even in that kind he might
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do much too, by the said advantage,) then if he did foretell many things future. But this is but a supposition: It is true: but such a supposition, as shews a possibility in nature, of things that would generally be deemed supernaturall. And there be some examples of men that have excelled, if not in this one, yet in some other sense, far beyond the ordinary proportion of men. *Ioannes*

Leo of Africa, a man for his fidelity, amongst the learned in the Eastern

*Jo. Leo Afric.
Deser. Afr. lib.
6. p. 246.*

Languages and Histories, of very good esteem, hath a strange relation, of a blind man that was a guide to certain Merchants travelling through the Deserts of *Arabia*. The man road upon a Camel, and led his company, not by his Eyes, which he had not; but by his Smell, which was so exquisite, that having been acquainted with those wayes before, he could find by the sent of the very earth, nay, of the sand, (which was reached unto him at every mile,) where he was, and would describe the places unto them as they went along: yea, told them long before (which proved true, though not believed then,) when they drew near to inhabited places.

But we will consider something more common, and more generally known in man. Wherein if we look upon the Body, or the Soul, but especially upon some Faculties of the Soul, and their severall functions in the body, we have matter of admiration enough. It is well known, how *Galen* in the consideration of these things was often posed

fed in the cause, and doth ingenuously acknowledge his ignorance. *Fernelius*, who was accounted the *Galen* of his time, hath collected many passages out of him to that purpose; and is so far from pretending to give us light himself in those things where *Galen* wanted eyes, that he makes it his task, to shew us onely that they are things to men incomprehensible. I will insist upon somewhat that may be thought to have some affinity with possession and Enthusiasme. And what more to be wondred at in this kind, then the power of the Phansey, which is able to carry a man out of his bed in his sleep; to make him walk up and down; to lead him over bridges; and to set his hands at work sometimes (all this in his dead sleep) to the accomplishment of such things, as no man otherwayes would have thought could have been done without the use of open eyes, and perfect reason? Examples of this distemper of body (for it is but a distemper of body,) there be so many & so strange, both in the writings of Physicians, and other Histories, besides what daily experience doth afford, that I shall willingly spare them here.

I will insist upon another thing, of it self more wonderfull by far, though commonly lesse wondred at, (as the fashion is amongst the vulgar of men,) because more ordinary, and that is, the power of Memory in man. I know no man that hath done upon that subject better then St. *Augustine* in his Confessions. he hath bestowed severall chapters upon it, not to find out the naturall cause, which he
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profefseth to be far above his reach; but to fet out (which he doth very pithily and copiously) to the view and confideration of other men the wonderfull effects of it. *Magna ista vis est Me-*

moria, magna nimis, Deus meus, penetrabile amplum, &c. c. 8. Et hoc quis tan-

Aug. Confess.
l. 10. c. 8, &c.

dem indagabit? Quis comprehendat quomodo sit?

Ego certe, Domine, laboro hic, & laboro in meipso;

factus sum mihi terra difficultatis; &c. ch. 16. and

again ch. 17. Magna ista vis est memoria. Nescio

quid horrendum, Deus meus, profunda & infinita

multiplicitas, &c. Aboali (to whom Iulius Scaliger

gives this testimony, that he is om-

nium philosophorum acutissimus atque

Exercit. contra
Card. 307. 28.

cordatissimus, that is, the wisest and a-

cutest of all Philosophers,) after he had turned him-

self all the wayes that he could to make somewhat

of it, that might sound of naturall reason, was at

last, by the many inextricable difficulties that he

met with, driven to this, to make a God or a

Dæmon of it, For he doth plainly deny that there

is any such thing in the naturall constitution of

man, as Memory; but that it is resident in an ex-

trinssecall intelligentia; and that what we call Me-

mory, is nothing but a naturall power of the in-

tellektus to reflect upon that intelligentia, and to

dispose it self for the influence of it. Scaliger ha-

ving spoken of this Philosopher and his opini-

on with great respect, as though he intended to

maintain it against all gainsayers, is content at the

last, for Aristotles sake, to bring many arguments

against

against it; which was no very hard thing to do: But as for those difficulties and perplexities, by himself acknowledged, that drove that *optimum virum*, as he calls him, into this opinion, I do not find that he takes away any, or so much as goes about it.

I shall insist but upon one thing more, which is of another nature indeed, because the cause of it is not hidden, but known unto all men: but yet such a thing in my judgement, as deserveth no lesse admiration, and hath as much affinity in its effects with Enthusiastick Divination as any thing that hath been spoken of. There was a time, it is well known, when none of those things that we call *letters*, which children are taught when first sent to school, were known or heard of. It is so yet, I believe, in some parts of the world: but in all parts time was when no such thing was known. If no letters, then no reading, no writing. This might very well be, when men in other things were wise and rationally enough; and perchance had some inventions of good use, which we have not. But I would have any man to consider with himself, if at such a time, some two or three that had been acquainted with the use of reading and writing had appeared, and made publick shew (yet concealing purposely the mystery of it, to beget admiration,) of their Art, by communicating with one another at a great distance (as now is ordinary) by the mediation of written papers, which should contain particulars of the present

sent condition of each place, what is done, what hath happened, &c. who can think otherwise, but that either the men would have been judged more then men, that could see and know at such a distance; or at least, the papers that brought intelligence unto them, to be some kind of Angels or Devils? But we need not go by conjectures; for it is certain enough, by the experience we have had of it in these later times, that it would have been so: witnesse divers that have written of the *Indies*, and of *America*: who also relate what use the *Spaniards* made of it, to beget to themselves, for this very thing, an opinion of divine and supernaturall abilities. You may read of it, if you please, and be not better furnisht, in *Herm. Hugo, De prima scribendi origine*, printed at *Antwerp*, 1617. in his Preface. And if any man think that I make too great a wonder of it, as I know there be many (never born to be Philosophers) who can hardly be brought to admire any thing that is known and ordinary: I could appeal to many both ancient and late, men of great reputation and learning, that have been of the same judgement, who have given it place (and some, preeminence,) among the greatest miracles in the world. You may find many of them quoted by the said Author. For my part, I profess to admire nothing more. I should not think it so much, to see a dead body made to walk by some Necromancer for a time, as I do to hear a man, that hath been dead some hundred, or thousand of years perchance, to speak to me so audibly

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and plainly by this Art. Neither do I think it a greater wonder, that some men have spoken without a tongue, (whereof I read a very late example in *Nicol. Tulpius* his *Observ. Medica lib. 1. c. 41. Mutus loquens.*) then that men should be able so familiarly and readily to communicate with one another at a distance, by the onely help of their hands. We may give men the praise, to have been the instruments and secondary cause; as some, we know, are commonly named to have invented some letters, and some others: but he is much to blame, in my judgement, that looks upon any other then God himself as the author of so great and so inestimable a benefit.

Were we to treat of the causes of Divination in generall, and of the severall opinions about it, we should think it necessary to begin with a consideration of that, which is commonly called among Philosophers *Intellectus agens*; what it is according to *Aristotle*, what according to *Averroes* and other *Arabs*; whether a particular existence in every man, or whether universal in all men; whether part of the soul of man, or whether extrinsecall and adventitious; whether eternall *à priori* & *posteriore*, or whether *à posteriore* only, or not so much as *à posteriore*; and the like. From the nature of which *intellectus agens*, most *Arabs* and many *Jews* fetch Divination; yea and some Christians too, notwithstanding them onely who had the bare name, as *Pomponatius* and the like; but some also that seem to ascribe very much to the Scriptures, as *Bodinus* par-

particularly; whose opinion of an extrinsecal *intellectus agens* in every man, seems not much repugnant to *Aboali's* in point of memory, before spoken of. He is copious enough upon that argument, if any desire to know his opinion. There is no question but if these opinions were true, or fit for our consideration in this place, we might conclude rightly enough, that enthusiastick Divination is no supernaturall thing, but naturall unto man as he is a man, endowed with such & such properties. For as in case of the pestilence incidentall unto men, we do not say that it is supernaturall, but naturall unto man to be infected; though the immediate cause (sometimes at least,) be not in man, but from such and such a constitution of the skies, and such a temper of the aire, to which such a constitution, and such a temper at some times is naturall, or doth happen by course of nature: So though this *intellectus agens*, as many teach, be a thing extrinsecall, yet as (according to their opinion) it is naturall unto all men, that are right men, to have such a one; so both it and the effects of it, (Divination among the rest,) may be thought naturall unto men. But for my part, as I do not embrace the opinion myself, so do I think the disquisition too abstruse for ordinary men: and perchance more abstruse then profitable, for any.

Aristotles opinion is that which I shall chiefly pitch upon; and if he do not help us, I see but little hopes from any other. *Aristotle* then in his Pro-

blems, sect. 30. 1. hath a long discourse of the severall effects of the *atrabilis*, according to its different *ῥασις* or temperature; that is, as it is mixed either with heat, or cold. Among other things, he hath these words: *ἔστι δὲ ἐν τῇ φύσει συνῆσις ῥασις μακρὰ* &c. that is; *They to whom this [melancholick] temperament is naturall, it presently shews it self in the varietie of their nature and dispositions, according to the diversity of the temperament or mixture. They that have superfluity of it, and cold, they are [naturally] sluggish and stupid. but they that abound with it joyned with heat, they are wildish, good natur'd [or witty] prone to love, quickly moved to passions and concupiscences; and some also very talkative [or discursive.] And some again, because of the nearnesse of this heat to the seat of reason, are liable to distempers of madnesse, and enthusiasticknesse. Hence also are proceeded the Sibyls, and the Bacchicks, and all that are truly ῥασις, [so called and accounted, that is, divinely possessed, and inspired,] when it doth not happen through sicknesse, but by naturall temper. Aristotle doth seem to contradict himself in those last words, in that having made enthusiasticknesse ἀνόητος, that is, a distemper, or sicknesse, he doth afterwards affirm, that the [true] ῥασις must be so by their naturall temper. which per-*

Bud. Annot. in

Pand. ed. Lug.

1562. p. 698

chance made *Budæus* to leave out those last words in the *Greek*, where he cites them in his Annotations upon the *Pandects*. But it must be remembered, which was noted before, that *ἐνθεσιαστικόν*, or *ἐνθεσιαστικὸν πάθος* is sometimes taken for a bodily disease; and so *ἐνθεσιαστικὸν* and

ἐνδεσι (commonly confounded) are distinct: *Aristotles* purpose being to say, that both the *ἐνδεσι* through disease, & the *ἐνθεσι*, naturally, proceed from this kind of mixture of the *atrabilis*. But again, If *ἐνδεσι*, may some say, so, really; how naturally? Except we shall say, that *Aristotle* intended to assign a double cause: the one naturall in preparing the body, without which preparation nothing would be done; the other supernaturall, the formall & immediate cause of the operation. And if this were his meaning, then he is much wronged by them who lay to his charge, as though he made Melancholy the onely cause; whereas themselves also allow of some previous preparation and disposition (in such cases) as necessary.

I have heard some learned men make a question whether those Problems were truly *Aristotles*, because they have observed some things in them not worthy (they think) so grave & solid a Philosopher. I have thought so my self sometimes, I must confesse; and it is not impossible but that something might be foisted in here and there, that is of another stamp. But for the generality of the book, there is authority enough from ancient Authors by whom it is often quoted: and for this part and parcel of it we are now upon, there is too much of *Aristotles* stile and genius in it, to leave it doubtfull and questionable. And besides that, we have *Cicero's* testimony, in his first of Divination: *Aristoteles quidem eos etiam qui valetudinis vitio furerent, & melancholici dicerentur, censebat habere aliquid in*

animis

animis præfagiens atque divinum. Except *Aristotle* should treat of it somewhere else too, as I think he doth; though this be the place most taken notice of. For my part, I confesse that I adscribe much to this discourse of the Philosopher concerning the effects of *atrabilis*. I wish some few lines had been left out, that the whole might have been read or interpreted inoffensively. However, because I would not be over-long upon this subject, I shall content my self with what hath been said upon it, hastening to the consideration of another opinion of the same *Aristotle*, which few take notice of that have written of this subject, concerning the causes of Divination; upon which I purpose to ground my conclusion. But first of all to make it the more intelligible to all men, I must begin with some generall grounds.

First, That there is nothing without a cause, but God.

Secondly, That some things are by Gods immediate will, without any subordination of secondary means; and some things though by the will of God, yet through means which he hath appointed, known to us under the name and notion of naturall causes.

Thirdly, Of things that happen by naturall causes, some things happen according to the ordinary course of nature, having their limited times and seasons, &c. other things extraordinarily, (as to the ordinary course of nature) though not lesse naturally.

Fourth-

Fourthly, Nothing that happens according to the ordinary course of nature, whereof the cause is known, though it be foretold long before, comes within the compasse of true Divination.

For example; An Astrologer can foretel what Eclipses of either Sun or Moon will be a hundred or two hundred years hence; at what Day of the Moneth, and what Hour of the Day they will happen. I know what can be said against it, that some have been deceived in the hour, as in the Eclipse that happened 1605. *April 3.* about which some very able Artists are noted to have mistaken; and the reason is given by Astronomers how such a mistake might happen: However it is very seldome that such a chance doth happen, and when it doth, it is but a mistake of the hour, not of the day. In such predictions, though wonderfull to ignorant people, and to some that make a trade of cheating people that are ignorant, there is nothing supernaturall, nothing that really can be accounted Divination.

Fifthly, That many things happen according to the constant course of nature, the causes whereof are not known. For example; the Flux and Reflux of the Sea, the inundation of the river *Nilus*; and the like.

Sixthly, That many naturall things before they come to that passe, as to be generally known or visible, have some kind of obscure beginnings, by which they be known by some long before. Or thus; That many naturall things, by some naturall

foregoing signes, may be known, felt or discerned by those men or creatures, that have a naturall disposition or sympathy, whether constant or temporary, to those things or their signes, though unto others that have not they be altogether unknown.

So, for example, many dumb creatures are sensible of future changes and alterations of air, of imminent storms and tempests. They foresee them not by any ratiocination, or consideration of the causes; but feel some effects of the agitation of causes, and foregoing symptomes, which in very truth are part of the being of the things themselves, not yet so discernable as afterwards. And not dumb creatures only, but men also, by the naturall temper of their heads, or by some accidentall distemper in some member, can foretell, sometimes a long time before, such alterations and Tempests, Frost or Snow, wet or drie weather, and the like; not by the help of their reason, but by some proper antecedent effects of such changes and chances, which they feel in themselves.

And this hath brought us to the main businesse which we are to consider of, and so to come to a conclusion. The ancient *Stoick* Philosophers, who did adscribe all things unto Fate or Destiny, did enlarge themselves very much upon this subject; alledging, first, that as nothing did happen in the world, but by an eternall concatenation of causes; so secondly, that there is such dependance of these causes, of the one upon the other, that nothing can truly be said to happen suddenly, because nothing

thing but had in, and of it self an aptitude to be fore-
seen long before in its Causes. Nay, some went
further, that all things that should be, had a kind of
present being in the generality of nature, though no
actuall visible existence. Upon all which they in-
ferred the possibility of Divination by the know-
ledge of nature. But leaving them to their opinions
as too generall and remote, *Democritus* will bring
us nearer to our aim; who maintained that out of
all things that happened by naturall causes, there
proceeded certain *species* (*εἰδωλα* he called them) and
emanations; not from the things themselves only
when actually existent, (though then indeed most
strong and apparent,) but from their Causes also.
It will be hard to make them that have no philo-
sophicall knowledge of nature at all to compre-
hend this: I do not say to believe it, that is ano-
ther thing; but to comprehend what is intended,
whether true or false. But they that have so much
philosophy in them, as to be able to give some ac-
count more then every child can, (because he hath
eyes,) how they see, especially if ever they have
been spectators of the *species* of objects, gathered
through a little hole and piece of glasse before it
in a dark chamber, upon a white wall, or sheet of
paper; as most (I suppose) that have any curiosity,
have seen at some time or other: such may the
better conceive what is intended. Not that I make
those *species* that issue out of objects, by the intro-
mission whereof the sight is accomplished, to be
the very same as those emanations he maintained;
but

but onely to have some kind of resemblance, whereby those may the better be understood.

Now this was *Aristotles* opinion, and the opinion of *Synesius* too, a very learned Philosopher of later times, that these emanations were the naturall cause of Divination by Dreams, when and where there was a disposition in the subject for reception or impression: which was, when & where reason had least force, as in Sleep, and Trances; and in such persons where reason naturally was weakest, and the phansie strongest, as in Women, weak men, Idiots, and the like. *Aristotle* indeed doth not there mention (neither doth *Synesius*) other Divination, then that which is by Dreams: but there being the same reason, I take it as generally intended by him; or at least applicable to any other kind, whereof question may be made, whether naturall or supernaturall. I make the more of this opinion, though I propose it but as an opinion, because I am very confident that greatest secrets of nature do depend from such kind of naturall unsensible emanations; as might appear by the consideration of many particulars, and the examination of severall opinions, if it were part of my task. Now from all that hath been said and observed hitherto, that which I would inferre, is;

First from those generall instances, not lesse to be wondered at, though certainly known and acknowledged to proceed from causes that are naturall, whether known or unknown, That it is possible, if not probable, that some Enthusiastick
Divi-

Divination may proceed from naturall causes.

Secondly, That such Divination as is concerning naturall events, grounded upon naturall causes, whether known or unknown, may possibly proceed from some such unsensible emanations as have been spoken of: those emanations at least as probable a cause of Divination in Fools and Idiots, as any other that hath been given; as Melancholy may be of some kind of Divination in a different temper and disposition.

What else may be said in this point agreeable to *Aristotles* doctrine, delivered by him in many places, shall be shewed when we shall treat of the causes of *Enthusiasme* in generall.

Most that have written of Divination, to prove that it proceeds of naturall causes, insist upon the divination of some dying men, upon which they inferre a naturall aptitude of the Soul to it when loose and free from the body. That holy men when near to death, have often prophesied by immediate divine Inspiration, is not a thing to be disputed among Christians. But what should make some, ordinary men, sometimes, to foresee, not the day and hour of their own Departure only, but to foretell the period of some other mens lives also, whereof there be divers examples both ancient and late: and not to foretell things only that belong to life and death; but sometimes more generally, many future things, which have proved true by the event of this, question may be made without offence, whether naturall, or supernaturall. First for emanations

tions; it cannot be doubted, but that long sickness in generall, but especially such and such as may have more particular operation and sympathy, may so affect the body, as to dispose it for the reception or dijudication of such emanations, if the thing foreseen and foretold be such as may be adscribed to naturall causes. But secondly, I remember an observation in the Author of the History of the Council of *Trent*, that is naturall unto many, dying, out of some hidden and supernaturall cause, to fall into a great contempt and loathing of all worldly things and humane affairs. But I know not how far I may trust my memory: for I have not the book at this time. The words (the best satisfaction I can give to the Reader,) in which I have entred it many years ago, when I first read it, into my *Adversaria*, are these; [P. 758. that refers to the Latin Translation, printed in *Germany* in 4°.] *in solenne in consilio mortis positis, res humanas ex ignota quadam & supernaturali causa fastidire.* Now such a *fastidium* we know, is an effect, as of greatest wisdom and religion often; so sometimes of pure melancholy, which would bring us to *Aristotles* opinion of the effects of *atrabilis* before spoken of. But I have met with an observation of *Aretæus*, an ancient Physician long before *Galen*, which I think very considerable in this place. *Aretæus* doth affirme, that they that are sick in the heart (*καρδιασποντες*, which is a very generall word, but more particularly intended of those that labour of a *syncope*,) have their externall senses more quick; that they see better, and hear better; that

that their mind is better settled, and their hearts more pure. and not only so, but that the same do foretell many future things also with great certainty. It is much against my will, that I must take any thing upon trust; I see very learned men so often deceived by it; but this I do: *Hieron. Mercurialis* is my Author, in his *Variae Lectiones*; where you may find it, and the Authors own words. I would not give any occasion of offence, by mixing impertinently and unseasonably things naturall and supernaturall, that is, heaven and earth: But who can read those words of that ancient Author, (especially if compared with *Galens*, who hath almost the same of the *vulnerati corde*, but that he doth not go so far as Divination,) but will think of *Esay's* words 57. v. 15. *For thus saith the high and lofty One, &c.* But this by the way only. *Plinie* in his *Naturall Historie* witnesseth of his time, that *Plena vita est his vaticiniis*; that is, that such Prophecies of dying men happened very frequently: which neverthelesse he professeth to make no great reckoning of, because for the most part false. Whereof he doth give a very notable instance of one *Gabinus*, in the time of the Civil warres. It may be read in him: and I am confident that he made choice of that instance among many, as of a thing that was generally known, and undoubtable.

*Plin. Nat. Hist.
lib. 7. c. 52.*

Multos nemora sylvaque, multos amnes aut maria commovent; quorum furibunda mens videt ante multo quae futura sunt; saith *Tully*. That the sight of

*Cicero I. De
Divinatione.*

vast

vast objects, as rocks and mountains, and wild prospects, and the attent consideration of some naturall object in a solitary place, doth dispose some men to Ecstacie, that is, transport their thoughts beyond their ordinary limits, and doth raise strange affections in them, I know to be most true: and if any should affect ecstaticall raptures, or alienation of mind, it is like enough that by the use of such means, with the concurrence of some others, as some kind of Musick, (to such as are of that temper,) they might be procured. But that any true Divination, or foretelling of things future, would follow upon it, I am not very apt to believe, neither do I know any reason for it.

However, I think that man that can enjoy his naturall wit and reason with sobriety, and doth affect such raptures and alienations of mind, hath attained to a good degree of Madnesse, without rapture, which makes him so much to undervalue the highest gift of God, (Grace excepted, which is but a perfection of Reason, or a reformation of corrupt Reason;) sound Reason. It made *Aristotle* deny that any Divination, either by Dreams or otherwise, was from God, because not Ignorant only, but Wicked men also were observed to have a greater share in such, then those that were noted for either Learning or Piety. And truly, I think it is not without some providence of God that it should be so; that those whom God hath blessed with wisdom, and a discerning spirit, might the better content themselves with their share, and be the more hear-

heartily thankfull. And in very deed, sound Reason and a discerning spirit is a perpetuall kind of Divination: as also it is somewhere called in the Scriptures. I could say much more: but it is not my Theme here, and I shall have a better opportunity, in the next Chapter, to say somewhat of the excellency of Reason in matter of True Prophecie.



CHAP.



CHAP. III.

Of Contemplative and Philosophicall
Enthusiasme.

The Contents.

Contemplation; *Θεωπία*: the happinesse of God, (and thence the Greek word,) according to Aristotle: The chiefeft pleasure of man in this life, according to divers of the Epicurean Sect. Lucretius the Poet, and Hippocrates the first of Physicians, their testimonies. Plato and Philo Jud. their Philosophy. ¶ The dependance of externall Senses on the Mind: their operation suspended by the intention of it; as particularly, that of Feeling: and the usefullnesse of this knowledge, for the preservation of publick peace, and of whole Kingdomes, shewed by a notable instance out of Thuanus. Some cautions inserted to prevent (in that which follows) offense by mistake. ¶ Ecstasis; the word how used by the Ancients: how by later writers. Not, by the Ancients, alwayes in one sense, probably inferred out of Aristotle, in his, *De Divin. per ins.* and another Ancient, (in Photius and Suidas) that had written the life of Pythagoras. The words of S. Mark 3. v. 21. *ἐκστατον ὄντι ἐξίστην*, for they said, &c. vindicated from a wrong and offensive interpretation. Ecstasis taken for a totall suspension of all sensitive powers, the effect sometimes of Contemplation, and earnest intention of the mind. Enthusiastick Delusions incidentall to naturall Ecstasies, and bodily distempers, proved by many examples, both old, (out of Tertullian, &c.) and late, (out of Gallendus, *De vitâ Peireskii*, &c.) one very late, in Suffex. This matter how subject to be mistaken, even by men judicious otherwise, through ignorance of naturall causes. One notable instance of it. The power of the phansie in Ecstasies, and other distempers of body, against Reason, and perfect (but in some one object) Vnderstanding; argued by reason, and proved by many examples and instances. A sure way to avoid the danger of Enthusiastick Illusions, out of Tertullian, Not to seek after New Lights, &c. A caveat concerning the case of Witches: their actions reall, not imaginary, ¶ Severall questions proposed, and fully discussed by reasons and authorities. First, Whether a Voluntary Ecstasie be a thing possible in nature. Instances: *Restitutus* in S. Augustine; his words, *Non autem obnitendo*, &c. explained. The power of the imagination. Tho. Fyenus, his opinion, examined: *Idiosyncrilia*, &c. Ant. P. Sancta Cruz,

Cruz, his opinion, and determination of this Matter; and his inconsistency; (as is conceived;) considered of. Giraldus Cambrensis, and his Enthusiasts: Merlins. Turkish Enthusiasts. The Messaliani, or Prayers, so called anciently. A consideration concerning the nature of their distemper, whether contagious or no. Different opinions concerning the contagion of a mad Dog, noted. Secondly, Whether in Naturall, or Supernaturall and Diabolicall Ecstasies there be, or may be (without a Miracle) a reall separation of the Soul from the Body. Thirdly and lastly, (after a distinction of sight internall, and externall,) Whether long Contemplation and Philosophy may transform a man into an Angelicall nature, and unite him unto God in an extraordinary manner, by communion of substance, &c. ¶ That Mysticall Theology, highly commended by some Christians as the most perfect way, shewed to be the invention of Heathen Philosophers. Dionysius Areopagita, the first broacher of it amongst Christians, by some new arguments out of Theophrastus, Synesius, &c. farther evinced a Counterfeit. ¶ A Relation concerning Visions and Enthusiasms that happened to a Nun in France some years ago, examined: and those Visions and Revelations, against the judgement of divers eminent men of France, maintained to be the effects of nature merely. Immoderate voluntary Pennances and bodily Chastisements no certain argument of true Mortification and Piety. That some take pleasure in being whipped unto bloud, &c. ¶ Maximus the Monk & Martyr his writings: Eunapius Of the life of Philosophers: passages out of them vindicated from wrong translations. The Author of the New Method. The Alumbrados of Spain, and the Quakers of England, as of one belief, in most points; so from one and the same beginning: more of them promised in our Second Part. The beginnings of Mahometisme.

THe word in Greek for *Contemplation* is *θεωρία*. the reason of which word may be, either because the highest object of mans Contemplation is God; (*θεός* in Greek;) or because as perfect happinesse doth most properly belong unto God, so doth Contemplation, wherein his happinesse doth chiefly consist; as by *Aristotle* is excellently well, to the utmost of what could come from mere man, in his *Ethicks* and elsewhere, disputed and declared. Who also doth thereupon well inferre, that as that man must needs

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be

be accounted most happy that is likest unto God, so the chiefest happinesse of man also must needs consist in Contemplation. Hence it is (for I go no further then humane reason here, I determine nothing my self,) that your refined *Epicures*, in profession *Epicures*, because they maintained that pleasure was the end (or *summum bonum*) of man; but in their particular tenets, & in their lives too, some of them, upon this ground, that there was not any true lasting pleasure but in the exercise of vertue, and peace of Conscience (of which argument you may read an epistle of one of that profession, among *Cicero's ad Familiares*, lib. 15. 19.) not inferior to the best of Philosophers; these refined *Epicures*, that proposed unto themselves no other end but their own pleasure and contentment of mind, divers of them, willingly bereaved themselves of all other sensuall pleasures, contemned the pomp and glory of all worldly wealth and greatnesse, that they might enjoy the pleasure of Contemplation. It may seem strange to some; but it must be to them that never had any experience in themselves of this noblest operation of the soul, and will believe nothing, though attested by never so many credible witnesses, that is not suitable to their own disposition. I know not in what rank of *Epicures* I should place *Lucrece* the Poet: but sure I am, (and I doubt not but it hath happened unto others as well as unto me;) that some of his verses, setting out the happinesse of some kind of contemplation, have had that operation upon me (as often almost

as I have had occasion to ride, and wanted other company, till of late yeares,) as I thought might compare with the highest contentments they can brag of, that have no other aim or end in this world, then present pleasure and contentment. The verses I mean (if any shall be so curious as to desire to know,) are those at the beginning of his second book, *Suave mari magno, &c. to, Nunc age quo motu, &c.* I wish some good *English* Poet would take them to task; though I doubt much whether it be possible for any translation to reach the excellencie and the elegancie of the originall, when the originall hath so much of both: and better they should not be meddled with at all, then spoiled in the translation.

But to leave these *Epicureans*, whose very name, because of the major part of that name, (those of later ages especially,) ought to be in detestation to all that love vertue and goodnesse: what man so dull and stupid, that can read *Hippocrates* upon this subject of *philosophicall contemplation*, without being affected himself, yea transported besides himself in some measure? His whole Epistle to *Demagetus*, conteining his relation and judgement concerning *Democritus*, who by others generally was conceived mad or phrantick; and his conference with him, wherein the vanity of all humane affairs is set out to the life; is in my judgement a very divine piece to that purpose. The oftener I read it, the more I am affected with it: but that it is still with some suspicion, that the Author of it (no

Christian I know) should be later then *Hippocrates*. But since that by very learned men, and best versed in Greek Authors, Physicians and others, it is acknowledged a genuine piece, I rather submit to better judgements. In one of his Epistle to *Philopæmen*, having first treated of melancholy as the effect of a bodily disease, he proceeds to melancholy as an effect of learning. *Not onely* (saith he) *mad men covet Caves and Solitudes; but they also that have attained to that sublimity of mind, as to be above all worldly cares, that they may not be subject to any disturbance. For as often as the mind, interrupted in its operation by externall objects, would have the body to be still, presently it betakes it self unto retiredness. There rising betimes in the morning, as it were, [the morning being the most advantagious time for contemplation; whence also it is, that the Hebrew word which signifieth to seek diligently, is taken from the aurora and day break:] it beholds round about in it self the region of [solid] Truth; where neither wife, nor children, nor mother, nor any cousins, or kindred, or servants, or any thing else of what nature soever it be, that can make any trouble, are to be seen. All things are excluded that can disturb: neither dare they attempt to come, for reverence of those that inhabit there. For there inhabit the Arts and*

the Vertues: there Gods and * *Angels: there Counsels and Decrees: yea the wide and ample Firmament it self, with all its variety of Starres and Planets of severall motions, by which it is so beautifully decked and adorned*

* *δαίμονες*. The word Angel, for a good Spirit, is used by divers heathens

adorned is there also. I do not expect that all men should be affected with these things. I will forbear to enquire into the reason, which it may be would be more unpleasing. They may make a virtue of a defect, that will forbear to read, so they forbear to censure. As for them that have any curiosity at all for the speculation of Nature, and her wonderfull works; I dare promise them that they shall find somewhat before they come to the end of this Chapter, that may give them better content. But I must take my liberty to proceed by degrees; and I am sure I do not digresse from my subject.

I have said somewhat of *Hippocrates*: how much more may we of *Plato* the Philosopher! whom no man (in some principall passages) can read in his own language, without some passion tending to *Enthusiasme*: much lesse can we think that he could so write himself, had not he been carried by some excesse of naturall wit and vigor, beyond ordinary men. Certain enough it is, that the sublimity both of his matter and language, hath been the infatuation of many, who being but weak, adspired high. It hath happened so unto many, not Heathens onely, but some also that made profession of Christianity. And if his Philosophy hath been a great advantage to Christianity, as some ancient Fathers have judged: yet of Christians it hath many Hereticks; and is to this day the common refuge of contemplative men, whether Christians, or others, that have run themselves besides their

wits : who also have not wanted Disciples, studious and ambitious to vent and propagate the abortive fruits of such depraved phantasies, unto others. Not to speak (as not needfull here) of some of his expressions in his sublimest contemplations: wherein though I can be perswaded my self, that he intended well; yet it cannot be denied, that he hath given just offence to them that are not so perswaded; seeming thereby to countenance some vices, no lesse brutish and unnaturall, then his best vertues and abilities have exceeded, or have been thought to exceed ordinary nature. *Plato* may be read with lesse danger, and no lesse pleasure perchance, in *Philo Iudaus*; a naturall *Iew*, but a better *Platonist* by far, both for his Stile and his Tenets, then he was a *Iew*, in point of Faith and Religion. For a taste of his enthusiastick expressions, in imitation of *Plato*, the Reader that is not better acquainted with him or himself, may take, if he please, his interpretation of those words of Scripture, καὶ εἰκόνα, καὶ καὶ ὁμοίωσιν; in his Treatise *Of the Creation*; Μετὰ τ' ἄλλα πάντα, καὶ αὐτὰρ ἐλέχθη, τὸν ἄνθρωπον, &c. But I would have him read in his own language, or not at all. For besides that most Translations lose the native grace of the originall expressions: in such passages, (as almost all *Plato* over,) no translation can be made without great obscurity; wherewith the understanding being perplexed and intangled, the matter must needs have lesse influence (if any at all) upon the heart and affections. Now when the mind is fixed upon any such contemplation, it is frequently

ly said by *Greek* Authors, *ἑνθεοσύνη*, that is, to be agitated by a divine power, or spirit. It is in that place of *Philo* but now spoken of: and it is in *Plato* too, with some others equivalent to that, in his *Phædrus*, and elsewhere.

All this while we have insisted but upon one effect of Philosophicall Contemplation, intellectuall pleasures and contentments, proceeding from the elevation of the mind above ordinary worldly objects, and fixed upon the contemplation of things naturall, and supernaturall: which Operation of the mind, as we said but now, is by some called *Enthusiasme*.

We proceed now to the consideration of other effects of *Contemplation*, which by degrees will bring us to the main Controversie, beyond which nothing (as to this world) can go, concerning the reall and actuall separation of the soul from the body by it: and to somewhat above that too, the absolute transformation of man into God. To make our way more plain to all readers, we shall first open some points, which may be perchance out of the knowledge and consideration of not a few.

It is a common speech, That *our eyes see; our ears hear*; and the like. There is no need to except against it in common use: yet Philosophers and Physicians that have looked more nearly into the nature of things, except against the propriety of the speech, teaching that, not the eye, but the soul through the eye; nor the ear, but the soul through

the ear; and so of other senses. *Aristotle* in his *Problems*, where he inquireth why the sense of hearing is quicker in the night, among other things, hath somewhat to this purpose, and alledgeth those words, *νοῦς ὁρᾷ, καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει*, (*the mind seeth, the mind heareth*;) as a common speech. Of the Author of those words, and of his meaning, I have had occasion to treat elsewhere, which is not needfull here. I shall content my self with two ancient Latine Authors. The first here, though later in time, shall be *Pliny*: *Animo autem videmus, animo cernimus: oculi ceu vasa quadam, visibilem ejus partem accipiunt, atque transmittunt. Sic magna cogitatio obcecat, abducto intus visu. Sic in morbo comitali, aperti nihil cernunt, animo caligante.* The second, *Cicero*: whom because somewhat more large, though to the same effect, I will set down in English. *Neque enim est ullus sensus in corpore, &c.* that is; Neither is any sense, truly and really, resident in the body it self: but, as not onely *Naturallists*, but *Physicians* also, who have looked into those places by [anatomicall] dissection, teach; from [the brain] the seat of the Soul, there be certain passages and conveyances, contrived into severall pipes and chanelles, unto the eyes, ears and nostrils; so that sometimes, either through intention of the mind in a deep study, or through some distemper of the body, the influence being stopped, though our ears and eyes be both sound and open, we neither see nor hear. Whence is easie to be gathered, that it is the mind, or soul, that seeth and heareth: not those parts of the body, which
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are but the windowes, as it were, of the soul. Lucrece the Poet, opposeth this very much, (*Dicere porro oculos nullam rem cernere posse; Sed per eos animum ut foribus spectare reclusis*, &c. lib. 3.) but like himself; that is, a brutish Epicure, who would not have us to believe either Sun or Moon to be bigger then they appear to our eyes, lest we should in any thing adscribe more to reason, then to sense: and yet elsewhere denieth that the eye was made to see, or the ear to hear, &c. (*Illud in his rebus vitium vehementer; & illum Effugere errorem*, &c. li. 4.) lest he might seem to adscribe somewhat unto providence. Now whether the faculty only, or some spirits with it, be conveyed into the organs; and why, if the faculty be resident in the brain, some parts of the body that are furthest off, are more quick of sense then those nearest unto the fountain; and other like questions, or objections, that may be made: I must referre to Philosophers and Anatomists.

One question we must not omit, because it will concern us. If it be so as we have said, that not the eye properly, but the soul through the eye seeth, heareth, &c. why may not the soul, at any time, though the eye be open, forbear to see; and the ear open, by inhibiting her influence, hinder her hearing? Such an objection is made by *Philo Iudæus*: *Ἐάν τις βέλῃ ὁ νῦν πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν ὁρατικὴν μὴ ἰδεῖν*, &c. Though the mind (or soul) saith he, lay its command upon the sight, (or sense of seeing) that it should not see, it will have its operation neverthlesse upon its object: and so the bearing,

hearing, though the soul interdict it never so strictly, it will hear, if any voice be within the compass of it: so the smelling, &c. But the matter will easily be answered. For though it be the same soul in man, that willeth, and seeth; yet the one being a faculty of the soul as it is rationally, the other, an operation of it as it is sensitive; that there should be such a subordination, or necessary dependance of the sensitive faculties, as there is of the *loco-motiva* (as commonly called,) upon the will, it doth not follow. It is enough, that the opening or shutting of the eye dependeth on the immediate command of the will: but for the influence of sense, the same Providence that took order for the one, that it should be arbitrary, saw not the like reason for the other, and therefore took no order for it; which should be reason enough to us, why it is not so. But if the soul intend it purposely, and shall use Art to withdraw its influence, which it cannot by command; as by intent meditation, or the like; if then it may be done, (as we shall shew it may:) that is enough to prove, that the power of sense is resident in the soul.

But yet let us consider a while; if it will be worth the while, as I think it will. I find it in *Cicero* too: *Vt facile intelligi possit, animum & videre & audire, non eas partes quæ quasi sunt fenestræ animi: quibus tamen sentire nihil queat mens,* (which is quite contrary to *Philo*'s assertion:) *nisi id agat & adsit.* He seemeth to say, that except the mind intend it, though the organs themselves do their parts, the sense

sense is not accomplished. It is not so ordinarily, we know: but whether by long use and custome, some such thing in some senses may not be brought to passe, I cannot tell. For what shall we think of those *Lacedemonian* boys and girls, (a thing so generally attested by so many Christians, as well as Heathens:) that would not onely play, prattle, and quarrell with one another in their play, but also keep their countenances without any the least appearance of change; whilst their backs were torn with unmercifull whips and scourges? Which were used so long sometimes, and so cruelly, that some were known to die in the exercise (for it was accounted no other:) very really, before it could be discerned that they smarted. Which made the *Stoick* Philosophers to maintain, (which also some of them confirmed by experience made upon their own bodies,) that pain was but opinion: and *Galen* also to maintain against *Aristotle*, (I shall name my Author by and by:) that *sensus non est mutatio quæ fit in instrumento, sed à mutationis cognitione provenire*.

I am very well pleased with the occasion that offers it self, that the Reader may the better be satisfied, how necessary the knowledge of these things is, not for the satisfaction of curiosity only, but even for the maintenance of publick peace. In the year of the Lord 1599. was brought to *Paris* in *France* a certain maid named *Martha*, (we had one before of that very name, and not unlike profession, out of *Plutarch*;) which was supposed to be possessed.

fed. She did many things to make the world think so. Strange gestures and convulsions, or convulsive motions rather, she had at command, and sometimes she was heard to speak strange Languages: but that was but sometimes and sparingly; which gave occasion of suspicion that she was a counterfeit. One thing she was very perfect at: She would endure pins and needles to be thrust in at the fleshy parts of her neck, or arms, and never seem to feel it. All the Physicians in Town, that were accounted of any ability, were employed about it, to find out the truth. but being much divided in their judgements themselves, how should others be certainly resolved? The Monks and Friars were very zealous that she might be accounted possesst, as thinking thereby to get great honour to their Exorcisms, and to give a great blow (their own profession: I have a good Author for it:) to the Hereticks, who despised them: by which Exorcisms though they could not, (having often tried,) dispossesse her; yet because the supposed Devil shewed himself very impatient at the hearing of them, they thought that conviction enough, untill more could be done; which certainly would have been the end, if things had been carried with more moderation. But the whole City being so divided about it, that a dangerous uprore was daily expected, and a worse consequent upon that feared; so that the King and his Councill were glad to interpose with all their power, and all little enough to prevent it: the conclusion was, that *Martha* was found to be

be a mere counterfeit. Yet herein the Pope must have his due commendation. For to *Rome* she was had by no mean persons, that intended notable feats with her, and perchance no lesse (so much was feared at least; and a lesse thing hath done it, we know, in some Kingdomes:) then the subversion of a whole Kingdome. But the Popes impartiall carriage in the businesse brake the neck of the plot; for which some of the chief contrivers, though they escaped the justice of men, yet soon incurred the just vengeance of God, and through shame and vexation of spirit came to a speedy death. But before things came to this light, whilst the Physicians at *Paris* were divided about it into Parties; one *Morescot* did set out a book about it, by which he did endeavour to prove that she was a counterfeit, and among other things did very particularly insist upon that point of the Needles, shewing that it was not without either president in History, (by the example of the *Lacedemonian* boys;) or without grounds of possibility in nature; by unfolding the nature of sense, with many curious observations upon it. I never saw the book. what I have of it, I have it out of *Thuanus*, that faithfull and noble Historian, where also the whole story is more particularly to be found. But for that particular of the *Lacedemonians*, I have had occasion to treat of it, and of divers other examples of the same kind, in another place; from which I think so much may very probably be inferred, that where the will is obstinately bent,

*Thuanus, Hist.
sui temp. tom. 5.
lib. 123.*

* See more below, in the First question : in St. Augustin's words, concerning Restitutus.

bent, (to which kind of * *obstinacy*, besides the advantage of a naturall temper in some, long use is much available;) the sense, if not altogether taken away, yet is nothing near so great, or so sharp as it is in others, where no such preparation is made.

However, in the order that I propose unto myself, we are not yet come to that : we shall have another place for it afterwards. In the mean time I require no more here, but that intent Contemplation may stop the influence, and so hinder the operation of some one sense. who is it almost, especially if, naturally, in prosecutions sad & serious, that hath not made triall of it in himself? As for the sense of Feeling, *Erasmus* (whose credit, I believe, will hold with most for a greater matter,) speaketh of him-

Eraf. Ad Chil.
4. Cent. 5.

self: *Et ipse sum expertus in cruciatu dentium aut calculi, multo leviozem reddi doloris sensum, si possis animum in aliquam cogitationem alienam intendere.* Might we believe *Epicurus* of himself, he tells us very strange things of his Patience, shall I say? or unsensibleness in greatest extremity of bodily pains. He would make us believe, that he was at the height of his Contemplation, when his disease was come to its height. Were it another, that had more credit with me than *Epicurus*, I should believe that the intention of his Contemplation, (as in *Erasmus* his case) might take off the edge of his pains: But *Cicero* long ago hath well argued it with him, or against

against him rather : whether it were possible that a man of such principles, could afford an example of such patience: to whose judgement & determination in this particular, (though I make a great difference between patience, as a virtue, and such resolution and obstinacy, which the most wicked, yea most brutish are capable of :) I do adscribe much more, then to *Epicurus* his testimony concerning himself.

Cic. 5. *Tuscul.*
Quæst.

This concerning a partiall deprivation of sense through naturall causes, as subject to lesse difficulty, may serve: but a totall, commonly called *Ecstasie*, or Trance, as liable to more both opposition and difficulty; so shall we more largely and punctually insist upon it, both by reasons, and by examples. But before we enter upon it, I must premit some cautions, to prevent offence upon mistake.

First, whereas by our inscription or indication at the beginning, we professe to treat in this Chapter of *Contemplative philosophicall Enthusiasme*; by *Philosophicall* we do not intend such as is proper to contemplative Philosophers only; of which kind somewhat hath already, and much more remaineth in the conclusion of all to be spoken: but all kind of *Enthusiasme* having any dependance from the *intention*, or *contemplation* of the mind: which because most proper unto Philosophers, is therefore designed by that name; though incidentall unto some, who never had to do with any, (more then naturall unto all, that are naturally rationall,) Philosophy. If this do not satisfie, I desire that my
generall

generall title, *Of Enthufiasme proceeding from naturall caufes*, &c. may be remembred: beyond which not to excurr, but where I give an account in some petty digreffion, is my chiefeft care.

Secondly, whilst we endeavour to reduce divers ecftasies to naturall caufes, the ignorance of which caufes we fhew to have been the caufe of many evils; we would not be fufpected by any, to question the truth and reallity of supernaturall: not only of fuch, for which having the authority of the Holy Scriptures, no man can denie or question them, except he firft deny or question the truth and reallity of thefe as divine; but alfo of many others, which either good, though not infallible authority, or found reason, upon due examination of circumftances, hath commended unto us for fuch. Except a man will argue, becaufe we do not believe all dreams that are dreamed by all manner of people in any part of the world, (which fome have maintained,) to be propheticall, that therefore none are from God: or, becaufe precious ftones may be counterfeited, fo that the

* See Abrah. Ecchel.
in Habdarrhamāum,
De proprietat. &c.
Not. p. 155. 160.

moft skilfull (* as is noted by fome,) may fometimes be deceived, therefore there is no fuch thing in the world as true Sapphires, or Diamonds.

Thirdly and laftly, when in matter of Difcafes, we oppofe naturall caufes to supernaturall, whether divine or diabolically; as we do not exclude the general will of God, without which nothing can be;
fo

so neither the generall ministerie & intervention of the Devil, who, for ought I know, may have a hand in all, or most diseases, to which mortall man (through sin) is naturally liable. But whether it be so or no, and by what kind of operation, is a speculation not proper to us here. No man doth sin, but he is possest in some degree; it is good Divinity: and best Philosophers have maintained, that there was no vice, but was the fruit of madnesse; and I believe that too to be good Philosophy; especially since I have *Hippocrates* too his authority for it. However, we make a difference between personall immediate possession, or operation, which we oppose to naturall causes; and that generall concurrence, or intervention of the Devil, which may be supposed in all that is evil, whether in a morall or naturall sense. So much to prevent mistakes. Now we proceed.

Not to insist upon the severall acceptions of the word *ecstasis*, which are not to our purpose; I shall only observe, that it is used by ancient *Greek* Physicians and others, in a much different from the now common use and notion. As used by ancient Authors, it doth import a distraction of the senses, a violent alienation of the mind, nay, violent, but not fixed or settled, madnesse; by which onely it doth differ from it. Such distraction of the senses, and such alienation of mind, as may be seen in some passionate men in a fit of Anger. As we read * of one of the Kings of *England*, a Prince otherwise of excellent parts,

* Baron. tom. 12.
a.d. 1163. §. 21.

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and

and in his ordinary conversation very meek; but in his anger so furious, that he would not onely fling and tear whatsoever was in his way, as many others; but sit upon the ground, pick straws, and do other such acts of a perfect *Bedlam*. As therefore of Anger it hath been said anciently, that *Ira furor brevis est*: so do I find ἐκστασις in the Author of the *Ῥοεῖς*, or *Physicall Definitions*, (supposed by many to be *Galen's*,) defined, ὀλιγοχρόνιον μανίαν. However, that the word is alwaies so taken by ancient Heathens for a violent Distraction, is more then I can say. For where *Aristotle*, in *De Divin. per insomnia*, upon his former position of unsensible emanations from naturall objects, (of which in the former Chapter,)

gives a reason why † some that fall into Ecstasies do prophesie; to wit, because their senses being discharged from their own proper operations, they are the more exposed to externall impressions: I do not see how he could mean it of any such extasie, where there is a violent distraction, such as was in the *Pythia*, and other, whether men or women, by whom Oracles anciently were issued; as he is interpreted by some *Latin* Commentators: neither was it so agreeable to his subject, of *divination by dreams*, to treat of alienation of mind incidentall unto men perfectly waking: but very proper and pertinent, to say somewhat of *Ecstasies*, as the word is now taken commonly; which have great affinity with Sleep, though from causes very different.

I am the more confirmed in this opinion by the words

† τοῦ δ' ἁγίου
πρὸς ἐκστατικὸν
παραφρᾶν, &c.

words of an ancient, that had written *Pythagoras* his life, of whom nothing is now left but some fragments in *Photius*, his *Bibliotheca*, and *Suidas*, his *Alphabetical Collections*. The words I aime at, are exhibited in *Suidas*, in Ἀνθρώπος αὐτὸς ἐαυτῷ, &c. but must be corrected out of *Photius*; (such was the negligence, that I say not ignorance, of them that last set him out:) in two or three places. There, that Author tells us, upon occasion, that ἡ ψυχὴ, κατὰ ποσὸν τι τὸ σῶματος χωριζομένη, --- ἐν τε τοῖς ὕπνοις καὶ τὰς ὀνειρώδεσσι, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐκστάσει τοῦ νῆσιος, μαντικὴ γίνεται, &c. that is, *that the soul being for a season (or, after a sort) separated (or, sequestered) from the body, both by dreams in sleep; and by ecstasies that come by diseases; doth become propheticall: where dreams, and ecstasies, (as in Aristotle) being joyned together; it cannot be that by ecstasies, he should intend madness, and violent distraction: (which indeed is incidentall to divers diseases, as fevers, and the like, mentioned by Hippocrates:) in which case the soul cannot be said to be separated from the body, as it is in sleep, through the rest of the senses: but such ecstasies; incidentall to epilepsies, and other like diseases.*

I take notice of it the rather, to vindicate a place of Scripture from a wrong interpretation, at which many godly men being scandalized, some have studied evasions, for which their good will hath been commended by others, more then their good luck, or judgement. It is *Mark* 3. 21. where the *Greek*, ἐπεὶ οὖν γὰρ ἦν ἐξέστη, is translated in our *English*, *For they said; he is besides himself*. Neither is it in the vul-

gar *Latin* better: rather worse. The *Syriack*, doubtful. What interpretations, or evasions rather have been devised, may be found in *Maldonat* and others. The *Arabick* translation of all others, hath been thought by many learned men to have lighted upon the right sense. For which also it hath found great commendations among Translations. It interprets the word ἐξίστασθαι, or ἐκστῆναι rather, not of *madness*, but of *fainting*: which as it is most proper to the Story, so not improper to the word. For first, it appears by the ninth verse, that Christ himself, as man, feared that he should suffer by excessive throng: and by verse 20. that they had not time to eat. And what more likely in a hot Country to cause fainting, then a great crowd, and an empty stomach? And besides, that it was ordinary enough in those Countreys for people when they travailed fasting, to faint (ἐκκρίσθαι, used of trances and ecstasies sometimes,) by the way, may probably be gathered by *Matth.* 15. 32. except we shall conceit with some, that the people there spoken of, had been three dayes without eating: (enough to cause faintnesse in any place:) which as of it self it is improbable; so neither can it be collected by any necessary consequence (such as we must have, before we come to miracles,) from the words of the Text: but this rather, (as by learned *Maldonat* is well observed,) that having been three dayes already with Christ, and spent what small provision they had brought with them, or could procure in that place, they must have gone away fasting; which, unto them

them especially that had far to go, (which therefore as a considerable circumstance is well supplied by St. Mark, ch. 8. v. 3. *for divers of them came from far*;) would have been of dangerous consequence. And as for the word ἐκστασις, from whence the word *ecstasis* is taken; if *ecstasis* be commonly taken (as at this day,) for a Trance, and was so anciently too; I pray what is the difference between a *Trance*, & a *fainting* or *swooning*, otherwise called ληποθυμία, or *deliquium*, or *syncope*? I do not say that there is no difference: but that there is so much affinity, that the words may probably be confounded sometimes, as divers are upon lesse. I omit what is added by *Grotius*, and some others. I should have thought that lesse would have served, to have perswaded them that are not very contentious. But I will judge no man. I wish heartily that that Translation were corrected in all Bibles. I would not have it believed, since there is no need, that Christ kindred did believe, or suspect at any time, that he was *ecstaticall*. They might, I know, believe it, or make as though they believed it, and yet upon no reall ground. But why should we give ground to any man (in these *Anabaptisticall* times especially,) to dispute it, where the Scripture doth not? If it be objected that the word ἐκστῆναι is not found in this sense elsewhere, in the Old or New Testament: the weaknesse of this objection may appear, if it be remembred, as by divers upon severall occasions is observed, that even in the New Testament (not to speak of other ancient Authors and writers of

all kind :) there be divers words found, which in some one place, and but one, are taken, & so commonly expounded, in a very different sense from the more known and usuall. We could shew divers examples, if need were.

As for those words, ἐξῆλθον κατέσται αὐτόν I wonder any man should find ground of an argument upon an *Accusative*, and not a *Genitive*, here used: whereas it is well known, that the construction is promiscuous enough: whereof we have an example, *Mark* 7. 3. and *Hebr.* 4. 14. κατέσται τὴν παράδοσιν, in the one; κατέσται τῆς ἐμολογίας, in the other: as by learned men hath been observed. The words therefore will afford either: but I make no great matter of it, whether we translate, *they went out to hold him up*; or, *they went out to lay hold on him*. They that are in a swoon, or ready to drop down through faintness, had need both of outward and inward support: to either of which the word κατέσται is very proper. But again 2. *Kings*, chap. 4. v. 8. we have this very phrase & construction: καὶ ἐκράτησεν αὐτὸν φαγὲν ἄρτον: *and she laid hold on him to eat bread*. There, *Elisha* resisted, till the woman used some kind of force to make him eat: here, the pressing multitude (verse 20.) hindred; some force must be used, to get him out of it, that he might be at liberty to eat. It is not improbable: but neither is it necessary that we should fly to this. I have been the longer upon it, because of the consequence, as I apprehended it; and that I thought this a very proper place.

Scaliger's definition of an *Ecstasie*, as we take it
com-

commonly, allowed by *Sennertus*, is; *Privatio officiorum animæ sentientis, moventis & intelligentis*. very different from the true supernaturall and divine, properly called *ἀναγωγή*. which they define; *Animæ abstractionem à potentiis sensitivis, & aliquando etiam intellectualibus, &c.* Such *ecstasies* (defined by *Scaliger*) to be incidentall to naturall diseases of the body, as *Epilepsies* and the like, is generally granted by all Physicians. As this also: That they are commonly accompanied (in the fit) with strange sights and visions: sometimes, without any further effect; which, for distinctions sake, we may call *ordinary*: but sometimes leaving impressions in the brain, which have their operation out of the fit; so that the party, after he is come to himself again, as to his senses and other naturall functions, yet is fully perswaded that his visions which he had in the fit, were not the naturall effects of a bodily disease, but true and reall. By which impressions, if strong and fixed, as in some, the party becomes often subject unto relapses into *ecstasies*, or *ecstaticall fits*; though the originall cause, the *epilepsie*, or whatever it was, be either cured, or for the present, at least, removed: So that what before was the symptome of a more generall distemper, becomes now the proper distemper of the brain: which kind we shall call, as well we may, *extraordinary ecstasies*. Besides, a man through mere melancholy may become *ecstaticall*; and without any direct *ecstasie*, yet liable to the effects of it, *ecstaticall impressions*, and *illusions* in the brain. And Physi-

cians and Philosophers observe, that there is a double Melancholy: the one that proceeds originally from generall diseases; (*vitio corporis*;) the other, *vitio solius animi, ut fit in iis qui ex nimia devotione, studio, aut amore melancholici evadunt*, to use learned *Fyenus* his words. Now whether with *ecstasies*, or without them; as many as are subject to visions, whether internal or * external, proceeding from naturall causes, with a reall apprehension of certainty and reality, where there is no reall ground for either, but mere imagination; so many we take into the number of *ecstaticall* men.

* See below 3.
question, at
the beginning.

But I will come now to particular examples, by which all that I have said will better be understood. I will begin with an example out

Tertul. de A-
nima, c. 9.

of *Tertullian*. There is a sister wth us, saith he (that is, in that particular Church and Congregation which he used, whether at *Carthage*, his own Countrey; or rather at *Rome*, where he was made priest, lived and wrote a long time, till his errors drove him out of it:) at this day, which hath obtained the gift, (or grace) of revelations: which in *ecstasies* of the spirit happen unto her in the Church, at the ordinary time of divine Service. She doth (in her fits) converse with Angels: sometimes with the Lord himself. She doth both hear and see things secret and mysticall: beholds the hearts of some: (or, discovers the secrets of some mens hearts:) & doth some cures also upon some that come to her. Now according as either Scriptures are

are read, or Psalms sung, or Exhortations made, or Prayers uttered; so do different visions offer themselves unto her. It happened at a time, that I had discoursed of the soul when this our sister was in the spirit. After publick Service, the people being dismissed, when she is wont to relate unto us what she hath seen; (for an account of it is diligently kept, and registred, that proof may be made upon occasion:) Among other things, said she, the substance of a Soul was shewed unto me, and it seemed unto me like a spirit, &c.

Such an ecstaticall woman, that would duly fall into her fits, as often as she received the Sacrament, in *Bellarmin's* time, was seen at Rome, and a great matter (for no great cause, that I can see, if it had been well looked into:) was made of it. You may read of her, in *Peireskius* his life, written by *Gassendus*: who tells us, that *Peireskius* was not easie to be perswaded, that such a thing could happen naturally. And yet *Peireskius*, (as he tells us elsewhere: but how faithfully, may be considered of at some other time:) did believe some things to be naturall, for which there was much less reason. See what is written here, in our first question, *Of voluntary ecstasies*. But to *Tertullian's* example.

Here we must observe, that when *Tertullian* wrote this, he lived yet in the communion of the Catholick Church: and that this particular Congregation he speaks of, is meant of a reputed Catholick and orthodox Congregation. It is true he became a *Montanist* afterwards; or was accounted

ed so at least: though in very deed, he never was of his Congregation or belief, generally; but in matter of private revelations only; which he maintained (though not those which *Montanus* boasted of,) very fervently: and for it being more roughly then discreetly (as *S. Ierom* judged) dealt with by some at *Rome*, he left them, and set up a Congregation of his own, which were called *Tertullianists*: as *S. Augustine* in his book *Of Hereticks* doth declare. Neither was he questioned about private Revelations, untill *Montanus* an Arch-villain, with his two Queans that he carried about with him as Prophetesses, had given so much offence. He was not accounted an Heretick for his opinion here maintained in this book *De Anima*, of the Corporeity of the Soul, in that sense he maintained it: as by *S. August.* in more then one place is largely treated.

What made so learned a man otherwise, to ascribe so much to private revelations, was certainly an excessse of Zeal, which he shews in all his works, ignorance of naturall causes, and the opinion he had of the holinesse and sincerity (true enough in some perchance, as shall be shewed afterwards:) of some of them, known unto him, that had such visions, which were taken for divine revelations. We must also, if we will judge of this example rightly, distinguish between that which *Tertullian* upon his own certain knowledge, which no man probably can doubt or question, doth witness; to wit, that such a sister there was, which had

strange

strange raptures or trances, a thing so publicly done, and so often, yea allowed of in a Catholick Church : and that which he writeth upon the credit of others ; as that she disclosed some secrets , or did some strange cures ; which no man is bound to believe , though it might be granted that somewhat, either casually, or by the power of the phansie, (as afterwards will be shewed,) might happen in that kind, without any miracle. It is ordinary : when any thing that is accounted strange, doth happen, and is become the subject of publick discourse & inquisition, there will be some found that will adde unto it, to make it more wonderfull, though they have no other end in it but to please their humour : most men naturally , and more women, being pleased with nothing more (it is a common observation in best Historiographers,) then with the report of strange things , whether false or true. Now for the ecstasies and visions of this *Soror* in *Tertullian*; I am clearly of opinion, & perchance my reader will be, by that time he hath done with this Chapter, that it was nothing else but an effect of devout melancholy : but not without the concurrence perchance of a naturall disposition ; as a strong phansie, tender brain; yea and some casuall contracted disposition (or indisposition) of the body too, perchance : especially if it were an ancient maid, as that maid is reported by some to have been , (*virgo vetula*, in *Thuanus*,) by whom learned *Postellus* was infatuated in his old age. However, that it was an effect of melancholy , was the
opi-

opinion of *Franc. Iunius*, an orthodox Divine of high account among Protestants. *Fuit autem hoc* (in his *Annotations* upon *Tertullian*) *phantasma laborantis melancholia, non indita à cælis revelatio*. I must also warn the Reader before I proceed, that where-

in I differ from *Baronius* in those things
Baronius a. d. 173. 31. 70. & 201. 7, &c. I have written of *Tertullian* upon this occasion, as I do in some, I do it not altogether upon mine own judgement, (though chiefly grounded upon *S. Ierom*, and *S. Augustine*;) but have also the same *Franc. Iunius* his authority to oppose against *Baronius*, and some others. But this is not a place to dispute it: let this warning serve.

I am much deceived, if that fam'd *Galinducha* in *Mauritius* the Emperour his time, was not such another as this of *Tertullian*. Strange things have been written of her. No part of *Æsops* Fables, had it been written for an History, can seem so strange. But neither indeed do those that write of her agree among themselves; nay, manifestly contradict one another. *Nicephorus* doth exceed all, even the Greek Menologies, in his relation; *Simocata*, more modest; *Euagrius*, very short: but all agree, (the last excepted, who doth only mention her,) in her ecstasies: which I believe might be true enough, and that in her fits she might see such strange things of heaven and hell, as is usuall unto most in those fits. The Reader, if he be so curious, may find them that I have named put together by *Raderus* the Jesuite, in his *Viridarium Sanctorum ex Menæis Grec. &c.*

Aug.

Aug. Vindelic. 1607. first part, or tome, p. 264. &c. One observation only I shall make upon some words of *Nicéphorus*, which perchance were taken, part of them at least, out of some truer relation: *Hæc sane cum graviter à martyrii ærumnis afficeretur*, (I take the words as I find them in *Raderus*;) *urbes circuibat, angelo duce progrediente, neque quicquam medicina doloribus adhibuit*, (these be the words) *nativis tantum thermarum lavacris usa*. From which words we may very probably collect, that she was much troubled with melancholy; since that not only *dulcis aquæ balnea tepida* are commended by Physicians against *maniam, uterinam, melancholiam*, (proper to women;) but the *acidula* and *thermæ*, in all hypochondriacall distempers: though *Sennertus* indeed doth not hold the externall use of the *thermæ* so proper, if the distempered be lean and exhausted, (as commonly they are,) as the internall.

Many such we might find perchance in the lives of reputed Saints: but I will insist in such especially, where there is more certainty, and will be lesse offence.

About the year of the Lord 1581. in *Germany*, at a place called *Aldenburgh*, it happened that a Baker, the master of a very untoward Boy, upon some great provocation, fell upon him with his fists, without mercy; upon his head especially; so that the Boy fell sick upon it of an Epilepsie: whereof he had divers terrible fits, and was twelve dayes speechlesse. Yet after a while those fits abated, and
by

by degrees vanished quite away. But then instead of them, he fell into *ecstasies*, in which he would continue two, three, four hours, without either sense or motion. As soon as he was out of a fit, the first thing he would do, was to sing divers songs and hymns, (though it was not known that he had ever learned any,) very melodiously. From this singing he would now and then passe abruptly to some strange relations, but especially of such & such, lately dead, whom he had seen in Paradise: and then fall to singing again. But when he was perfectly come to himself, and had left singing, then would he sadly and with much confidence maintain, That he had been, not upon his bed, as they that were present would make him believe; but in heaven with his Heavenly Father, having been carried thither by Angels, and placed in a most pleasant green, where he had enjoyed excessive happinesse, and had seen things that he could not expresse; &c. The same Boy when he foresaw his fit coming upon him, he would say, that now the Angels were ready to carry him away. There were divers relations made of him at that time: but that which I have here, I have it from *Joh. Coboldus*, a Doctor of Physick of the same Town: Divers Epistles of whom, both of his judgement, and of the particulars in point of relation, are to be seen in a book intituled *Historia admiranda & prodigiosa Apollonia Schriera &c.* containing severall relations concerning certain persons, maids especially, in severall ages and places, but of late years and in *Germany* chiefly; which af-
ter

ter diligent observation made by learned Divines and Physicians, and long custody in the hands, or by the appointment of Magistrates, have been known, and approved to live divers years without either eating or drinking; set out by one *Paul. Lentulus*, a Doctor of Physick, printed *Bernæ Helvetiorum*, anno Dom. 1604. *Thuanus* also in his History, hath most of them, with some notable particulars, not found in this Collection; not to mention Physicians, as *Sennertus*, *Quercetanus*, and others, who write of the same. But to return to the Boy: That learned Doctor his opinion there is, that they were *symptomata morbi melancholici*, occasioned by the Epilepsie. For that it is naturall to those that have been epilepticall, to fall into melancholy, besides his own experience, he proves out of *Hippocrates*. But because this Boy besides his visions, was also reported, and believed commonly, to prophesie many things: the Doctor doth acknowledge himself posed in that, and professeth to doubt, that besides Nature, there might be some operation of the Devil concurring. Wherein neverthelesse he seemeth afterwards to have altered his opinion, and to adscribe all partly to Nature, (Ecstasies and Visions,) and partly (Prophecies,) to Art and Imposture: not only because the Boy had alwaies been an arrant Rogue, (for his age,) and very subtle and cunning; but also because when he was removed to another house, and more carefully watched, his prophecies did vanish; yea and his ecstasies too (after a while) as he seemeth to intimate.

In

In the same book there is another relation of an ecstaticall Maid in *Friburg* (in *Misnia*; for there is another *Friburg* in *Helvetia*, and a third too, elsewhere;) with the judgement of *Paulus Eberus*, a *Lutheran* Divine, a man of great fame in those dayes. It doth not appear that this maid had any discoverable epilepsie at all, but began at the very first with ecstasies and visions. After her fits, she was full of religious discourse, most in the nature of Sermons, and godly Exhortations: so that she was generally apprehended to be inspired, and her speeches were published in print, under the name of divine Prophecies and Warnings. *Paulus Eberus* was much against it: and though he durst not, against the publick voice, affirm that there was nothing of Gods spirit in all that she said; yet in effect, he doth plainly enough declare his judgement to be, that the maid did *laborare epilepsia*, &c. that her ecstasies were epilepticall fits, but of a more gentle & remiss kind of Epilepsie then is ordinary: and as for her godly speeches, that they were the effects of a godly education, frequent hearing of the Word, intent and assiduous meditation, and the like. which it seems, upon diligent enquire, he had found to be her case. This happened in the year of the Lord 1560.

Before I proceed further, I will here insert somewhat, that happened among us here very lately. In September last, on the fifteenth day, there was a Court kept at a place called *Bosam*, not above one mile or two from *Chichester* in *Sussex*: where a worthy Gentleman, and my very good friend, is Steward

ard to the right Honourable (to whom I wish all increase of Honour, that his *noble & vertuous* mind, whereof my self have had some experience, doth deserve :) *GEORGE BERKLEY*. I happened to be there: and saw there, before I went away, and spake with him, one *John Carpenter*, of the same parish and tything, where I now dwell and write, between a Yeoman and a Labourer. I observed no alteration at all in the man, having had in the Summer moneths often occasion to speak with him, about some commodities which he sold, and I wanted, for winter provision. The very next day in the morning a daughter of his was at my door; though not to speak with me, but with some others in the house. I happened to open her the door, and observing by her eyes and speech, that she was troubled, I inquired, and understood by her, that she was sent to procure some body to go to the Minister of the Parish; her father (she said) not being sick bodily, but talking very strangely of strange things that he had seen, so that they could not tell what to make of it. After that the maid had done her errand, and was gone; although I have been very careful ever since I came hither, not to meddle with any businesses of the Parish; but especially not with any thing that belongeth to a spirituall charge, wherein I know how much it concerned my peace and quietnesse not to intermeddle: yet partly charity, (because the Minister lived in another Parish, at some distance:) and partly curiosity, led me towards the house. When I was come near, before I

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would

would go further, I sent one of purpose to know who were there, and whether my coming would be well taken. Whereupon some coming out to me, and desiring me, I went with them, and found the man in a low room walking. I observed nothing, not even then, either in his eyes, or voice, or motion, either so quick, or so loud, that seemed extraordinary. As soon as I was come in, after some expressions of his good acceptance of my presence, he began a relation of visions and raptures, to this effect: That in the night, God had taken him under the arm, (wherein he was very punctuall in all the particulars:) and first had lift him to heaven, where he had seen the joys of Paradise, the glory of God, &c. then carried him to hell, where he had seen such and such things. He was very plentifull of discourse to that purpose: but my mind was so intent upon the generall, that I did not much heed particulars: neither indeed did I then think that I should ever have this occasion, to remember any thing that he had said. And it is observable, that even the night before, by his relation to his wife and children in the morning, he had had the same phancies, or very like. He expressed much sense of his former errors of his life, and as much joy that God had been so gracious unto him; not for himself only, but for others also; not doubting but many thousands (those very words he used,) would be converted unto God by his ministry & revelations. This he spake so zealously, that he fell upon his knees in the middle of the room, to give God thanks,

thanks, but rose again very soon of his own accord. I commended his zeal and good intentions for others, congratulated unto him the good use that he had made of what had happened unto him for the comfort of his own soul. But when I endeavoured, as gently as I could, to make him understand that he was in some distemper of body, which would require some help; he had not patience to hear me; wondred at my incredulity, if I mistrusted the truth of his relations, or the power of God; and began by degrees to be so hot and earnest, that I judged it altogether impertinent to reason with him any longer. And because I knew the man was no contemplative man, by his profession, nor observed so zealous in point of religion, above others, in his life, that this could probably happen unto him (in which case, though his melancholy would have been more incurable, yet his life in lesse danger:) through pure contemplative melancholy: I concluded with my self, that it was an effect of some great bodily distemper, which would in time shew it self. To that purpose I spake with his wife by her self, (out of his sight, I mean, but in the presence of some others,) and earnestly advised her speedily to repair to some Physician: for that her husband, I thought, though little sign of it yet, would be very sick; and that I feared he would before long be very outrageous, and would want good keeping, both for his own, and their safety that should be about him. This is all the sight I had of the man since his distemper, whilest he was yet

to be seen. Only the next day I met his wife in the street casually, very sad: and was again very earnest with her, that she would do somewhat speedily, and lose no time. What she did, or any others that had to do with him, I cannot give an account. It was reported, that they had given him some strong water, to comfort his heart and strengthen his brain: but I have heard it denied. On the third day, being a Sunday, or Lords day, a woman was sent for, which was reported to have good skill, & to have done some cures upon some, committed unto her in the like case. She would speedily have let him blood, as I have heard, (for by this he was grown very outrageous and violent,) and plyed him with other things which she judged proper to his case, to allay his heat, procure sleep, &c. But some of the good women of the Parish, that were there met together, (of the inferior sort,) had, according to their learning and wisdom, concluded among themselves, that the poor man was possessed, & consequently, that if the woman did take upon her to drive out Devils, she must be a witch: that they must not lose a soul (O wisdoms!) to save a body. Certainly it is, that the woman was driven out of the house, (though she lay in the Parish that night,) by their insolent language and carriage: and as certain, that the poor man, being in a high fever, & having spent himself in such violent actions and speeches, as are usuall to men in that case, having none about him but those that were employed to hold him, and to give him drink as often as he called for it, died that very night.

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But for ignorant people to be bold & confident, & in their confidence to deceive themselves and others, is no wonder at all. a man needs but open his eyes, to see such sights at every door. That which I (not without some indignation sometimes) have wondred at, is; that even learned men, yea men of great fame and credit in the world for their parts and performances in other kinds, have in this particular of Ecstasies and Raptures, been so apt in all ages to be gulled. We had an example before in *Tertullian*, in whom it might seem the more wonderfull, because himself had observed it of some others (lapsed into heresie by it) before him, and condemned them for it. We might find divers instances, with little seeking, if need were. but of all that I have read or known in that kind, I shall pitch upon one above the rest, and make some observations upon it, which may be of some use. That contemplative men, wise and sober otherwise, should become ecstaticall themselves, being subject to all infirmities incidentall to flesh and bloud, as well as others; and by their authority (though in that case, not to be accounted the same men as before,) should deceive others of lesse learning and judgement, is no strange thing: but that any sober, wise, and learned, whilst sober, wise, and learned, should at any time be liable to the delusions of ignorant and silly people, is not so easie to be believed by them that do not know, that all sciences have their bounds; & that it is very possible, that a man should excell in some one, or more faculties, who yet may

be very defective in some other knowledge, not lesse necessary perchance, though lesse regarded, or known. I shall be beholding to a Jesuit for the relation, to whom we are beholding for many other relations, wherein he hath approved his fidelity unto many. But however, there is no ground of suspicion in this relation, why we should like it the worse because it comes from a Iesuite. *Iosephus Acosta* is the man; a *Spaniard* by birth: among whom I believe, if not such examples, yet raptures and ecstasies in generall, because naturally devout and contemplative, to be frequent enough. I shall set down his words at large, partly because of the observation I intend upon them, to give the Reader the better satisfaction; & partly because I doubt that the book is not so ordinarily known among us.

Jos. Acosta, de
temporibus no-
vis. lib. 2. c. 11.
Rom. ed. 1590.
p. 54. &c.

There was (saith Acosta,) in this very Kingdome of Peru (where himself was once *Præpositus Generalis*,) a man of great esteem in those dayes, a learned Divine and Professor (or Doctor) of Divinity. The same also accounted religious and orthodox: yea, in a manner, the Oracle, for his time, of this other world, [America.] This man being grown familiar with a certain muliercula [or, plain woman,] which as another *Philumena*, or *Maximilla* that *Montanus* carried about, boasted of her self, that she was taught by an Angell certain great mysteries; and would also fall, (or feign it at least) into trances and raptures, which carried her quite besides her self: he

was at last so bewitched and captivated by her, that he did not stick to referre unto her concerning highest points of Divinity; entertain her answers, as Oracles; blaze her abroad, as a woman full of revelations; and very dear unto God; though in very deed a woman, as of mean fortune, so of as mean a capacitie otherwise, except it were to forge lies. This woman then, whether really possesse of the Devil, which is most likely, because of those ecstasies; or whether she acted it with art & cunning, as some learned men suspected; because she told him strange things concerning himself, that should come to passe, which his phansie made yet greater: he did certainly the more willingly apply himself unto her, to be her disciple, whose ghostly Father he had been before. To be short; he came at last to that, that he would take upon himself to do miracles, & did verily think that he did, when in very deed there was no ground at all for any such thought. For which, and for certain propositions contrary to the Faith, he had received from his Prophetesse, he was at last, by order of the Iudges of the holy Inquisition, to the great astonishment of this whole Kingdome, apprehended, and put in prison: where for the space of five years he was heard, tolerated, examined: untill at last his incomparable pride & madnesse was made known unto all men. For whereas he pretended with all possible confidence and pertinacy, that he had a private Angel, of whom he learned whatsoever he desired; yea, that he had been intimate with God himself, and conferred with him personally: he would utter such fopperies as none would believe could proceed from any that were not

stark mad: yet in very truth, the man was in perfect sense, as to soundness of brain; as perfect as I my self can think my self, at this time now writing of him. Very sadly and soberly therefore he would affirm, that he should be a King: yea, and Pope too; the Apostolicall See being translated to those parts: as also that holiness was granted unto him above all Angels, and heavenly hosts, and above all Apostles: yea that God had made profer unto him of hypostaticall union, but that he refused to accept of it. Moreover, that he was appointed to be Redeemer of the world, as to matter of efficacy: which Christ, he said, had been no further then to sufficiency only. That all Ecclesiasticall estate was to be abrogated; and that he would make new laws, plain and easie, by which the Cœlibatus (or restraint of Marriage) of Clergie-men should be taken away, multitude of wives allowed, and all necessity of confession avoided. These things, and other things of that nature he would affirme with such earnest confidence, as we were all amazed, that any man could be in his right wits that held such opinions. In fine, after the examination of his actions, & hereticall propositions, to the number of a hundred and ten and upwards, either hereticall all, or at least not agreeable to the sound doctrine of the Church; as the manner of that High Court is, we were appointed to dispute with him, if possibly we might reduce him to sobriety. We were three in all, besides the Bishop of Quinto, that met before the Iudges about it. The man being brought in, did plead his cause with that liberty and eloquence of speech, that I stand amazed to this day, that mere
pride

pride ſhould bring a man unto this. He acknowledged that his Doctrine, becauſe above all humane reaſon, could not be proved but by Scripture, and Miracles. As for Scripture; that he had proved the truth of it by teſtimonies taken from thence, more clear & more pregnant, then ever Paul had proved Ieſus Chriſt to be the true Meſſias by. As for Miracles; that he had done ſo many and ſo great, that the Reſurrection of Chriſt it ſelf was not a greater Miracle. For that he had been dead verily and truly, and was riſen again; and that the truth of it had been made apparent unto all. All this while, though he had never a book in the Priſon, ſo that even his Breviary was taken away from him, he did quote places of Scripture out of the Prophets, the Apocalyps, the Pſalms, and other books, ſo many and ſo long, that his very memory cauſed great admiration. But theſe places he did ſo apply to his phanſies, and did ſo allegorize them, that any that heard him muſt needs either weep or laugh. But laſtly, if we did yet require Miracles, that he was ready to be tried by them. And this he ſpoke as either certainly mad himſelf, or accounting us all mad. For that by revelation it was come to his knowledge, he ſaid, that the Sereniſſimus Iohn of Auſtria was vanquiſhed by the Turks upon the Seas: that Philip the moſt puiſſant King of Spain, had loſt moſt part of his Kingdome: that a Council was held at Rome, about the depoſition of Pope Gregory, and another to be choſen in his place. That he told us theſe things, whereof we had had certain intelligence, becauſe we might be ſure that they could not be known unto himſelf, but by immediate divine revelation. All which

which things, though they were so false that nothing could be more, yet still were they affirmed by him, as certainly known unto us. But at last, having disputed with him two dayes to no effect at all, being led out, with some others (as the fashion is in Spain) to be made a publick Spectacle; he ceased not to look up to Heaven, expecting (as it seems the Devil had promised him,) that fire would come to consume both Inquisitors, and Spectators all. But in very deed, no such fire came from above; but a flame came from below, which seized upon this pretended King, and Pope, and Redeemer, and new Law-giver, and quickly did reduce him into ashes.

In this relation, the first thing I shall take notice of, which to me seemeth very strange, is, that neither *Acosta* himself, nor any of those grave men and Judges by him mentioned, did seem to know, that there is a sober kind of distraction or melancholy: not such only wherein the brain is generally affected to all objects equally; never outrageous, nor out of reason, as it were, to outward appearance; but also where the distemper is confined to some one object or other, the brain being otherwise very sound and sober upon all other objects and occasions. I need not go so farre as *Aristotle* for an instance, though to be found in him, or at least, in that book that beareth his name, *Περὶ τῆς θαυμασιᾶν ἀνοησίας*. which by *Horace*,

————— *Fuit haud ignobilis Argis,*
Qui se credebat, &c. —————

is very elegantly rendred in *Latin* verses. We need not go so far, either for an instance, or for his authority: there is not any Phyfician, either ancient or late, that treateth of Melancholy, but doth both acknowledge it, and hath severall examples. *Laurentius* in his treatise *Of melancholick diseases*, hath one whole Chapter of examples, whereof some were of his owne time & knowledge. As that of a Noble-man, that otherwise had his senses very perfect, & would discourse (as *Laurentius* observeth) of any subject very rationally; but that he was perswaded that he was glasse; would keep himself still in a chair; and though he loved to be visited, yet was very much afraid of his friends, when they came to him, lest they should come too near him. And of another, a Poet, yet then alive when he wrote, and not yet cured, who was perswaded that all men that came near him, smelt of a certain ointment that had been used about him in a fever, to make him sleep; which he did ever since extremely detest and abhorre: in-
somuch that no man might speak to him, but at a distance: & if any man had touched him, he would cast away his cloaths, & never wear them again. Yet in all other things, saith my Author, very rationally, and as good a Poet as ever. *Fyenus* also out of divers authors, hath divers examples in his Treatise *De viribus imaginationis*. *Sennertus* treats of it, lib. 1. part. 2. c. 8. de melancholia in genere: wherein *Aretæus*, an ancient Phyfician, his words are, *In melancholia, in unanare aliqua est lapsus; constante in reliquis judicio*. He hath a merry example out of *Huartus* his *Examen*
de

de Ingen. of one, a Noble-mans foot-boy in *Italy* that thought himself a Monarch. But *Laurentius*, in the forenamed Treatise and Chapter, professeth to forbear of purpose such instances, because so common and obvious. Indeed, I remember to have read in *Antony du Verdier* his *Divers Readings*, two notable examples: the one of an ordinary serving-man, that thought himself Pope; the other of a Groom, that belonged to an *Italian* Noble-man, who thought himself Emperour, and at a certain hour of the day would lock himself in a chamber privately, there place himself in a chair of State, such as himself had erected to that purpose, give answers to Embassadours of severall Nations, make speeches upon divers subjects, (some of which speeches were taken clancularly, there inserted;) and perform many other acts to the same purpose. I myself in my life time, have known one, (yet alive for ought I know,) who upon apprehension of great wrong done unto him by some in Authority, fell into some hypochondriacall conceits much of that nature. sober and discreet otherwise, in all his conversation: only upon that subject he would be very earnest; and if opposed, grow fierce. A man might have conversed with him long enough, before he should have discovered any thing; for he was purposely very reserved: and except a man had been acquainted with his case by others, not apt of himself to fall upon it: so much command he had of himself, notwithstanding his melancholy. But I knew him very familiarly, and therefore can speak
of

of him with more confidence. I mentioned *Aristotle*, at the beginning, concerning Melancholy confined to a particular Object. Though I did not think it needfull to make use of his instance, yet that instance of his puts me in mind of a strange case, not unworthy to be related: of a kind of tragicall, or poeticall Melancholy, that is reported to have happened unto many together, almost to a whole town, at onetime. *Lucian* is my Author, a man otherwise not very apt to believe strange things: a right Infidell in most things, as well to all Natures wonders, as to supernaturall and divine. And he tells it in good earnest, in a very serious discourse of his, *Of the conditions of a true History*, at the very beginning of it. Most of the town *Abdera* (in *Greece*) in such a mans reign, as is there expressed, fell into a kind of Fevers at one time. At the seventh day, some bleeding at the nose, some sweating in their bodies very plentifully, were quitted of their agues: but became (in a degree) maddish of the stage, and were perpetually acting some part of a Tragedy. *Lucian's* opinion upon it (if it were his own, and not part of his History;) is very probable. There was an excellent Tragedian in the Town, who had lately represented a play called *Andromede*. It was in the very middle of Sommer; and it happened to be an extraordinary hot day. So that partly with hearing with great intention of mind, and thronged besides in their bodies, most of them probably, at such a concourse of the whole town, it is no wonder if they fell into fevers: and in their fevers, (as it is very naturall,)

naturall,) what they had so lately heard with great admiration, occurring to their minds, and making (as at such a time, when the spirits are quickned by the heat of the fever, is most naturall too,) great impression; no wonder if the effects of that impression continued, even after the fever, for a long time: till the winter time, and a very great frost that happened, wiped it away. I cannot warrant the truth of this relation, otherwise then as I have said. but other things of the same nature I can, and shall impart to the Reader, which will be warranted by good authority; which I my self wonder at much more, and yet can give some reasons to my self, why I can believe them possible and true. It seemeth strange unto me, that this conceited Melancholy, being nothing else but mere conceit, (in common opinion,) should have so reall an operation upon the senses, as in some cases it hath. *Zacuthus Lusitanus*, for example, tells of one, that phansied unto himself that he was very cold; bemoned himself both night and day, and would have cast himself into the fire many times, had not he been bound with chains to keep him from it: being perswaded, except his body were burnt, he should never be warm. At last he was cured (*Zacuthus* himself did the cure:) by an excessive artificiall heat, which would have made another roar, but made him leap & dance for joy, & in time, acknowledge that he was warme, and after that acknowledgement, sound. It is not improbable that he had felt some great cold, either waking or sleeping, by which he was much affected, the *species* where-

whereof might remain in his memory; which being stirred up and quickned by his imagination, might cause some reality of sense. So they, not all, but some, as is observed by that Treasurer of rare Observations, *Ambrosius Pareus*, (I have met with the observation, out of him in *Sennertus*: but long before, when but a Boy, I remember well that I heard a very learned Physician, a man of excellent parts in some other faculties, *Raphael Thorius*, discourse upon that subject from his own experience: not upon his own body, I do not mean; but upon some that had been his Patients:) some then, I say, that have had a Foot, or a Leg, or any other member cut off, have complained long after of the very pains that they suffered in that very part before it was cut off. So that I conceive that there may be some reality of sense, where there is no reality of hurt: except a man may dy also without any reality of sense; it being a case tried and granted, that some men have been put to death by the conceit of death, being struck only with a little wand, or a wet role of cloath, when they expected they should have been struck with a naked sword. So we read of one that phansied unto himself, that he was so big of body, that no door was wide enough for him. He was forced violently, that is, against his will, (for many are often cured by such experiments;) through a door, wide enough for a greater body: but he was not cured of his conceit; but conceiting that his body had been by that violence extremely squeezed & bruised, complained much of pain

*Fyenus, de vi-
rib, imagin.*

pain, & dyed. I believe that there is more then bare imagination in such cases, to cause such effects; though imagination be the originall cause. But the further consideration of this I will leave to learned Physicians: somewhat I will add of mine own experience, which may contribute somewhat to their speculations. When a young Scholar in the University, I used swings often. they are prescribed for health; but I used them as much for pleasure: and I remember I have read somewhere, that *Asclepiades*, who prescribed nothing but pleasing remedies,, did cure many diseases by such *jactations*. I have dreamed often that I was swinging; or without swings, floating, as it were, in the aire. I am certain that I have found in my sleep that very ease, or pleasingnesse (if I may so call it,) of the whole body,, that I did when I was really swinging: and I have thought after I was awaked, (a good while after,) that my body was the better for it. Again, I have been in the cold water against my will twice, in boats that sunk to the ground: (whereof in due time, as of some other things in point of nature strange, if not miraculous, that have happened unto me in my life, I may perchance give some account to the world:) I have dreamed that I was in the water, and thought I felt cold. but of this I cannot speak so much, because not often, as of my nocturnall imaginary swinging or flying, which doth happen very often.

I hope the Reader will not be offended with this digression: which in very deed is no digression; such

such distempers of the brain, as we have hitherto spoken of, falling very naturally within the consideration of *enthusiasme*: and besides, as they conferre to the clearing of other obscure matters, that have or shall be treated of, not impertinent, even so.

Now to return to *Acosta* & his example: When that poor man so confidently averred himself as destinated to be a King or a Pope, or when he confidently bragged of his miracles, and wondred at the perverseness of his Judges for not acknowledging the truth of that which seemed unto him, though not unto any other but himself, so truly visible and palpable; as that of his resurrection, of *John Duke of Austria*, of the King of *Spain*, and the like: whether in such a case and condition, he might as truly be conceived, as is confidently affirmed, in his right wits, since *Acosta* thought fit to make the case publick, he must give every man leave, if not to judge, yet to consider. Though it can do him no good whom he writes of; yet it may concern divers others, who in their melancholy (as many have done, and do daily, if we may credit *Laurentius*;) may conceit themselves Popes and Emperours, and perchance assume the Titles too, and yet no dangerous men, nor liable, if they meet not with very severe Judges, to any other judgement, then to be laughed at by some, (which is uncharitable enough, since it is a common chance,) and to be pitied by others. But if a man should be found and convicted, whilst in his right wits, through ex-

cesses of ambition to have tampered (which is done sometimes) with either men or Devils, by secret unlawfull plots & projects, to compass a Crown, or a Mitre: though that man afterwards, by continuall and vehement intention of his mind upon the same subject, should crack his brain, and believe himself really, what he had long endeavoured wickedly; I doubt whether the innocency of his belief (as a distracted man,) would acquit him from the unlawfulness of his attempts, when a sound man, which brought him to that distraction. So if a man, neither factious in his life, nor abettor of strange Opinions, when himself, in a fit of a burning fever, or through some proper distemper of the brain, occasioned by a melancholick constitution of body or otherwise, should fall into a conceit, and speak accordingly, that he is Christ, or God, or the like; I think he should have hard measure, if he should be punished as a Blasphemer. But if he bring himself to this through excess of spirituall pride, and self-conceit, but especially, by using such indirect courses, little better then witchcraft, as private Revelations and Enthusiasms; as I desire not to be judge in such cases, so I think it may be spoken by any man without presumption, that they that are condemned to suffer for it by others, do not suffer innocent. For truly my opinion is, that it is no lesse then absolute renunciation of the Gospel, and Faith of Christ; and the ready way, I am sure, to bring in *Mahometisme*, or if any thing can be worse; after the Gospel, and faith of Christ once delivered, to pretend

tend to new Lights, and to seek after Revelations in matters of Faith & Doctrine. God make me constant to that profession of *Tertullian*, falling from which himself, he became an Heretick, & a persecutor of the Catholick Church by his writings: *Nobis curiositate opus non est post Christum Iesum; nec inquisitione post Evangelium.* Tertul. advers. her. cap. 4.
Cum credimus, nihil desideramus ultra credere: hoc enim prius credimus, non esse quod ultra credere debeamus. There can be nothing plainer: yet for their sakes that understand nothing but English, I will English the words. *There is no need of curiosity* [after Oracles, or Prophets, or Philosophers, to teach the way to happiness;] *after Christ Iesus: nor of inquisition, after his Gospel.* When we profess our selves to believe, [being well grounded by good Catechizing, &c. in the Christian faith,] all our desires, and all our endeavours in point of believing, are at end. For even that we believed, before we professed, that nothing more was to be believed, then barely that which we should profess.

But this is somewhat besides my subject, and purpose too, however I am fallen upon it. What Courts of Justice have determined in these cases, doth not concern us; but what learned Naturalists. And here I meet with an objection, which I must remove, or recant part of what I have said. Some Physicians in their *Consultations* and *Resolutions* seem to say, as *Acosta* doth in his relation, that in such distempers the *intellectus* is *integer*, that is, the understanding

Iul. Cæs. Claudini, Consultat. medic. Resp. 21.

found. That some Physicians say so, I should make no great matter of it: they may have their opinions as well as other men; and there be of all professions that affect it. But it troubles me, that *Galen* should be named for one of that opinion. The case related out of him, is of one *Theophilus*, who did phantasie to himself, that he both saw and heard some Minstrels in a corner of his Chamber, and could not rest for them: otherwise it seems, both before and after his recovery, very rationally in all other things. Hereupon it is determined, that it was an error of his imagination onely, and not of his understanding. I would not contend about words. If their meaning be, that the *Imagination* and the *Intellect* being different faculties, really different by place and proprieties, and liable to particular symptoms and distempers; that in such cases the distemper, originally and inherently is in the *imaginative*, not *intellective* faculty, though the error by reason of that relation, or subordination which is between the two, be communicated to the understanding: though I know there is matter enough of dispute about the differences and proprieties of each faculty, yet I shall not oppose any thing. To some other purposes, the difference may be very observable. It may satisfy a man, how it comes to passe that the understanding should be so right in all others, though so wrong in one particular object: whereas if the distemper were in the ratiocinative it self, the distraction would be generall. Neither is every error of the imagination an error of the understanding.

ing. For we phanſie many things awaked, as in the water, or in the clouds, which our reaſon doth oppoſe, and therefore we believe not. Nay ſometimes in our very dreams, reaſon doth oppoſe phanſy, and informes us, that what we wonder at, or fear, is but a dream, becauſe impoſſible or abſurd; when yet that very information is part of our dream. But if once any particular imagination be ſo ſtrong and violent, as to force aſſent from the underſtanding, ſo that no power of ratiocination that is left in us, is ſtrong enough to make us believe that it is otherwiſe then we imagine: is not this a depravation of the Underſtanding, as well as of the Imagination? Or what if the Imagination be altogether depraved, and a man, not out of any proper diſtemper of underſtanding, (for that is as poſſible as the other,) but of the imagination, in every thing that he ſaith or doth, both ſpeak and do like a mad man; ſhall not he be accounted mad? I will believe that *Galen* intended it not otherwiſe then as I have explained it, untill I have better conſidered of his words in himſelf, which now I have not the opportunity to do; or that I meet with further reaſon, to ſatiſſie me that it is ſo as ſome make him to ſay, then any I have yet met with.

As for the *muliercula*, or ſimple woman, the cauſe of this mans infatuation; whether ſhe were really poſſeſt, or a counterfeit, or whether ecſtaticall from ſome naturall cauſe; becauſe we find ſo little of her in the relation to help our inquiſition, I muſt let her alone. It is certain, that many that fall into

those fits, naturally, or, to speak more plainly, from naturall causes, phansie to themselves heavens, and angels, and revelations of mysteries, very really; and are in a better capacity, through the agitation of the brain and purest spirits, (as in Fevers, many,) after their fits, to speak & discourse of many things, then they were before. It is not so in all, I know: some become more stupid: but in some it is so; and whether it were this womans case particularly, I know not. But I leave her: and before I proceed to new matter, I must insert a caveat. In the case of Witches in generall there is much dispute among learned men, (as, whether corporally transported from place to place, &c.) of the power of the imagination. I would not have any thing that hath been said by me, to be drawn to that case, which I apprehend to be a quite different case. For it is certain, (if any thing be certain in the world,) that most Witches, though they may suffer depravation, or illusion rather of phansie, in some other things; wittingly and willingly, in perfect use of sense and reason, and upon apparent grounds of envie, malice, revenge, and the like, do many mischiefs. But if any supposed Witch, being accused by others, or any that should acknowledge her self to be such, should not or cannot be convicted legally, to do, or to have done any thing worthy of death; such a one though she should tell many strange things of her self, which may be thought to deserve death; yet I should not think it very safe to condemn her, without better evidence then her own confession, or testimony.

After

After fo much of Ecftafies, which are the proper paffion of the mind or Underftanding, and fo moft naturally the effects of *Contemplation*, which is the proper and fupreme operation of the underftanding: we fhall now proceed to the confideration of two notable controverfies, which will much conduce to the further clearing of thefe hidden myfteries, and lead us to the main bufineffe of this Chapter.

The firft is, Whether it may be conceived poffible in nature, for any man, whether by the advantage of fome *idiosyncrifia*, (or *idiosyncraticia*: which you will: for I have been fhewed it in *Galen*, fo written; and fince that, have found it in *Ptolemaeus* his *Tetrabiblon* too, more then once:) that is fome peculiar naturall property, fome fecret sympathy or antipathy, or the like; of which kind of *idiosyncrifie* there be fo many rare examples in Phyficians and Philofophers, as may feem in point of crediblenefle to furpaffe the greateft wonders in the world; whether then, by fome fuch help or advantage (if it may be fo called,) of nature, or by fome contracted propriety by long ufe and endeavour, it may be thought poffible in nature, without the concurrence of any fupernaturall caufe, for any one man or woman to put themfelves into a Trance, or Ecftafie, when they will.

The fecond, Whether in any Trance or Ecftafie of the mind, whether voluntary or involuntary, a true and real feparation of the Soul from the Body for a time, be a thing poffible in nature.

For the first question; I find *Avicenne*, (an ancient *Arab*, of great credit among all; by some preferred above all other Philosophers, or Physicians;) quoted by some, concerning one, who besides some other extraordinary properties, nothing to our purpose, could put himself into a fit of Palsie when he would. And if that were granted, there would be no great question of the possibility of voluntary Trances: it being a thing (in ordinary judgement) of equall facility in point of nature, to fill the Ventricles of the Brain with pituitous (or whatever Physicians will make them,) humours, and to empty them at pleasure; and to command certain humours into the chine of the back, and nerves, to be recalled again at will. So that if the one may be arbitrary in some one or other by some propriety of temper, &c. the other may as probably. But I will not much insist upon this example, because of the uncertainty. I think there is no body almost, that pretends to learning or curiosity in any kind of nature and Philosophy, but hath heard, or read of *Restitutus*, an *African* Priest, in *S. Augustine*; who with the help of a mournfull tone, or lamenting voice, whether reall or counterfeit, would presently fall into a perfect ecstatic, so that he would not stirre at all for any punching or pricking, though to a considerable wound: no, nor at the applying of fire; except perchance a man had applied so much, as to have endangered his life. So much perchance might be thought somewhat, to make faith of a real Trance. We heard before out of *Thuanus*,
what

what a mighty matter was made of it, that a Maid should endure patiently (without any sign of offense, I mean,) the driving of pins or needles into some fleshy parts. But *S. Augustine* had more experience in the world then so. Besides that common president of the *Lacedemonian* Boys and Girls, he had observed with many Philosophers, (yea and Civilians,) how far man or womans resolute obstinacy could go in point of suffering. That his reader therefore might be fully satisfied, that it was no juggling businesse, but a true, reall, perfect ecstasie, he addeth; *Non autem obnitendo, sed non sentiendo, non movere corpus eo probabatur, quod tanquam in defuncto nullus inveniebatur anhelitus; hominum tamen voces, si clarius loquerentur, &c.* that is, (but I must let the Reader know by the way, that the Edition of *S. Augustine*, the onely I have at this time, is very ancient; almost as ancient as printing is; being the *Venice* edition of *Petrus de Tarvisio*, 1475. for which I like it not the worse, I confess: yet thought good to give the Reader notice, in case, as oftentimes, there should be found any thing different in later Editions, though commonly for the worst:)

Now that this his not stirring of his body at all those things, happened not through a resolute obstinacy (such as by ancient

August. De Civ. Dei: l. 14. c. 24.

Heathens was commonly objected to Christian Martyrs; but very impertinently, it being both in regard of the number, and divers other circumstances, a quite different case:) *or opposition of the mind; but merely because he did not feel; was certainly*
known,

known, because all this while no breath was found in him, no more then if he had been quite dead. Yet the same man, if any body with a very loud voice had spoken or called unto him, he would acknowledge afterwards, when come to himself, that he had heard some kind of noise, as if it were afar off. But this indeed S. Augustine doth not relate as a thing that himself had seen: no; but yet as a thing of very fresh memory, averred unto him by many that had seen it, and whom he doth professe (*expertisunt*: as of a thing that he made no question:) to believe. And truly I for my part must acknowledge, that I give more credit to this relation of S. Augustine, then to Cardan his testimony concerning either himself, or his Father: though Bodinus is well content to believe:

Bodin. Theat.
Nat. p. 503.

it, and partly grounds upon it as unquestionable. It was in their power, he saith, to abstract their souls from their bodies, when they would. The possibility whereof, except he meant it of an absolute separation, although I do not absolutely deny: yet that such a thing should be believed upon his bare testimony, *hominis ventosi ingenii*, as Scaliger of him somewhere, a man ever ambitious to tell strange things, to be admired by others; I see no just ground.

The words I know may have another meaning, as commonly interpreted. but this too may be right enough, and is warrantable by other places in Hippocrates.

Well, but *experientia fallax*. it is his caveat, who of a wise man (and much the wiser for it, certainly,) adscribed as much to experience as ever man did: and therefore so earnestly exhorteth all young

young Physicians, not to neglect the experiments, and advises grounded upon experiments, even of the most illiterate of the world. I doubt therefore, whether we may build so much upon two or three examples, though attested by very good authority, as to make an absolute inference, without some further reasoning. I find that *Tho. Fyenus*, a very learned Physician, who hath published a very rationall and scholasticall Treatise, *Concerning the power of the Imagination*, doth expresse himself peremptorily upon the point, on the negative: *Ea* (of this very instance out of *S. Aug.*) *vel arte Diabolica, vel fallacia aliqua contigisse; vel alias impossibilia esse.* But I profess to wonder much at this his determination; and whether without cause, I shall make the reader judge. For first, the question is not whether the bare Imagination can do it immediately, which is contrary to the course of nature; as is well shewed by him throughout his Treatise: but whether the Imagination, or any other Power depending on the Will, by the subordination of other Faculties; as by stirring up some Passion, and the like. And so himself doth grant, that many Diseases be caused by the Imagination; as particularly the Plague: which though it be particularly acknowledged by him, yet for the Readers further satisfaction, I will here adde another learned Physician his words, who is generally thought to have written of all *contagious diseases*, as learnedly and solidly as any man. His words are very expresse. *Ex animi perturbationibus iracundia, &c.* that is; *As*

Palmar. de morbis contag. p. 311.

We

we have said, that among the Passions of the mind, Anger, Terror and Grief are not without danger: so do we now declare, that fear of the Plague, and intent cogitation about it, do often bring it; and bear witnesse, that many perfectly sound before, being struck with a suddain fright and fear of it, were presently taken, and little after died; upon no other ground or cause, as my opinion is, but this, that vehement and intent cogitation of the mind, and continued imagination, whilst they do strongly affect the heart, they do at the same time imprint and ingrave in it that very thing, which is so much feared and thought upon. And to this purpose I remember very well, that I did once, when very young, hear that worthy *Raphael Thorius*, mentioned before, who continued in *London* all the Plague-time 1603. hear him, I say, with great admiration, tell of many particulars; of men and women, to his knowledge, and in his sight walking, sitting, talking in perfect health; at some outward sight, or unseasonable relation, or the like, suddainly taken. Some might except, that their fear was not the cause of the Plague; but the unsensible grudgings or beginnings of the Plague in their bodies, rather cause of their fear: as when a man dreameth of some smart pain; not the dream, often, is the cause of the pain, but the pain of the dream. No; that cannot be, by divers instances which he did alledge. For then, their fear proceeding from an inward cause, would have been without any externall provocation: whereas in all those examples, some externall provocations were the first, and onely apparent cause.

cause. Yet I will not deny, but that probably there might be a concurrence of both in some of those many instances. But now to *Fyenus* again. Some can weep when they will: that he doth not deny; no man indeed can deny it. I know what Poets and Comicks do write of all women in generall; but I will not make use of their authority, neither do I believe it true. But they that have read of Burials and Funerals in ancient Authors, cannot but take some notice of the *mulieres praeſicæ* among the *Romans*, (& ſuch there were among other nations; as among the *Iews* particularly:) who though they were but hired with money to weep, and did without all doubt rejoyce, more or leſſe, in their hearts for the occaſion, it being their profeſſion, by which they maintained their own life: would nevertheless ſo mightily & ſo naturally weep, that many that ſaw them, though they knew well enough that they did it merely for their hire, and forcedly, and had otherwiſe no mind nor occaſion themſelves; yet could not forbear to do as they did. Now were it ſo as *Fyenus* ſeems elſewhere to determine, that a voluntary ecſtaſie were nothing elſe but *humoris pituitoſi in cerebri ventriculos & ſubſtantiam intro-miſſio & inductio*; as he defineth arbitrary weeping by *Seri pro imperio motio*: truly I ſhould think it might eaſily be inferred, that the one (as to naturall poſſibility) might be as well as the other; ſo that the one being granted by him, the other could not in reaſon be affirmed impoſſible. But I will diſpute againſt my ſelf in this, for the truth, as I apprehend it.

For

For as I conceive every true, naturall, and perfect ecstasie, to be a degree or *species* of epilepsie: so I subscribe to *Sennertus*, and other Physicians, who besides ordinarily known humors, maintain that there is a different specifick epilepticall humor, or quality, as yet unknown unto men, which is the immediate cause of Epilepsies.

But lastly, *Fyennus* seems to me in some degree, if not to contradict, yet to be inconstant unto himself. For whereas he doth there so peremptorily determine it as *impossible*: in this his second Question, *Concl.* 11. where he hath the same instances at large, he proposeth them there as things that might happen indeed, but (*præter communem cursum naturæ,*) besides the ordinary course of nature; not as supernaturall, (lest any should mistake,) but *ex particulari aliquorum hominū proprietate, & singulari corporis conformatione*: though indeed, even there at the last he concludes with a doubt; *sed forte etiam aliqua eorum arte magica &c. aliqua forte etiam non sunt vera*. which I take to be a farre more discreet and judicious determination, then his *impossible* afterwards. Which to make yet more probable unto my Reader, since it is granted that strange things may be done by some, through peculiar naturall properties, my course would be, as I take it, to look into those many examples of *idiosyncrasia*, which I find in good Authors: whether among them we might not find divers things, which might seem every whit as strange as those controverted Ecstasies. But because I desire not to be over-long, and that I would

would not glut the Reader with ftrange ftories; among whom fome will be found, perchance, of *Lucian's* temper, who not valuing the authority of moft credible Authors, will account all fabulous that themfelves have not feen or known; I fhall forbear. Yet for their fakes that may be more candid and curious, I fhall mention two books which I read but lately, (for which I was beholding, as for divers others, to a worthy Friend, a Doctor and Profeflor of Phyfick, in Chichefter:) the one, *Henrici à Heers* his *Observationes medicae*; the other, *Dan. Sennerti* lib. 6. *de morbis à fascino, incantatione, &c.* published long after his other works: which two books, if my memory deceive me not, will competently furnifh them with fuch examples. But to let that paffe, and the advantage that we might make of it: That fome can bring themfelves to that, as to weep when they will, as we faid before, is granted: and *S. Auguftine* in the fame chapter profefleth himfelf to have feen one that could fweat (without any motion, or any other ordinary means,) when he would: and this alfo by *Fyennus* is granted as poffible: and *Iulius Scaliger* in his Exercitations againft *Cardan*, writes of one, as very well known unto him, that could not hold his water, if he heard any play upon a Lute or Harp: and I have it from perfons of credit, that profefled to have feen a woman, that could make her felf blufh when fhe would. That a man may by intent imagination or cogitation, bring himfelf to a *vertigo*, as will make him fall to the ground, and trouble his
brain

brain very much, best Physicians do affirm : nay,, that a great fright in tender bodies, (as women with child,) and intent imagination, is enough to beget *epilepticam*, is observed by *Guil. Fabricius*, Cent. 3. Observ. 3. to whom *Sennertus* doth assent. Have there not been men or women, boys or girls, and children in the world, who at the very remembrance of some very sad or terrible thing, that had happened unto them in their life, would fall into a swoon, whether they would or no? How much more if they affected it, and after some two or three involuntary fits, finding some disposition in themselves to it, and aiming at some advantage by it, or proposing to themselves some other end, used means by intent cogitation or otherwise, to bring themselves into a habit of it? Is there any thing in this impossible? If I should rub up mine own memory, I could tell of many things that I have known in my time in that kind. But why should not I (in things so ordinary) leave all men to their own experience? This is somewhat rare, that I remember to have read in *Beneventus*, *De abditis morborum causis*, &c. (a book for the bignesse, as full of choice Observations, as any I have seen; of whom and of his Observations, we shall have occasion to say more in some other Chapter :) of a Boy, who having been frightened by some strange apparition, whether reall, or conceited, was wont from that very day, and almost hour, every eighth day to fall into the same horrors & outcries, which he had then suffered and used; from which he could

could never be cured, as long as he lived: but it seems it brought him into a speedy consumption, so that he did not live very long after it.

More I know may be found to the same purpose: but I think I have said enough to conclude, that granting what must be granted, and doth often happen in the world, besides the ordinary course of nature, yet by causes that are naturall, as such and such an *idiosyncrisia*, and the like; a voluntary ecstasie is not a thing impossible to nature.

I have since lighted upon the same question, handled by a very learned man, a profound philosopher, in my judgement: for to this day I never found him (that I remember) named in any book. He hath been mentioned by me once before: *Anton. P. Sancta Cruz*: in my second Chapter *Of Divination*. In the same Commentaries it is, upon Hippocrates, *De morbo sacro*, where I found this question handled: whereof, for the respect I beare to the Author, I think my self bound to give some account to the Reader. It is not without some wonder to me; and will not be so much to the satisfaction of the Reader, as I could wish: but I can make it no otherwise, then I find it. In the first part of the Chapter, if I understand Latin, or my haste did not much beguile me, he doth clearly deliver himself, as I do here: that such voluntary ecstasies are possible in nature. I will put some of his words here. *Maxime difficile*, saith he, *& arduum opus est, tales mutationes cognoscere, an sint à Deo, an à propria voluntate, an à demone*. That is, *It is very hard and*

difficult to determine of such changes, (or, passions of the soul,) whether they be from God, or from ones proper will and endeavour, or lastly from the Devil. And then again: *Atque quamvis dispositio ille soleat fieri, &c. à malo demone, aut à proprio appetitu, vehementer moto ad aliquam novitatis finem; quod ut est difficile cognoscere, ita maxime dolendū.* That is, And although this state, or dispositiō of the soul, may happen-- as by the power of the Devil, --so by a strong desire of the party for some ambitious end: which as it is not easie to discern, so the more to be lamented. What can be more plain? You may be sure, he that durst say so much, (in *Spain*,) had seen a great deal in that kind, that did not please him very well. Yet for all this, so peremptorily, and not without some indignation delivered, in the premises; when he comes to the conclusion, he tells us another tale, that he doth not see, how such things can happen naturally; and therefore that *Restitutus* (contrary to *S. Augustine's* judgement,) and the like, must needs be supposed to have done, or suffered what they did, if not by God, (as there is little reason we should believe,) then by the Devil. Might not a man suspect, that this man was afraid, to speak too much truth? and that he did bethink himself in time, that he wrote among them, where such supposed raptures are in great esteem? The Reader may better satisfy himself, by reading the Author himself, at better leasure, then I could in a shop: though for that use, that I had of him, I thank good friends in *S. Paul's Church-yard* heartily.

But I have not yet done. There is somewhat else to be said, that may seem to conduce very much to this our present inquiry: and though I my self shall make no great matter of it, yet some body else may; and think, it would have stood me in great stead. *Giraldus Cambrensis*, a Briton by birth, though by descent rather an *English-man*, or *Norman*, as he makes himself, but a very learned man for those times, in his *Description of Wales*, chapter 16. tells us of a certain company, frequent in those dayes, in *Wales*, commonly called *awenyd hion*; that is, ecstaticall, or *mente ducti*, according to *Giraldus* his interpretation. These men, it seems, according to his relation, could put themselves into a trance when they would: that is, as often as any came to them to consult them as Prophets. Two things especially *Giraldus* would have us to take notice of: the one, that they did not use to come to themselves again, except some kind of violence were used, to recall and awaken them, as it were: and then secondly, that after they were come to themselves, they remembered nothing at all they had either said or done in their fits. He makes them to have been a race of the *Trojan* Soothsayers, among whom and their posterity, the *Britons*, only, he would have us to believe such Prophets have been. Yet again he doth argue, and would have us to believe that they prophesied by the spirit too, and to that end instances in divers, who though Infidels, though lewd in their conversations, have had the gift of prophesie. And such also he maketh the *Merlins* to have

been. I can easily be perswaded, that *Giraldus* wrote as himself believed; not out of any design, as many have done, to abuse his Reader. It appeareth by the many Miracles wherewith he hath stuffed his *Itinerarium*, that he was a man of very easie belief: which was the epidemicall disease of those times of Ignorance, when all Piety almost consisted in telling and making of Miracles. And what might not he believe, who did believe that *Alexander of Macedon*, though long before those miraculous times, had removed the *Caspian* mountains, and inclosed within them, as within walls, the ten tribes of *Israel*; not to be removed from thence till the coming of *Enoch* and *Elias*? I do not say that he was the Authour of this pretty Fable: but that he had credulity enough to believe it; and by consequent not to be wondred at, if he believed many other things, that may probably be supposed as true. But truly I think we are much beholding to his fidelity. For had he been of the temper of some others, he would have added somewhat of his own, to make his story more strange; which might have troubled us. But now as he describeth them, we may believe him, so farre as he speaks of himself; and yet know them (be it spoken without any disparagement to that ancient noble people; since there is no nation in the world but hath store of such:) know them, I say, for arrant Jugglers and Impostors. For there is not any thing in the whole relation, but might easily be performed by any ordinary Gypsie. And the like we may as probably

bably conclude of those dancing *Enthusiasts*, by him elsewhere mentioned and described in his *Itinerarium*. As for his *Merlins*, if they were no others then the *Merlins* of our dayes, it will require no long deliberation to determine what they were. But we know ours, that now are, well enough: but as for them that were, I leave them to them that know more of them then I do, to judge of them.

Neither shall I need to say any thing of the *Turkish* Enthusiasts, the *Darvises*, or *Torlaces*, who, as I find them described in some *Turkish* Histories, have (some of them) much resemblance with those in *Giraldus*, as to their pretended Fits and Raptures: but such lewd abominable Rascals otherwise, that were it not that we see among Christians also how inclinable the common sort of people are to be carried with any pretence of Religion, though the actions be never so irreligious and contrary to that which is pretended; it would be incredible that such monsters should be suffered in a Common-wealth: much more incredible, that with so much zeal and devotion, as men of God and holy Prophets, they should be worshipped and adored, as they are there by many. Strange stories may be read in *Leo Africanus*, in his 3. book of the *Description of Africk*; *Diversæ regulæ ac sectæ*, &c. p. 135. to this purpose; whereof he professeth himself to have been eyewitnesse: but nothing more strange, then what *Germany* hath seen, and any other Countrey may, where Anabaptisticall Enthusiasts are tolerated, and from toleration come in time to prevail and rule.

I will not make a question of it to dispute it; for I have but little to say for it: but I desire onely to propose it, that learned Naturalists and Physicians may (if they please) consider of it; Whether it be probable or possible, that naturall Ecstasies and Enthusiasms, such as proceed from naturall causes merely, should be contagious: though not contagious in the same manner as the Plague, or the Pox is; yet contagious in their kind. Neither indeed are all contagious diseases, contagious in one kind: A mad Dogge is not contagious with his Breath: *Fracastorius*, that hath written of that subject, saith with his Teeth onely; and not except some blood be drawn. Being spoken here but upon supposition, and yet grounded upon such authority, it did not concern me to inquire further into it. But lest any, reading this, should upon such authority grow bold, and pay for it, (which I should be sorry for;) let them know, that this opinion of *Fracastorius* is largely confuted by *Zacuthus Lusit.* (a very able man, in his profession) in his *Praxis Admiranda*, lib. 3. c. 82. who by many good authorities, and pregnant instances proves against him, that the *contactus*, in any kind, may cause madness. And yet I wonder that *Zacuthus* there hath nothing out of *Aretens*, a Physician of great note, and greater antiquity; who goes further, & maintaineth, that the very *breath* of a mad dog, is enough to infect. *Aret. De acutis*; lib. 1. cap. 7. *De angina*. Yet I believe somewhat might be said of the differences of climats. But this is as much, as I thought need-
full

full here. But it is not my purpose to inquire into the truth of that now: I would onely suppose, that all diseases that are contagious, are not contagious in the same manner. The chiefeft ground of my suspicion is, the history of those ancient Hereticks, who were commonly known under the name (for they had many others besides, as *Enthusiasts*, &c.) of *Messaliani*, a *Syriack* word; that is, *Euchites*, or *Prayers*: because they were wont to pray themselves into raptures and ecstasies, of which we shall speak more in its proper place. But that I have here to say of them is, that whereas this strange Sect (as most others) began by a few; it did in time so spread and prevail, that whole Monasteries, whole Towns, and almost Countries were infected with it. Neither could any other cure be found, but absolute destruction. Which may seem strange, that that wherein the happinesse and perfection of a Christian, being well used, doth chiefly consist; as being that which bringeth man nearest unto God; through abuse and excesse, should become liable to the punishment of highest crimes. But in this *quare* we go upon a wrong ground, I know, if it be conceived that those men were really posselt, as some have thought anciently. For my part, I see no cause to believe it: but I leave every man free. I propose it to them that shall be of my opinion, as I doubt not but some will be: and we shall say more afterwards of it, in due place.

II. Our second question which we proposed is, Whether through any Naturall Ecstasie, the Soul

may really quit the Bodie, and then return. I shall begin with the consideration of what some Ancients have thought and written. But before that, I must professe that I do not, in such high points, adscribe so much unto ancient Heathens, except it be some of the most solid and rationall among them, as to think their opinion in a serious discourse, a sufficient ground for a *Quere*; much less, for a Conclusion. But since that I find that some Christians, men of good learning and great fame, have not onely largely disputed, but in conclusion affirmed it; I think I should not give my Reader that satisfaction that he might expect from me, if before I come to them and their Arguments, I should not tell him, who before them, whether heathen or others, that are come to my knowledge, or present remembrance, have concurred with them in their opinion: & the rather, because it is not unlikely that themselves might be the bolder to publish what they maintained, because they found they were not the first that had been of that opinion. Ancient Heathens, whether Philosophers or others, that did believe such a separation possible, seem to ground especially upon a story, that passed among them for very current and true; of one *Hermotimus Clazomenius*, whose soul, they say, was wont to wander into farre places, the body, mean while, being as still and senselesse as if it had been a dead body. The matter, it seemeth, when ever it happened, was very publick; and therefore passed to posterity with lesse controul.

There

There is nothing in *Plinies* relation of it, (for the matter of fact,) but is possible enough , and might well be conceived to have proceeded from some naturall cause. Physicians are agreed upon it; and they ground it upon certain experience, that a man in *ecstasi melancholica*, or a woman in *hysterica passione*, may be gone three dayes, and come to themselves again. Therefore they strictly forbid in such cases to burie *ante biduum exactum; quod quosdam ferè triduo elapso revixisse observatum sit*: as *Sennertus* of women particularly. *Tertullian De anima cap. 51.* hath a storie of a Woman that stirred her armes when she was carried to be buried. It seemeth by him, that he was present when it happened: but it was looked upon as a thing merely supernaturall and miraculous; and so the woman was buried neverthelesse; which, perchance, if then taken up and well tended, might have recovered to perfect life, without a miracle. Now that a man or woman after such a fit, in course of nature, should tell strange things, which he hath seen, yea and foretell(though this be rare;) some things to come; is not so much to be wondred at, that it should be thought incredible. I find the relation concerning this *Hermotimus*, in *Apollonius*, *Περὶ κατὰ δαίμονας ἰσορίας.* cap. 3. more full: but there indeed much improved, as such things use to be by time; and altogether incredible. There dayes, (as probably in the first relation,) are made years: two or three dayes perchance, many years, beyond all sense and reason. For though I will not dispute it here, whether

it may not fall out in nature, that a man may sleep some moneths, (which is written of a whole Countrey in the North, as naturall unto the people of that countrey, and is not contradicted by some eminent Physicians :) or years; for which I know much may be said, as well as for living divers years without any food, which of the two, in point of reason might seem more impossible; and yet is certainly known to have happened, even of late years, unto many: yet for a Bodie to lie so long destitute of a Soul and of all naturall functions, and not to be dead, is not conceivable in nature. As for those particulars of his predictions in the said *Apollonius*,

**Ομβρος μεγάλης καὶ ἀνομβρίας· ἔτι δὲ σεισμός τε καὶ λοιμός, καὶ παραπλήσια :*

all these things proceeding from naturall causes, which have operations long before upon some creatures; from the diligent observation of which operations, skilfull Naturalists also sometimes foresee and foretell them; (of which we have spoken in the former Chapter;) I would not stick much at that, as is intimated before. But as my purpose is only for the truth, so I must remove one objection, that may be made from the Authour I have named. His very title (*περὶ κατεφ. ιστορ.*) promises onely Fables. Yet it is certain that he hath inserted divers things, which are asserted by best Historians; as *Meursius* himself in his Preface to the reader, out of *Phlegon*, doth observe. But besides, that bare alteration of dayes into years, was enough and more then enough, to turn a Truth into a Fable *Tertullian De an. c. 44.* hath some conjectures about this *Hermo-*

timus; but not any either in themselves very probable; or to us here at all considerable.

Plutarch in his Treatise of the *Slacknesse of Gods judgements*, hath a relation too of one *Thespesius*, who fell down from a high place (drunk perchance; for he was a lewd Companion:) without any externall wound or bleeding; upon which he grew immediately senselesse, and after a while was supposed dead: but came to himself again after the third day, and then told strange things that he had seen; some things also (of which *Plutarch* speaketh very sparingly,) he foretold: and then was his Soul also supposed to have wandred out of the Body all that while. I think it very probable, though I have nothing but *Plutarch's* authority for it, that such a thing (laying aside the main controversie of reall separation, till we come to some determination about it,) might happen. First, such a fall as he describeth, might probably be the occasion (as we had before in the ecstaticall Boy, whom his master had so grievously beaten about the head:) of such an Ecstasie. Secondly, three dayes, the very proportion of time which Physicians have pitched upon, during which they teach that an ecstasie may last. And though *Plutarch* say after three dayes; it is like enough they would speak so, though some houres, amounting perchance to half a day and better, to make three dayes, were wanting. But then lastly, the substance of his Visions, and places of his wandrings, do just agree with the relations of other ecstaticall persons, that have been at severall times and places.

places. It may be comprehended in few words: Heaven, Hell, and Purgatorie. The phrases indeed, and expressions, proper to Heathens, as must needs be; but the substance of the matter, the very same for all the world as we find in others, that were of another faith & profession. And yet it must be supposed, that this story having passed through severall hands before it came to *Plutarch*, had suffered some alterations according to different humours of men, & perchance memories, before: & what end soever any other might propose unto himself in it, apparent enough it is, that *Plutarch*, as may be seen in the end, where he speaks of *Nero's* soul, did aim at some use, for the credit and benefit of his own Countrey. So much for Heathens. I have not met with any professing Christianity, either ancient, (that I remember at least,) or late, that have maintained this separation possible upon grounds of reason; or *de facto*, really and credible; but *Ioh. Bodinus* and *Cardanus*. Of *Cardanus* I can say little more, then what I find in *Bodinus* of him, because I have not his books. Why I do not value much his testimonie in these things, I have given some reason before. And if his arguments be not better, (in case he have any to prove it possible; which is more then I know:) we should make no great reckoning of them. As for *Bodinus*, he was a man famous enough for other learning too, but especially well versed in such arguments and speculations, as appeareth by his book of *Demonologia*. The *elogium* of the man and his writings, is in *Thuanus* at large. He plainly main-
tains

tains it in that choice piece of his, his *Theatrum Naturæ*: a book full of naturall Curiosities; whether as solid as curious, I cannot tell. But he speaks not of it as of a thing feasible by nature, but by power either divine, or diabolicall. And what is that to us? Yes, even unto us, as I conceive, that otherwise desire not to meddle with any thing that is supernaturall. For as to divine; as I should hold it a mad thing, from the power of God, which even heathens (though not *Galen*, who quarrels with *Moses* for making it so) have acknowledged infinite, to argue to the power of nature, which God (the author) from the first creation hath bounded within certain limits: so on the other side, if it were granted that ordinary Witches and Magicians, can at pleasure by power given them from the Devil, separate their souls from their bodies for certain houres, or dayes, and then resume their bodies again, and be as before; which by the said *Bodinus* is disputed and maintained; truely I should think, it might without impiety or improbabilitie be inferred from thence, that this kind of separation is a thing possible in, and by nature also. But I will not engage my self here upon that argument of Witches, of which I once purposed to treat more at large, & by it self: it is yet possible that I may before I die, if God please. Somewhat *Bodinus* hath from some precedents in nature, that we might not too much wonder at that which he doth averre and maintain, though not by naturall causes, so often to come to pass, *Nec debet illud mirum videri, si quis*
memi-

meminerit ex electo, &c. I did expect he would have told somewhat of divers creatures, which some for a longer, some for a shorter time, as Flies in the winter, lie quite senselesse, and seem to be dead: and yet afterwards are known to revive, and to be as active and busie as ever they were. Such argumentss I remember, and instances we had many, when young Sophisters in the University, upon occasion of severall disputes. But this example taken from the separation of Gold & Silver, informing the true *Electrum*; or of the separation of Oyl and Water, after mixture, by such and such means; seemeth to me so remote, that I do not see how a rationall man can inferre any thing out of it pertinent to this purpose. Again; had *Bodinus* gone that way to work, to prove, or make it probable at least, that the rationall soul or spirit of man is really distinct and separable from the vegetative and sensitive; though contrary to the common opinion of best philosophers; yet so he might have laid a plausible foundation to his opinion of separation in ecstasies. But that he doth not; but plainly maintaineth the contrary.

I shall not absolutely determine any thing: but I shall give some reason why I do not, which will be a kind of determination of the businesse. *S. Paul* speaking of his own divine raptures, professeth not to know whether they happened unto him in the body, or out of the body. He is earnest in that profession, and repeats it twice. I am not of their opinion, though it be the opinion of no lesse a man then *Hugo Grotius*, among others, that make *S. Paul's* meaning

meaning to be, that he did not know whether he were carried in body to heaven, or heavenly things represented unto his mind. I should account that, but for the respect I bear to some that embrace it, somewhat a course interpretation. Now if *S. Paul*, according to that interpretation of his words which is more commonly received, though he knew the power of God very well, and that what had hapned unto him, whatever it was, was not from any naturall cause, but altogether supernaturall; would not, or could not neverthelesse, absolutely determine, whether that in his divine rapture there were any reall separation of his soul from his body: I must think it somewhat bold for any man to maintain, that such a separation, either by diabolical power, or by causes that are naturall, is possible; much lesse, as *Bodinus*, ordinary. Besides, in that case of *Witches*, which is the main argument; except we can tell of *Witches* and *Sorcerers* that are in trances for some weeks, moneths, or years together, what need? May not the Devil as easily, yea and farre more easily to our apprehension in point of possibilitie, represent such things unto their phansie, and make them believe, (which many do without any Devil, upon such impressions, occasioned by some distemper of the brain, or otherwise, as in former examples:) that they saw or did such and such things really, in such and such places? But they are carried to farre places, and give a true account of what they have seen, it may be a hundred, or a thousand miles off. This I believe to be true enough, that
many

many Witches and Sorcerers in divers places in the world, by severall kinds of Witchcraft do it. But if a Sorcerer, or a Witch shew in a glass what is now done upon the Exchange at *Antwerp*, or at the *Louvre* in *Paris*; which certainly some have done, or somewhat equivalent to that; must we therefore conclude that he that hath seen it, hath been at either? But lastly; though the Soul, in man, be it that seeth properly, not the Eyes; yet as the Soul is fitted by God to inform a Body, it cannot see without Eyes. When once, as to nature, it hath lost its relation to the body; it then becomes (though the very same substance still,) a new creature as it were, to all manner of operations. It seeth, it speaketh, or to speak more properly, communiceth: but not either with Eyes, or Tongue; but as Spirits or Angels do. of the particular manner whereof, both ancient Philosophers and Schoolmen have disputed and treated at large. If therefore the soul separated from the body can return into it again, and remember what it hath seen; it would also remember as well, that it was not with bodily eyes that it saw or knew, but in such a manner as is proper and naturall (if we may so speak) to a spirit: which is contrarie to the account that is given by Witches, and other of like trade. If any man should say, though separated for a season, it might carry with it some *species*, that it had received in the body through the ministry of the Eyes, and so of other senses: though that be absurd, because all such *species* are imprinted in the brain, disposed by the presence

sence of the soul to receive them; or if we fly to the *intelligibiles*, abstracted out of the materials by vertue of the *intellectus agens*: yet even so, though it might see (were it granted) by that means, some things, even after its separation, that it had seen before, whilst in the body; yet other things, whether present or future, by vertue of those *species*, more then it had seen or known before, it could not.

III. I have done with the two questions which I proposed: I shall now passe to a third, which I did not mention, to prevent prejudice, lest by the very termes, it might be thought frivolous and fruitlesse; which neverthelesse in the end, before we have done with it, will appear of great consequence and reality. But before I come to that new question, I will conclude this discourse concerning Ecstasies, with somewhat that may doe them perchance some pleasure, who are not much conversant in Philosophy. We had somewhat of Visions, whether internall or externall, before. It may be, that expression will not be understood by some. It is true that ordinarily, as all object of sight is outward; so all sight or *vision*, properly inward. *Animus videt*, &c. as before, at the beginning, disputed. But *Laurentius* in his Treatise of *melancholie*, delivers it as a secret, that even without outward objects we may see things inwardly; and thereupon defendeth *Galen* against *Averroes*, affirming that the darkness of melancholick spirits, is a great occasion of melancholy mens continuall fearfulnessse. He handleth it also in his *Anatomy*, lib. 11. q. 2. The *species*,
L he

he saith, (which must be understood of some extraordinary cases; else the sight would be a very uncertain sense:) with such and such impressions, may be sent unto the eyes from the brain, and from the eyes returned unto the place from whence they came, and the brain receive them (for which see his reasons in his *Anatomy*:) as things outward. I leave it to the further consideration of learned Physicians and Anatomists. Certain it is, that upon some distempers of the brain, a man shall think, even awaking, that he seeth those things which he doth not see: things which are not, nor perchance can be. *Aristotle* in his Treatise of *Dreams*, gives an instance of it in children and young boyes; who after some terrible dream, though they be out of their dream, and their eyes full open, (and light brought in sometimes: which I adde, because I know it to be true:) think neverthelesse for a while after, that they see with their eyes, what they saw in their dream. And *Vitus Amerbachius*, a learned man, in his book *De anima*, lib. 4. confirms it to be true by his own experience, even when he was a man, if I mistake him not. But whatever be the cause, the effect is certain; confirmed also by learned *Fracastorius* in these words: *Nihil enim refert ad apparentiam faciendam, &c.* that is, *Whether the species comes to the eyes from without, or from within, is not materiall at all, in point of apparition: for they believe they see, and are astonished, and grow besides themselves, &c.* De Sympath. c. 20.

Our third question or consideration is, whether
a man

a man by Philosophy, or philosophicall contemplation, may attain to an Angelicall transformation: or to go higher, to such a degree of union with God, that he shall neither by the help of any sense, or phansie, understand as other men; but by a kind of *contactus*, or union of substance with the Supreme Cause of all things. If any man think this too curious a question, or too high for ordinary capacities, he will be (as is already intimated,) much deceived. For it is for their sakes especially that are the weaker sex, that I propose it; as he will find it, if he have but the patience to read unto the end. This marvellous transmutation of man by philosophy, is asserted by men that call themselves *Platonicks*. *Iulius Caesar Vaninius* (a man of the same religion, as *Pomponatius* was,) describeth it in this manner: *Ejus causa, continua sublimiorum contemplatio, quæ à sensibilibus & à corporis penso animum se vocat, & profundissima mentis intentione incorporea sapientie conjungit: cumque ad illum gradum pervenerit, qui est contemplativæ perfectionis supremus, tunc rapitur ab omnibus creatis speciebus, & intelligit non per species acquisitas, sed per inspectionem ad Ideas, in quarum lumine omnia agnoscit. Ideo ecstatici multa vera prædicunt.* They that can come at *Ficinus*, *De philosoph. Platon.* and other works of his, may expect a more perfect account. But for my part, by what I can find in *Plato*, or other ancient *Platonists*, I doubt that *Plato* is wrongfully quoted. I deny not but that he might be some foundation: but they

that raised it to this height, were no others, as I take it, then the enthusiastick *Arabs*, the very same that bred us *Mahomet*; whether before, or afterwards. I have a good Author for it. Learned *Montecatenu* (an exquisite *Aristotelian*) in his Commentaries upon the third of *Aristotle De Anima*, speaking there of *Averroes*, hath these words: *Hic enim est qui opinatur, etsi eam opinionem non usquequaque probemus*, (I wonder so sober a man would say so much:) *per eas species [intellectiles] tanquam per sui partes, perfecte demum nobiscum copulari effectricem mentem: in quam ille ubi numerum expleverint, repentina quadam luce effulgentes, quasi abeant & convertantur; imaginatione etiam totoque homine secum attractis: adeo ut exinde, non per species, ut antea, non ope imaginationis intelligamus; sed per illius mentis essentiam, in quam nos pene ista mutavit copulatio.* It were no hard thing to put this into English: but how to make it intelligible English to them that know nothing of the *intellectus agens*, and *patiens*, and other mysteries of the nature of understanding, I know not. However, the summe is already in the question, as I proposed it. And in the application that we shall make, every thing will be clearer.

Let the *Arabs* therefore have the honour of it; if not of the first invention, yet of the perfection: yea and practice too, for which they are better fitted by their naturall temper, then many other nations. However, that they had it in part, as almost all other things, from the *Grecians*, is most certain;

as

as is elfewhere treated more at large in a Difcourfe *De cultu Dei fpiritali, five per intellectum*, not yet printed. Among the works of *Dionyfius Areopagita*, as commonly called, there is a little Treatife *De myftica Theologia*. Were it poffible to hope, that men would judge without prejudice or partiality, I think it might be proved, partly by what hath already been done by others, partly by what might yet be added to that purpofe, as clear as the light of the Sun it felf is, that the Author of the book cannot be that *Dionyfius*, whom he counterfeits himfelf, and many gladly believe. But it is, and would be but labour loft. So farre hath that pompous drefse of words, joyned with the fublimity of the fubject, bewitched many: befides what advantage is made by fome, of this pretended antiquity, in fome controverted points of religion. However, the Author is ancient, we grant, and good enough too for fome uſes, to deſerve reſpect at the hands of all learned men. In the Treatife *De myftica Theologia*, he teacheth a new kind of practicall Divinity, by renouncing not to the Senſes onely, but to the Underſtanding alſo, and to all intellectuall powers, faculties, and operations that are naturall: by which in time we may attain [through elevation of mind] to an union not expreſſible, nor underſtood, yet felt, and in an hidden manner operative, with God: in this union, as the perfection of man, and the height of mortall exaltation, to reſt, when attained, without paſſion, without affection, without knowledge. I will give a ſhort deſcription of this my-

* Since this written, I have seen one Sandæus, of the same argument: but have not yet found in him any thing much materiall, that is not in Herfentius: though I do not find that he maketh any mention of him any where.

stery, in the words of * *Carolus Herfentius*, one that hath commented upon that book, and hath collected out of other Authors, men and women, whatever he could meet with, to commend it and the

doctrine of it unto the world: *Cum ad hunc amoris & contemplationis gradum pervenit*, saith he, *ut nihil eorum quæ intellectu, &c. miro & incognito modo à Deo rapitur; à Deo, & in Deo suscipitur; tota Deo plena fit; tota in Deum transfunditur: ita ut essentia Dei ejus essentia & substantia intime & absque ullo modo creato uniatur. Deus autem in raptu hujusmodi, adventu suo seu illapsu, rationem & mentem obscurat, stupefacit, suspenditque: ita ut pro eo temporis intervallo nullius actionis capax sit.* We shall have the English of all this also, (the substance of it at least,) when I come to that application of it which I aim at. But I would gladly know, of whom this *Dionysius* learned this strange Divinity. It is somewhat, that *Herfentius* doth acknowledge *Dionysius* in this his doctrine, *Platoniorum dogmatum sectatorem*, p. 101. and *Platonis sectatorem accuratissimum*. p. 91. And p. 93, &c. he bringeth passages out of *Iamblichus*, *Porphyrus*, *Proclus*, noted *Platonists*, teaching in a manner the same thing. Insomuch that p. 43. he dares adventure upon so much truth, as to say, *Ego equidem dum Procli philosophi Platonici in Theologiam Platonis axiomata animadverto, firmiter mihi persuadeo aut Dionysium Procli scripta legisse;*

gisse; (a terrible businesse to be supposed, which would prove no lesse then heresie, and losse of goods and life. For then what must this *Dionysius* prove, but an impostor, seeing *Proclus* lived, all men know, some centuries of yeares since the true *Dionysius*;) *aut quod vero similis*, (yea by all means it concerns him to say so;) *Proclum libris Dionysii operam navasse*. But let the sober Reader consider: Here is a strange kind of *Divinity*, as some call it, or *Philosophy*; of which much hath been written (in many volumes by some of them,) by *Platonick* Philosophers, grounding all upon expresse passages (though drawn much further, by the *Arabs* especially, then he ever intended perchance,) of their master *Plato*: insomuch that *Hersentius* himself, as observed before, is forced to call *Dionysius*, a *Platonist*, for teaching this doctrine. We find nothing of it (except we draw things *obtorto collo*, as we say;) in the Gospel of Christ; nothing in ancient Fathers of greatest antiquity: and yet likely after all this, that *Proclus* learned it from *Dionysius*. But what if we find other Philosophers also, besides *Plato*, that lived some hundred of years before the true *Dionysius*, teach the same doctrine more clearly then *Plato* himself; as clearly almost, as either *Proclus*, or *Dionysius*? It cannot be displeasing to them that are Scholars, if I take some pains to discover some mysteries of this mystery of darknesse, which for ought I know, have not yet been brought to light by any man. Who is the true Author of those Metaphysicks, or rather fragments of Meta-

physicks, that go under *Theophrastus* his name, certainly I cannot tell. We find them adscribed to divers Authors by ancient Greek Philosophers: yet by some very ancient (though not found in the Catalogue of his books set out by *Diogenes Laertius*, where divers books of his are missing as well as this;) to *Theophrastus* himself. learned *Sylburgius* leaves it doubtfull. *Theophrastus* was one of *Aristotles* own disciples, and succeeded him in his School; much commended by him: an excellent Philosopher certainly by those works of his (not the twentieth part of what he had written,) that remain unto this day. Those Fragments of Metaphysicks, whoever be the Author, who must have lived long before Christ, are a choice piece; but very imperfect, and therefore the more obscure. In the eighth Chapter of these Fragments, (as divided in *Sylburgius* his edition: for in *Aldus*, long before that, I find none:) after a long discourse of the speculation of principles, we find these words: Μέχρι μὲν οὖν πᾶσι δυνάμεθα δι' αἰτίης θεωρεῖν τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅσοι τῶν αἰδιόσεων λαμβάνοντες. Ὅταν δ' ἐπ' αὐτά τε ἀκρὰ καὶ πρῶτα μεταβάνωμεν, ἐκ ἐπὶ δυνάμεθα, εἴτε διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν αἰτίαν· εἴτε διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀδύναμιν, ὥσπερ πρὸς τὰ φωτεινότερα βλέπεν. τάχα δ' ἐκείνο ἀληθέστερον, ὡς αὐτῶν τῶν νῶν ἡ θεωρία διήκοντι, καὶ οἷον ἀφ' αὐτῶν. διὸ καὶ ἐκ ἔστιν ἀπάτη περὶ αὐτά· χαλεπή δὲ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ ἡ σὺν νου καὶ ἡ πύξις. All that know any thing of Philosophy, be it never so little, cannot but have heard of *Aristotles* opinion, so much disputed in the schools of Philosophers: that the understanding, whilst joyned with the body, can do nothing without the senses. of which we also have had occasion to consider at large in another work, (*De origine Idololatriæ*) not yet

yet printed. *Theophrastus* therefore here saith; *That to some degree or measure, we may contemplate and know the first causes scientifically, that is, by their causes, from things sensible: (or, by the help of the same senses:) But when once ascended to the Summities, or Originall Firsts, we can go no further: either because they have no cause; or partly because of our weaknesse, as in matter of sight, (he had this similitude, upon the like occasion, from his master Aristotle;) When we would look upon that (to wit the Sun,) which is most bright and splendid. And in this case, it may be true indeed, (by which words Theophrastus doth seem to referre to the speech of some former noted Philosopher, whether Aristotle or Plato:) that all knowledge and contemplation [of the first causes] must be by very touching and feeling (that is, union, or conjunction, as in the former testimonies:) of the mind, or intellect. Whence it is that such knowledge (grounded upon a kind of feeling, of all senses the most certain in man; by which also he doth sometimes correct the errours of his eyes; or rather, because immediately from God:) is not liable to error; however the comprehension of this very thing, and the certainty of it, (or, though that degree of knowledge, necessary before a man can attain to this; as of *confidence also;) be a thing of great difficulty. So *Theophrastus* there. And now I would desire the Reader, that hath so much curiosity for the truth, to read over that Discourse (it is very short, and will take but little time:) of this pretended *Dionysius*, and tell himself, when he hath done*

*See Chap. 6.

done, (some common things concerning the incomprehensibleness of God, laid aside,) whether the very pith and marrow of it, be not in those few lines. I will appeal unto *Herfentius*, who in his paraphrase at the end, summs up all in these words: *Fatendum igitur, si Deus à nobis aliqua ratione agnoscipotest, sola ignoratio, silentio, conjunctione supra sensum & mentem, per ipsam animæ unionem agnosci.* As for that *θεῶν νέφος*, that *divine cloud*, which the Author proposeth at the first, as his chiefest argument; I know there is ground enough for it, as in the nature, so in the Word of God: as by the Greek Commentators upon this *Dionysius* is well shewed. But of this *νέφος* of Gods nature, how to extract a

*Some may make a difference between *ignoratio* and *ignorantia*. But I know not how to do it in English: except I may be allowed to say *unknowingness*; or the like.

νέφος τῆς ἀγνοίας, a *mist* of **ignorance* in man, (as the Author elsewhere speaketh,) as the readiest way to the knowledge of God, so much pressed by this Author, and so much commended unto others by the abettors of this strange doctrine; I know no ground at all for it either in reason, or Scripture. However, I am much

beholding to that phrase. It hath put me in mind of somewhat that may serve very well further to discover this imposture. *Synesius* is a man well known among Scholars: he was made Bishop against his will, for his great fame and worth. He did oppose it very much: and in very truth, in some of his writings, even since a Bishop, as I take it, he sheweth himself a better *Platonist*, then sound Christian. It

seems

seems that even in his dayes this new Divinity began to be in request among Christians, and some illiterate Monks and others took hold of this magnified *ἀγνοια* or *absolute ignorance*, to bring themselves into reputation, as though they had been the only wise and godly men of the world, because the most ignorant; but pretending by that ignorance, to have nearest access unto God, and most of God in themselves. Hereupon *Synesius* wrote that exquisite piece, which he inscribed *Dio*; (because in very deed, *Dio Chrysostomus* a great part of his subject;) to prove the necessity of humane Learning and Philosophy, to all that will contemplate of high things with sobriety and good successe. He doth not deny but that some such transcendent wits and natures have been, (but Phoenix like, scarce one in an Age,) who without any such preparation, have been able by the sublimity of their naturall parts and excellencies, to ascend without steps to the highest that man can reach. but that any of those professors of ignorance, that pretended to that happy condition, were such, he doth very peremptorily deny. He tells them of their fopperies and manifold extravagancies in their language, and writings; by which a man might sooner guesse them to be sunk much lower then ordinary nature, then to have attained to any supernaturall sublimity. I would have the Reader observe those words, τὸ ἰσχυρὸν, τὸ ἐπὶ κενῶν λόγῳ, τὰ ἀνέχα, ἢ ἐπαφὴ τῆς πρώτης, and the like; which be terms of Art, & much used in this mysticall science: by which it doth plainly appear, that he

meant

meant those very men, whom I speak of. *God forbid, saith he there in a place, that we should think that if God dwell in us, he should dwell in any other part of us, then that which is rationall: which is his proper Temple. It cannot be certainly, that Truth should be found in Ignorance; or that he should be wise truly, which is irrational: with many such things to that purpose.*

Yea he tells them also of their affected silence and taciturnity. *Ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ ἀπιστεῖν αὐτοῖς βόλομαι, &c.* He would not believe that they were Mysteries indeed, that made them dumb, because inexpressible: not but that it is the nature of things really sublime, to be so; but because he saw nothing in them or from them, that argued either knowledge, or capacity of things farre under Mysteries. But the Reader must not expect that satisfaction from me, which he may give himself, if he will read *Synesius* himself. There is nothing of *Synesius*, but is very good in his kind, and well worth any mans reading: this, both good and usefull, more then any other part of him, if I be not mistaken. It is pity, it is no better translated. but indeed more pity, that he should be read in any other language then his own; it is so very good and elegant.

Now to come to that use of this last question and consideration, which at the first I aimed at: I shall not here dispute, how farre a well-grounded intelligent Philosopher may adventure in this kind of mysticall Theology (a word common to heathens, it is well known, as well as to Christians;) for the discovery of any truth, above ordinary humane ra-

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tiocination; nor whether the most illiterate among Christians, whether men or women, may not attain sometimes by Gods speciall favour, and reall holinesse and sanctity, to the highest mysteries of Christian religion; which as we deny not, so we are sure, is nothing at all to this purpose; nor lastly, whether the true knowledge and love of Christ, joyned with a holy life, have not in many, or most, (in some more, in some lesse,) a ravishing power, set out allegorically in the book of Canticles, and other Scriptures: All these, as altogether impertinent to the question and case we are upon, I shall passe by. That which we are to consider, is, whether this *Mysticall Theology*, as they call it, by renouncing to all senses, to all knowledge, and intellectuall operation, that is, in effect, by affected Ecstasies and Enthusiasms, be a probable way, to compassse a more perfect, reall and substantiall union with God, or Christ, then otherwise is to be compassed: whether the writings of some ancient and later *Platonists*, *Greeks* and *Arabs*, Heathens and *Mahometans*, be a sufficient ground and warrant for it, to them that professe to adscribe more to the Scriptures, received among Christians for divine, by which sobriety of sense is so much commended unto us; then to the opinions of heathen Philosophers. but more particularly, whether allowable or commendable in women, whom all men know to be naturally weaker of brain, and easiest to be infatuated and deluded. But this last is the thing I intend specially to insist upon, by reason of that example

ample mentioned in the Epistle to the Reader; by consideration of which (finding it backed with so much authority,) I was first provoked to undertake this whole Discourse: having also some respect to some very near unto me by kindred, of the same, or like profession.

The life of sister Catharine of Jesus, &c. at Paris: 1628. See the Epistle to the Reader.

This supposed holy Maid, whom we are now to consider of, was from her infancy, according to the relation, which we must trust to, very devout: and, as averse from any worldly pomp and pleasure; so, strangely addicted to bodily penances and voluntary chastisements. We will conclude nothing of this. We know well enough what the Apostle writeth of himself, and what hath been the practise of some truly devout, in times of purest devotion and piety. However, it is sure enough, that such immoderate castigations and vexations, may be an effect of melancholy, as well as religion; and had not that famous, shall I say, or infamous *Porphyrius*, lighted upon a better friend, to take him off in time, he had never lived to plot and write so much against Christians and Christ himself, as he did. *Zeno* the Philosopher was wont to say, *Let me be mad, rather than in pleasure*: not considering that even in pain there is pleasure, if a man thereby please his own mind, and think highly of himself, (wherein the height of humane contentment and ambition often lieth,) because he can endure much. Certainly, there would never have been so many *Stoicks* and *Cynicks* in the world, who

who when they might have lived otherwise, (and some of them of their own accord parted with good means and temporall estates for it,) chose to beg, and to be trampled upon by every idle Rascall that met them, to make good their profession of unpassionatnesse; had it not been so, that pain and pleasure are things which oftentimes depend more on phansie, then realitie; and that pleasure may be found, where others feel pain. When I lived in *Somerset-shire*, (where first called to the discharge of holy Duties,) there was in a Gentlewomans house (a woman of good estate and reputation, much given to hospitality; where I my self have been often kindly entertained;) a naturall Fool, but usefull enough in a great house for some services; who took a singular pleasure in being whipped, even unto blood: and it was one or two lusty Maids (for it must be done by Maids, to give him content,) their task every morning, when they could intend it. He was not pleased, nor would follow his businesse so well all the day after, if it were not done. Since this, I have had information from a very good hand, of such another example, as to point of whipping unto blood, with pleasure: but with farre more aggravating circumstances, otherwise. But I will forbear particulars for his sake, from whom I had my information; not for his, that was the subject of it, who deserves it not: but rather to be made known, that he might be looked upon, and abhorred in all places, (though, what is monstrous in these times?) as a monster. But what do I talk of
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one fool? or of one monster? whereas we find it recorded by good Historians, that whole nations at once, have been posselt, shall I say, or infected, with this phrensie? Were I in a place where books are to be had, I should be able perchance to give a better account of what I say to the Reader. I am very confident I have read it in more then one, with observations made upon it, as an epidemicall disease or distemper; though by more I know adscribed to mere devotion. But to supply that defect as well as I can, I will here impart unto the Reader what I find of it in my Father, of B. M. his *Adversaria*.

Διαμυστικός *desiderium repente populos*
Europa invadit.

Memorabilis historia: Circa An. Dom. 1260. cum pauci in Italia velut sydere afflati cepissent sese ex pœnitentia flagellare, miro casu ad reliquos Europa populos exemplum manavit, & eos quoque cupiditas flagellandi se incessit.

Vide Chron. Patav. mona. p. 612. 1613.

And who hath not heard of the *Milesian* Virgins; a thing so generally attested by all Ancients, that no man can reasonably make a question of the truth of it? A humor took them to make themselves away. no perswasions of friends, or parents, or any thing else that was most dear unto them, nor any other means that could be thought of, were effectually to perswade them to live. There was scarce
any

any house left in the Town, that mourned not for some of these self-executioners. Untill at last a simple device (as it commonly falls out with them that labour of a limited melancholy to some one object: of which we had examples before;) did that which no obligation, either civil or naturall, could do before: to make them fear that, which of all fears otherwise, is generally accounted, and by some Philosophers absolutely determined, to be most naturall unto all.

At what age of her life this Maid began to fall into Trances and Ecstasies, I cannot find by the Storie, which is not digested into yeares. But from her first generall confession, which she made but 9. yeares old, [p. 6, 20.] she began to talke much of Gods presence; and phansie to her self, that she saw God visibly, every time she went to Church. And being asked whether she suffered any distraction of senses; she said, no; (I wonder who doth in that case:) and was believed. The first visible fit, it seems, began in the Church, [p. 33.] with a trembling: so that she let her Wax-candle, (which by the proper ceremonie of the day, she held in her hand,) fall to the ground, and could not take it up. From that time, her visions, it seems, began to be very frequent. and I find it observed, [p. 31, 33, 45, 50] that she could seldome speak, or expresse her self, when she had seen any thing; so that she only reaped the benefit of those great secrets and mysteries, which God is said to have revealed unto her.

But from 21. of her life, [p. 38. 54.] her ecstasies began to be very strong, and would last three or four houres in a day: so that she did verily think her self to be in heaven, sometimes, [p. 39.] when she was upon earth, at her ordinarie (as is noted) employment.

Pag. 34. (and 61, 63, 64, 65.) of the Story, Christ is said to have drawn her soul into his. Pag. 45, 46, 47. to have taken possession of her: and more particularly, (which the author of the relation professeth not to understand,) to have marked her with a mark: and afterwards to have abided in her, by presence, and by operation, to her last day.

Pag. 47. It is directly affirmed, that she was for the most part, deprived of her naturall wit and understanding.

Pag. 52. She was one day transported besides herself in a Garden, and for the space of an hour (which by the Relation is called, *a strong operation of God*,) continued saying over and over, *God doth put his Power in me, God doth put his Wisdome in me, and his Knowledge.*

Pag. 54, &c. She often saw, and in some degree suffered (through fright, &c.) the pains of Hell. I know not at what time of her age; but it might be the first direct ecstasie she had, for ought I can gather by the relation. She was, according to her own relation, [p. 39.] in a Cave, called *S. Denys* his Cave, because by tradition, *S. Denys*, with divers other Martyrs, had inhabited it by the space of two years; and therefore had in great reverence by the whole

whole Convent. In that Cave being alone, (and let the Reader judge, whether that holy Cave alone, with the opinion they had of it, was not enough to put any melancholick maid, devoutly given, into an ecftafie:) ſhe ſaw Heaven and Hell, and the Soul of *Chriſt* in its purity.

Pag. 75. She is yet reported to have been exalted higher: for that the Soul of Chriſt (who was ſaid before to have drawn her Soul into his,) did draw her into an operation of the Holy Trinity: in which operation ſhe is ſaid to have continued unto the end of her life. How this to be underſtood, muſt not be expected from me. All my care is, not to miſrelate any thing, or to make it worſe, by my tranſlation, then I find it

Pag. 91. God puts upon her, (as our Story tells us,) the care of the affairs of *France*: which ſhe did accept, and commend her ſelf unto God at the ſame time.

Pag. 101. She foretold ſomewhat of her death, that it ſhould not be a naturall death, nor by ordinary means. But it fell out otherwiſe, though the Story doth endeavour to make it good: but in vain. For ſhe died of a generall Conſumption of the body, (the moſt naturall death that could happen to ſuch a life,) which ended in a continuall Fever, with a kind of Lethargy, or *caros*: very violent at the laſt; and ſo made an end of her. It ſeems ſhe did not think to die, when ſhe did, as our Story tells us, [p. 115, 117.] which I ſuppoſe would tell us no more of that, then it muſt needs.

She had some strange sights before her death. As for example; that there is a plenitude of God in all things, even to the least Ant. which is very philosophicall; but not very easie to be understood by ordinary people, and more apt to be mistaken to some hereticall sense; as somewhat was by the *Manicheans*, not much different.

These, (not to speak of her spirituall temptations, which were frequent and terrible, & some obscure intimations of Miracles; for which we will rather commend the ingenuity of the Relator, considering what is ordinarily done by others, upon such occasions, then find fault:) these, I say, be the chief particulars, which her Story doth afford: which as I propose to the learned Readers consideration; so shall I not, submitting to better judgements, stick in the mean time to declare mine own. Truly I do not see any cause to believe that in any of these many Visions or Ecstasies, there was any thing at all supernaturall, either divine or diabolicall, more then is in every common disease: wherein we acknowledge as the hand of God alwayes; so the ministry of the Devil, if not alwayes, very often, as was before declared. I conceive them all, both Visions and Ecstasies, to have been the effect of pure melancholy; very agreeable to what hath happened unto other melancholick persons, in other places. Whether I should blame the ignorance, or the superstition of them that had to do with her, or both, I know not: but I think they were to blame, and that she had ill luck to fall into such hands. They do

do well to make her amends what they can, after her death: but I think it had been more charitable, to have used some means for the cure of her melancholy, by which (with Gods blessing upon the means alwayes to be presupposed,) she might have been preserved in life. As for her expressions, of Christs drawing her soul into his, and the like; so agreeable, in effect, to those of the *Platonists*, and *Arab Philosophers*, the terms onely (*Christ for God*) changed: I have no suspicion for all that, that she was acquainted with them, nor with any secrets of that mysticall Theology that came from them; but that naturally, according to the condition of her temper, she fell into those phantasies, which some enthusiastick Philosophers before, not by vertue of their Philosophy, but through distemper of their enthusiastick brains, had lighted upon.

I have expressed my self the more freely in this businesse, not that I take any pleasure, or have any ambition at all, to oppose the judgement of others: which if I were ambitious to do, I could have found matter enough to busie my self, long before this: but because I judged it a matter of great consequence, not onely for the preservation of some lives, but of Truth, (more precious then many lives,) which hath in all Ages suffered by nothing more, then by pretended Enthusiasms; and of publick Peace, which hath often been disturbed by such, whether artifices, or mere mistakes.

But I have not yet done with my *Theologia mystica*: which being so proper to my subject, I must

not passe it over superficially. The Reader that is not learned, will have patience if I desire to gratify them that are. *Hersentius* his authorities for this kind of Divinity, so much magnified by him, are all either Heathen Philosophers, (greatest opposers of Christianity,) *Plotinus*, *Proclus*, *Porphyrus*, *Iamblichus*; or very late and inconsiderable Writers, *Ioannes Rusbrocius*, *Henricus Harphius*, *Ludovicus Blosius*, (or rather *Thalerus*,) and one Woman, *Sancta Teresa*: not one word out of any ancient Father, (in that Chapter) *Greek* or *Latine*; not so much as out of *S. Augustine*, or *Gregory* the Great, or *S. Bernard*: who otherwise, of true Christian Raptures, proceeding from intent love and admiration, grounded not upon Ignorance and self-conceitednesse, but sound Knowledge and Piety; might have afforded matter for a bigger volume, then that whole Discourse, with all that hath been written either by *Dionysius* (so called,) or any other of that Sect, comes too. But I will deal very ingenuously with the Reader. There was one *Maximus*, in the dayes of *Heraclius* Emperour of *Constantinople*: of whom we are bound to speak with honour, because he suffered for the true Faith. Whether it were he, whose *Greek Scholias* are extant upon this *Dionysius*, is doubted by some: but more probable that it is. This *Maximus* (besides other works of his, some extant, some not,) hath written a *Mystagogia*: which I suppose to be altogether of the same argument as this *Mystica Theologia* of *Dionysius*. It was published by *David Hæschelius*, a learned man, to whom we

ow many other good books, but it hath not been my luck ever to see it. But though not that, yet I have seen and often read, sometimes with admiration, sometimes with indignation, another work of his, (not much known, I believe,) which he calleth his *Κεφάλαια Θεολογικά, καὶ οἰκονομικά*: printed at *Paris*, besides later editions, very elegantly, by *Guiliel. Morellius*, an. Do. 1560. fitted by remote allegoricall interpretations of Scripture, for Christians; but written by him in imitation of *Porphyrius*, and other Heathens, their *ἀπορρητὰ*, as they call them; from whom also he hath taken some things *verbatim*. There indeed we shall find this *mysticall Theologie* in its height, in divers places. I can easily believe that so holy a man, in his ordinary conversation, and so profound a Philosopher, as he shews himself by his writings, might make good use of such meditations, and elevations of thoughts; and yet keep himself within sobriety. but that it is a dangerous book otherwise for ordinary capacities, apt to turn all Religion and all Scripture (in weaker brains) into mere phansie, and * Teutonick Chimericall extravagancies, I do, upon grounds of reason, as verily believe, as I do the former, charitably. I know not whether it be for the better, or for the worse: but sure I am, that his meaning is often mistaken by the *Latine* Interpreter; whereof I

* *Wigelius*, *Stifelius*, *Jac. Behmius*; and divers others of that country; mere Fanatics; as unto any sober man may appear by their Writings: some of which have been translated into English. But of them and their phrensies, see more, if you desire it, in *Christ. Becmanus* (not to mention others,) his *Exercitationes Theologicæ*.

shall give but one instance, because of some further use that may be made of it. Centur. 2. κεφ. ιγ'. Τὴν αμείνον λαβὼν ἔνωσιν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν ὁ νῆς, τὴν τε νοεῖν καὶ νοεῖσθαι παντελῶς δύναμιν ἔχει χαλάσσειν. His meaning is, according to the principles of this Divinity, by him more at large explained in some former Aphorisms, that by this immediate, intimate Union with God, by which he sticks not to say, that the soul is actually Deified, all operations of the understanding do cease. The Interpreter quite contrary: *Mens immediatam erga Deum unionem adeptam, totis viribus in id incumbit, ut intelligat & intelligatur.* That which deceived him, are the words, νοεῖν and νοεῖσθαι, which so joyned, he did not understand to be put, as often, figuratively, to intimate an absolute cessation of all understanding. So Gen. 31. 29. *either good or evil*: where *evill* only was intended, properly. And Numb. 23. 25. *neither curse them at all, nor blesse them at all*: where *cursing* was extremely desired and endeavoured; and *blessing* onely properly intended to be forbidden. And so I believe Matth. 12. 14. *three dayes & three nights*, which hath so much troubled Expositors, should be understood: *three nights* added onely for the more emphaticall expression of *three dayes*. *Three dayes*, really and truly; (though not three full dayes;) as men are wont to understand dayes ordinarily, not figuratively; and therefore set out by their contraries also, the nights. But in Etmapius certainly, τὸ λυπόμενον αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸ ἠδόμενον ἀπέδετε, is no more then *omnia humana contemnebat*: where-as learned Hadr. Iunius, translating, *Delicias suas*,

Et excruciantem se aegritudinem exuit, makes *Eunapius* clearly to contradict himself, who both before and afterwards, sets out *Porphyrius*, as plunged in deepest melancholy, and not likely to hold out much longer, had not *Plotinus* come to his succour in time.

This mention of *Eunapius* puts me in mind of *Alypius* that Pygmie Philosopher, who through continuall contemplation (if we may believe the story,) having reduced his body to almost nothing; *Eunapius* saith, (but there too mistaken by the *Latine* Interpreter,) that the saying of *Plato* was verified in him, That whereas the souls of ordinary men were placed in their bodies; the bodies of holy men and Philosophers were placed in their souls. But this is nothing to what we read of *Ignatius Loyola*, whose body was so transformed into soul, that he could lift and bear himself up in the air to a good height, without wings; as we shall find perchance in its proper place. For it was at his prayers onely that he could do it, when he was at the height of the spirit, as my Author tells me.

But to return to *Maximus*, and what I intended of him. Although I honour his Sufferings, yet I do not think my self bound by that to approve his Doctrine. Neither do I think that *Photius* had much better opinion of that work, then I have; who plainly censureth it, as an *abortive*, or *adulterinum foetum*. (wherein the *Latine* Interpreter, apparently swarving from the originall *Greek*, makes him say the contrary.) not that he doubted *Maximus*
to

to be the Author; no more then he did of those *ἀπορήματα καὶ λύσεις*: concerning which he gives the Reader a large account before: but because he judged neither the one nor the other, (being both of a strain; those *Aporemata* and these *κατάλητα*;) worthy of that *Maximus*, the Author of those *Centurie*, *De Charitate*: which he much commends, and deservedly. And why should not the authority of so many ancient Fathers, and many of them Martyrs too, as well as he; who because they neither practised it (though not unknown unto them, as excellent Philosophers, some of them,) themselves, this *Mysticall Theologie* I mean, nor any where in their writings commend it unto others, must needs be supposed to have condemned it; why not their authority, say I, more considerable, then the authority of one or two, so long after, and so much inferior unto them? But besides, how contrary to the doctrine of best Schoolmen, I appeal to *Thom. Aquinas*, 2. 2. *questione* 174. who there very solidly proveth and asserteth the excellency of rationall intellectuall Christian knowledge, above all prophesy: to whom also that excellent Rabbi *Ben Maimon*, the *Aquinas* of the Rabbins, doth agree in divers places of his *More Nevuchim*, making it (rationall intellectuall Divinity) the highest degree of prophesie: who also hath a Chapter there (of very good use, to keep men from running themselves out of their right wits,) of moderation to be observed in Contemplation. I shall therefore conclude concerning this way of Theology;

First,

First, that as it hath its origine from heathen Philosophers, & by them recommended unto us, as the highest and most perfect way: so it is extremely derogatory to the Scriptures, and to the Doctrine of Christ, where no footstep of it is to be seen; but contrarily, much against it, as it deprives a man of the use of Reason.

Secondly, that although it be granted, that some profound Philosophers, by the advantage of such and such a naturall Disposition, of a strong, well-settled and temper'd brain, &c. may make some use of it to their own content: yet to commend it to ordinary people, and to women especially, is to perswade them to madnesse; and to expose them to the illusions of the Devil, alwayes readie to take such advantages.

Thirdly, that the use of this Theologie, doth most properly belong unto *Iesuits*, (which I would not have understood of any truly pious and peaceable amongst them:) and *Iesuited* Politicians, whether they call themselves *Lutherans*, or *Calvinists*, or otherwise; who having designes *pro re nata* upon the lives of Kings and Princes, (or whoever else they be, whom they would have out of the way,) have no better way, when open force doth fail, to bring their designes to passe, then by the hands of such, whom they have brought up to this mysticall art. For what will not even a sober man do, upon a strong, whether right or wrong, apprehension of Heaven or Hell? How much more those, who besides their common obligation of blind obedience,
by

by long, forced, wild contemplation, are become ecstaticall, that is, fitted for any desperate attempt?

Neither can I have any better opinion (in point of *Sciences*) of that *Method*, which of late years hath been proposed by some, and by many (whom *Plutarch* would not have thought very wise, for looking with more admiration upon fierie Meteors, & other apparitions of the Air, then ever they did upon the Sun, by whom we enjoy all that is comfortable in this world;) gladly entertained. For my part, I never looked upon it as a *New Method*, as to the main end of it: knowing that *Numa Pompilius* long before, and before him *Minos*, and some others, to make their Lawes received as Oracles, did their best to perswade, that they did not come by them as other men did by theirs; but that they were the fruits of Caves, and darknesse: not to speak of what hath been devised by severall Poets in that kind, to inhaunce their reputation. And it seemes the Author did not altogether misse of his aim in that. But for the pretended end of it, to direct others; if he would have dealt ingenuously, he might in two or three lines, that had contained the names but of three or four herbs, have prescribed a farre shorter way. I meddle not with his abilities, what ever they were. I believe he saw much in the Mathematicks; and he might, in divers other things: though I would not have any man to rely upon his demonstrations, concerning either the being of a God, or the Immortalitie of the Soul. But his abilities

ties I question not: his *Method*, having so much affinity with this *Mysticall Theologie*, against which I think too much cannot be said, I could not passe it without some censure. I am one, I confesse, that think reason should be highly valued by all creatures, that are naturally rationall. Neither do I think we need to seek the *Image of God* in man elsewhere, then in perfect Reason; such as he was created in. *Holinesse* and *Righteousnesse* were but fruits of it. Let others admire *Witches* and *Magicians*, as much as they will; who by their art can bring them their lost precious rings, and Jewels: I honour and admire a good *Physician* much more, who can (as Gods instrument,) by the knowledge of nature, bring a man to his right wits again, when he hath lost them: and I tremble (*homo sum, & humani à me nihil alienum puto:*) when I think that one Mad man is enough to infect a whole Province. Somewhat to that purpose we have had already: and I doubt, whether by this there would have been one sober man left in all *Spain*, had not the *Alumbrados*, or *Illuminated sect*, which also pretended much to Contemplation, and thereby to Ecstasies and mysticall unions, been suppressed in time.


In the former edition, I mentioned these *Alumbrados* only by the way, as occasion offered it self. But since that, having heard much of a new generation of men, that are called *Quakers*, and seen also some printed papers against them; where I expected to find somewhat (upon so much affinity) of these *Alumbrados*, but did not: I think it season-


seasonable to let my Reader know that those men ,
 so called in *Spain*, were no other , in most of their
 Tenets & practises, then these our *Quakers* are now
 in *England*; so that the matter is not so much to be
 wondred at, as it is by many , if the Devil , in such
 times of libertie , (*exceptis excipiendis*; which may
 easily be understood :) play the same pranks in *Eng-
 land*, which he did before in *Spain*. I confesse I am
 very destitute of books at this time, to give the Rea-
 der so good an account of this businesse, as I could
 wish. All I can say of them, now , is out of some
French books, where I find a large *Edict* against
 them, containing their severall Tenets and errors;
 whereof one was , *That mentall Prayer only , with
 contemplation, was necessarie: vocall, and all other du-
 ties of Religion, superstitious, or improfitable.* Another;
*That certain ardors , or burnings , tremblings , (or ,
 quakings ,) and swoonings , which they did find in
 themselves , were a sufficient token of grace, and that
 they needed nothing else, that had attained unto them.*
 Another; *That they might be God, visibly in their ec-
 stasies, &c. That all things ought to be done, by immedi-
 ate motions and inspirations, &c. That they can give
 the Holy Ghost by breathing , or otherwise.* I do not
 know whether all these do belong to our *Quakers*
 also: neither is it likely , that they agree in all parti-
 culars: as it is not likely that the *Quakers* them-
 selves , of all parts of the Realm, are yet agreed upon
 which to professe, or to believe. Here is enough
 I think, to give a man ground to say, that ours might
 come from those: or at least, that they had but once
 begin-

beginning. But for my part, for the beginning both of the one, and of the other, I think I must go much higher: as I may have an opportunitie to shew in my Second Part, if God grant me life and health, (which I have wanted a long time:) to finish it. These *Alumbrados* of *Spain* came first to be known, and talked of, in the year of the Lord 1623. which may be a sufficient direction to them that have books, or can come at them, where to find more of them.

Here I should have ended this Chapter, which hath taken up, I believe, the greatest part of this whole Discourse. But I promised somewhat of *Mahomet*: I must acquit my self of that before. I have perused severall relations of *Greek* Authors, set out by *Sylburgius*, *an. Dom.* 1595. concerning the beginning of *Mahomet*. They all agree, that a naturall disease was his first inducement. Some call it a *Palsie*; but more, and, I believe, more truly, *πῆξις τῆς ἐπιληψίας*, that is, an *Epilepsie*, or *epilepticall distemper*. of which he made that advantage, as to beget himself Divine authority. Now to such a disease, how naturally incidentall strange Visions and Apparitions are, by which the parties themselves, deeming their phantasies and visions, realities and truths, are often deceived; I appeal to former examples. I could have told of them too, that have thought books brought unto them by Angels, in their Ecstasies; and some such other things, which may come somewhat near to *Mahomet's* case. Now whether he might not be deceived at first, before he used

used other Arts and Impostures, the better to countenance his Phrensies , I propose it as a disputable matter. In point of *Mahometisme* , as to the horridness of the delusion, whether so or no, it is all one, I know. It makes it neither greater, nor lesse. Neither do I make any question, but that the Devil was a chief actor in the progresse of it. But when we shall consider with our selves seriously , what these beginnings , that began with epilepticall Raptures and Ecstasies , and supposed revelations of Angels , & the like, came to afterwards; it would, it should I am sure, (& to that end I mention him here,) make men the more warie, either how they give credit to such fits & revelations of others; or how themselves , by their ignorance or indiscretion, expose themselves to delusion.





CHAP. IV. Of Rhetoricall Enthusiasme.

The Contents.

The nature and causes of Speech, a curious and usefull speculation: by the perfect knowledge whereof the deaf & dumb (so naturally) may be taught not onely to understand whatsoever is spoken by others; as some (upon credible information) have done in England; but also to speak and to discourse, as one very lately, a Noble-man, in Spain. A Spanisb book teaching that Art. Another way to teach the dumb to speak, out of Valesius. A dumb man, that could expresse himself, and understand others perfectly, by writing. Another pregnant example out of Nicolaus Tulpius, his Observaciones Medicæ: which makes it clear, that it is possible (though not without long and curious observation,) for deaf men, to speak and discourse: as also possible, for any others, by the same art, fully and freely to communicate, at a certain distance, without any sound, or voice. But this, where there is no need, rather to be avoided, then sought in curiosity, with much expense of time. Another use of this knowledge, conceited, but not affirmed. ¶ The dependance of reason, and speech; both, αἰνῶς in Greek. Rhetorick, what it is; of what use; and whether absolutely necessary. The matter and method of this Chapter, in four propositions or particulars. I. That divers ancient Orators did really apprehend themselves inspired, &c. Enthusiasm in point of speech, used by some Ancients metaphorically, or figuratively: by some others, properly, for divine inspiration. Longinus, Aristides, Apollonius in Philostratus, Quintilian, upon this subject. Seneca, concerning the causes of high conceptions and expressions, inconstant to himself. His violent both stile (in some places,) & spirit, noted. True valour and magnanimity, in meekness, according to Aristotle. A place of Plato considered of. Prov. 16. 1. The preparations, &c. II. That Rhetorick, or good language hath often had enthusiasick operation upon others. Demagogie, anciently, how powerfull: the Athenians, particularly, blinded & bewitched by it. Acts 17. 21. concerning the Athenians, illustrated. Philosophicall Discourses, what made them powerfull. Ancient Orators; Demosthenes and Cicero: their language both read, and heard, how strangely amazing and ravishing; proved by some notable instances. The Sophistæ of those

times, whose profession was, to amaze men both by set, and extemporary speeches. Gorgias the first of that profession, how much admired, and almost adored. Their usuall Arguments. Their extemporarie facultie, or abilitie publickly and suddainly to discourse of any subject that should be proposed unto them, proved by divers instances. Callisthenes. The Tarsenses of Asia. Adolefcens sine controversia disertus; in Aulus Gellius. This extemporary kind of speaking (by many now fondly deemed inspiration) why not so frequent in our dayes: some reasons given for it. The learning of severall tongues, &c. Synesius his way of extemporary speaking, much more strange, and almost incredible. Petavius the Iesuite, his translation of Synesius very faulty; and some examples of his mistakes. III. Whence that apprehension of divine Inspiration. Ardor, Impetus, in Latine Authors: $\Theta\acute{\epsilon}\rho\eta\mu\alpha, \pi\acute{\iota}\eta\eta$, in Greek Authors. God himself, $\Theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$, according to Hippocrates. Not Heathens onely, but Ben Maimon, and Philo Judæus, both learned Iews, mistaken in this matter. An observation of Ribera the Iesuite considered of. Spiritus in Latine Poets: $Z\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\eta$, or Zeal, in the N. T. diversly taken, and diversly (which we think should not be;) translated. IV. What causes, truly naturall, of those wonderfull operations, mistaken by many for divine and supernaturall. That some other cause besides that which is generally apprehended, must be sought or supposed, proved by the example of some notoriously wicked, as Nero, Dionysius, &c. who nevertheless took great pleasure in the exhortations of Philosophers, perswading to goodnesse and sobriety. As also by the example of poor Mechanicks, who neglected their trade, to please their ears. Passages out of Seneca and Plinius Secundus, to that purpose. First then, The power and pleasure of Musick, in good language and elocution, proved by sundrie authorities, and by arguments taken from the very nature of speech. Ezek. 33. 31, &c. Musonius. The $\sigma\upsilon\lambda\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\eta\varsigma$ or artificiall collocation of words in speech, a great mystrie of Eloquence. Dionys. Halicarn. his Treatise of that subject; and divers others. Contrarie faculties working the same effect. A passage of Plutarch considered of. Somewhat of the nature of letters and syllables, and who have written of them. Rhythmus, in matter of prose or speech, what it is. The Organs of speech; and Greg. Nyssen interpreted. Secondly, The pleasure of the eies in good language. The nature of Metaphors and Allegories. Aristotle, Cicero, Plutarch, (corrected by the way,) & some others, concerning them. Εὐάγγελον or Εὐεργόνον , what kind of figure, and how powerfull. Homer and Virgil, their proper praise, and incomparable excellencie. Opus emblematicum, vermiculatum, &c. The excellencie of that Art, and how imitated in the collocation of words. Dionys. Halicarn. and Hadrianus the Cardinall, their testimony concerning the ravishing power of elegant Elocution. Ancient Orators, their adscribing their extemporarie speaking upon emergent occasions to Nescio quis Deus, or immediate Inspiration: and Quintilian's

lian's judgement upon it. ¶ Upon this occasion, (as very pertinent to *Enthusiasme* in generall, though not to Rhetoricall *Enthusiasm* particularly,) a more generall consideration of this *Aliquis Deus*, or *Nescio quis Deus*, frequently alledged by the Ancients upon suddain occasions, or evasions. Passages out of Homer, Cicero, Plinius Secundus, to that purpose. Plutarch his rule in such cases not allowed of. To make a particular providence of every thing that may be thought to happen extraordinarily, how destructive to Gods providence in generall. A place of Aristotle's consider'd of. Cures, anciently, by Dreams and Revelations. M. A. Antoninus. the Roman Emperour. Divine revelations and apparitions in Dreams (upon other occasions too) believed by Galen, &c. Sortes Homericæ. Something in that kind amongst Christians also; and what to be thought, (if sought and studied) of it. Great caution to be used in such things. Two extremes to be avoided; Unthankfulnesse, & Superstition.

IN this Chapter we are to consider of the strange, but naturall effects of Speech; and of the causes of such effects, both in them that speak, and in them that hear: such effects and such causes, as come within the compasse of *Enthusiasme*, according to the apprehensions and expressions of ancient Authors; which is the businesse of this *Treatise*. But I will begin with some observations concerning Speech in generall: which though they belong not to *Enthusiasme* properly; yet may prove not altogether impertinent to our further enquiries, that may have more immediate relation unto it; and otherwise too not unacceptable, perchance, to the curious and philosophicall Reader.

Few men, even they that consider of many other things, take notice what a rare Art speaking is; or so much as think of it, under the notion of an Art. The reason is, because they were very little when they learned it: and though it were not without

much labour and striving; yet they had scarce wit enough to be sensible of it then, or at least, not memory enough now, to remember what they thought of it when so young. It is a curious speculation to consider what instruments nature hath provided for that use; what is the proper use of every instrument; what resemblance those instru-

* See more below,
in the 4. Particu-
lar: where of Greg.
Nyssen, Casseri-
us, &c.

ments have to some * musicall instruments; what letters are formed by the tongue especially, which by the teeth, which by the roof of the mouth, nose, throat, lips, or otherwise; and by what concurrence, motions, flexions and reflections, of such and such of those instruments, inwardly; and by what shapes, signes, and postures of the mouth, lips, and chinne, outwardly, the whole businesse is managed.

There be many mysteries and secrets of nature belonging to this Art, very worthy to be known. But the use of this knowledge, is farre greater then the curiosity. For by the perfect knowledge of these things, those that are born deaf, and by consequent, naturally dumb, are taught to speak. Whereof a rare example, in the person of a Nobleman, was lately seen in *Spain*: of which many living in *England*, persons of worth and eminency, have been both eye and ear witnesses. And for the better satisfaction, and benefit withall of posterity, a book was set out by him that was his master, under this title; *Arte para ensennar de hablar los mudos*: whereof some copies have been in *England*.

Neither

Neither could this dumb person onely ſpeak himſelf, but was able alſo to underſtand what was ſaid by others, in ſuch a language, and at ſuch a diſtance. The like whereof (as to this laſt) hath been ſeen in *England* alſo, if I may credit the relation of two grave Divines: whereof the one affirmed concerning a man, the other concerning a woman, both, deaf and dumb; which nevertheleſſe at a certain diſtance, and by diligent obſervation of the motions of the mouth and face, could tell (and would readily answer to it by ſigns,) what was ſpoken unto them. But of the woman I was told particularly, that ſhe could underſtand them onely that were beardleſſe: which is a very probable circumſtance; as they can beſt judge, who not onely have ſtudied the inward fabrick of the mouth, by which words, with aire, are immediately formed; but alſo the outward conſtitution of the mouth and face in generall, conſiſting of ſo many ſeverall muſcles, nerves, and what elſe, (*ὁμιέρες, ἴνες, σύνδεσμοι, τένοντες, &c.*) beſt known unto exact Anatomifts: as I find them curiouſly ſet out and deſcribed by *Galen* in his books *Περὶ ἀνατομικῶν ἐργηρίσεων*, in the fourth book, and elſewhere.

Since this, I have happily lighted upon another example, which is able to put all further queſtioning and reaſoning about the truth, or poſſibility of theſe relations, at an end. My Author is, *Nicolaus Tulpius*, a late Phyſician (& Senator) of *Amſterdam*, of very great credit among all that can judge of men of worth. In his *Obſervationibus Medicis*,

l. 4. cap. 18. he hath a large and very punctuall relation of one that was deaf, and did understand any language (*quemvis sermonem*, in my Author: but he meaneth, as I take it, any man speaking;) at a convenient distance, by observation of the motion of the lips. He was, by long use and practise, become very quick at it: so that so farre as his eye could reach, as, from the top of a house, or from the end of a street, (if not very long,) to see faces, and lips stirring; he would discourse readily at that distance: but with women, (saith *Tulpius*) and all such, whose lips and faces were most exposed to view, most readily, and without any stop at all, that you could not discern him from any other man. *Tulpius* would not be satisfied, untill he had seen and heard him himself: which when he had, how ravished he was with admiration of this incredible kind of sagacity, himself doth endeavour to expresse, and hath many words about it. If any man, (as some might that had not known him) had mistrusted that he was not so deaf, as he made himself; he might quickly satisfie himself. For it was all one to him, though you were a good way off, whether you made any sound or no, so you moved your lips rightly, to frame such and such words, fit to expresse your mind.

But that *Spaniard*, the Author of that book, was not the first that taught the deaf and dumb to speak: as may appear by these words of *Franciscus Valisius*, *De sacra philosophia*, cap. 3. *Petrus Pontius monachus Sancti Benedicti, amicus meus, natos surdos*

*dos (res mirabilis) docebat loqui, non alia arte, quam docens primum scribere, res ipsas digito primum indicando, quæ characteribus illis significarentur; deinde ad motus linguæ qui characteribus responderent, provocando: that is, Petrus Pontius, a Benedictine Monk, a friend of mine, was wont (a wonderfull thing!) to teach men that were born dumb, to speak: which he did by no other Art, then first teaching them to write, first pointing at the things themselves with his finger, that were expressed by such and such letters or characters; then using them to such motions of the tongue, which were answerable to those characters. Which words, though not many, may satisfie any man that hath judgement, concerning the possibility of the thing. Rodolphus Agricola, a man well known, and yet for the good use that may be made of his writings, well deserving to be yet better known unto all Scholars, affords unto us this notable example: *Surdum vidi*, saith he, &c. I myself have seen one deaf from his infancy, and consequently dumb, to have attained unto this by art, that whatsoever another did write, he was able to read and understand; and himself also, even as any other that can speak, whatsoever was in his mind, he could perfectly expresse by writing. So he. I believe this is he whom Ludovicus Vives, in his book *De Anima*, did intend: where, upon occasion of Aristotles noted axiome, that they that want the sense of hearing, are not capable of discipline, he hath these words: *Quo magis miror, fuisse mutum & surdum natum, qui literas**

Rodolp. Agric.
lib. 3. De Invention.
tione.

didicerit. Fides sit penes Rodolphum Agricolum, qui id memoria prodidit, & se illum vidisse affirmat. though the expression (*qui literas didicerit*) be somewhat ambiguous, and more likely to be construed of one that had attained to some learning, as learning is taken commonly for University learning, then of one that had learned to read and write only. However it is unquestionable, that he that had attained to that faculty of writing, to understand, and to be understood generally, as *Agricola* describeth his man, was very capable of further progresse; and not incapable, I think, of any liberall Art, or Science, if further pains had been taken with him. But this is another way, by writing; not by bare observation of the instruments of speech, whether internall or externall; concerning which our observation began. However this sheweth a possibility of the thing, by naturall means: which granted, any other cause no lesse naturall and probable may the sooner be believed.

But there is yet another use to be made of this knowledge, which to some persons and occasions may be very considerable. It is not for the dumb, this that I mean: but for them that can speak; yet would be glad sometimes perchance, upon some speciall occasions, to know how they might speak, and be spoken unto at a convenient distance, without a tongue, or noise, or almost sign discernable unto others. But this perchance may be but my phansie, and I shall not adventure many words upon it. So much I had adventured upon, before I re-
mem-

membred (for I had read the book before) *Tulpius* his example. Now I might say much more, and with more confidence: but there will be enough ready to catch at such novelties, whilest they contemne old things far more needfull to be known. It is the disease of the times, reigning in all places. New Sects: new religions: new philosophie: new methods: all new, till all be lost. For my part, I shall not commend the use of this art, or sagacity further then for the speculation of nature, and the benefit of the deaf: beyond which I think it may be of dangerous consequence. But certainly the consideration of speech in generall (which I began with,) doth afford many both curious and usefull speculations; and is a speculation, which once so much pleased me, that I had begun a *Diatriba, De ortu & natura sermonis*: which also, though not ended, was once half written out for the presse; but for want of an *amanuensis*, it went not further; and is not very likely now, so long after, ever to come to any thing. Yet I have been the more willing to mention these particulars, to excite some body else to undertake so plausible an argument, which may to many be both pleasing in the speculation, and profitable to many purposes. I have done with my *Prologue*, and shall now proceed to the main businesse.

There is not any thing more naturall unto man, as he is a man, (that is a rationall creature,) then *Reason*. Whatsoever may seem naturall unto man besides, (in this life,) some one or two not very
con-

considerable things, as laughing perchance, or weeping, excepted, belongeth unto brutes as well as unto man; and no part of man therefore, as man, properly. *Speech* is the interpreter, or minister of *reason*, that is, of rationall thoughts, or thoughts ingendred in and by a rationall soul. Which according to their object may be distinguished into sensuall, civile, and intellectuall: but alwayes *rationall*, as they flow from a rationall cause or principle, which is the soul. Whence it is that brute beasts, though some may be taught to utter many words, and lines perchance; yet cannot be said, properly, to speak, because they understand not, truly and really, any thing that they say. Though some may be brought to some kind of practicall, or experimental apprehension of what is spoken unto them; as a Horse, or a Dog may be ruled by some words, which (by common use of mans first institution,) shall be proper to the actions which they perform: yet even then they understand not those words, as words, but sounds onely. From that subordination of *speech* unto *reason* it is, that the *Grecians* comprehend both (which neverthelesse doth cause ambiguity sometimes,) in one word, λόγος. If therefore Reason be so naturall unto man, and Speech unto Reason; it is no wonder, if as Reason is the inward principle, by which the actions of men are guided; so Speech be the most powerfull externall instrument to the same end, in reference to others.

Rhetorick (or rhetoricall speech,) is a speech dressed with certain devices and allurements, proper

per to please and to perswade. The use of such devices and allurements, is sometimes good, by the advantage of some sensuall delight, the more powerfull to inforce, or to insinuate somewhat that of it self is true, right, or reasonable. However, it is a very disputable point, whether bare speech, if well handled, be not sufficient, nay most available to perswade, in things of most weight. For those actions are best grounded, that are grounded upon judgement, upon which bare Speech hath most direct influence; as Rhetorick hath upon the Affections: and the fruits of a convicted judgement by calm reason, are likely to be more durable then those that are the effects of any passions, or affections, stirred up by rhetoricall powers. But it is an ample subject, upon which *Seneca* is very copious, and in my judgement hath done very well; though judicious *Aristotle* in his *Rhetoricks*, in two words hath comprehended all that needeth to be said in that argument. But this yet, before I leave it;

Διὰ ῥητορικῶν
καὶ πολιτικῶν.
Arist. Rhet.
lib. 3. c. 1.

That the providence of God, for the prevention of all doubts and scruples, was great, in that he would not lay the foundation of the Christian Faith, as not in the force of armes, so neither of eloquence, and artificiall speech; which is often insisted upon by *S. Paul*: as 1 Cor. *Not with wisdom* (οὐδὲν: those men that were most admired for their eloquence, whom we are to speak of, were anciently called σοφισταί.) *of words or speech*: chap. 7. 17. *Not with excellency of speech or of wisdom*: ch. 11. 1.

Not

Not with enticing words of mans wisdom: v. 4. Not in the words which mans wisdom teacheth: v. 13. of the same chapter, and elsewhere. All which, though most true, as would easily be demonstrated, if need were: yet it cannot be denied, that S. Paul in some kind and upon some subjects, is as eloquent as ever man was; not inferior to *Demosthenes* (whom I have some reason to believe, that he had read very well:) or *Æschines*, or any other anciently most admired. But this is by the way only.

The chief things I propose to my self, as was before intimated, in this Chapter, and which I conceive most pertinent to my undertaking, are these:

First, That divers ancient Orators did apprehend themselves, and were so apprehended by divers others, to be inspired, or agitated by some higher power then bare nature could pretend unto.

Secondly, That the power of Oratory hath been such in many Ancients, as that it hath had *enthusiastic* operation upon others.

Thirdly, Whence that apprehension of inspiration might probably proceed.

But *Fourthly*, and lastly, What causes truly naturall, can be given of those wonderfull operations of *Rhetorick*, which have been mistaken by many for supernaturall.

I. I will not take advantage of the words, ἐνθουσιασμός, ἐνθουσιαστής, or any other equivalent unto them: because

cause often by *Greek* Authors used figuratively, where no reall *Enthufiasme* or supernaturall agitation, fo farre at least as can be collected from the words, is intended. *Aristotle* in his *Rhetoricks*, hath the word ἐνθουσιάζειν, upon this argument, in one Chapter twice. *Dionysius Longinus*, a very great master of Rhetorick, (of whom Christians are bound to think the better, for his candid and ingenuous judgement of *Moses* his expressions about the Creation of the World; so contrary, and therefore the more considerable, to *Galen* his impertinent exceptions :) this *Longinus*, in that small book of his, as now extant, inscribed περὶ ὑψους, hath many words to that purpose. As when he saith, speaking of that kind of language, which when I was a Boy in the University, was called *strong*

lines; Πολλαχὲς γὰρ ἐνθουσιᾶν ἑαυτοῖς δοκοῦντες, ὃ βακχεύουσιν, ἀλλὰ παίζουσιν. *Many men*, saith he, *whilst they strain their wits to find somewhat that is very extraordinary,*

and may relish of some rapture, or Enthufiasme; they plainly rave, [or, play the fools,] and not ravish. The same *Longinus* again, speaking of the power of Rhetorick, in rhetoricall expressions: ὡς περ ὑπὸ μανίας

πινὸς καὶ πνεύματι ἐνθουσιαστικῷ ἐκπνέον, καὶ ὁνοεῖ φοι-

βάζον τὰς λόγους. And again, p. 61. ἔταν ἀλέγης, ὅπ' ἐνθουσιασμε καὶ παίδους βλέπειν δεκῆς, &c.

And again, p. 69. ὁνοεῖ φοιβεόληπτος γινόμενος.

And of *Plato*, p. 113. ὑπὸ βακχείας πινὸς τοῦ λόγων: &c. It appears by those qualifications, ὡς περ and ὁνοεῖ, that he in-

Longinus περὶ ὑψ. ed. in quarto, Basil. p. 7. Oxon. in octavo, cum Notis viri cl. Guil. L. p. 11.

The English of these passages is not materiall; because tending only to shew the use of the word. See also at the end of 4. Particular: of ἐνθουσιάζειν, &c.

tended

tended it onely after a sort, as things may be compared, not really. Indeed *Longinus*, though a heathen by profession, yet was not he very superstitious; as may appear by this, that he durst challenge *Homer*, (upon whom especially all heathenish *Theologie* was grounded,) though but a Poet, of Atheisme and grosse absurdity, for making his Gods to fight with men; and not onely to fight, but receive wounds also. But *Aristides* on the other side, an excellent Orator, it cannot be denied, and rationall enough in other things, but as very a *bigot*, as ever was, of a heathen; who phansied Gods in every dream, and tells us of so many wonderfull cures by nocturnall sights and revelations; who gave credit to the very *Gypsies*, in telling of fortunes: he not only of himself particularly, in his *Περὶ τῶν παρερμηνευστικῶν*, speaks very positively and peremptorily, as inspired by God, in his Orations; (of which more afterwards:) but of Rhetorick in generall, in his 1^a. *contra Platonem*, as positively and confidently maintaineth, not only that it is the gift of God, (which might very well be allowed;) as all other good and usefull things are; but also, if right and excellent, that it comes by immediate inspiration, as Oracles and Prophecies; without Study or Learning, or so much as Nature. Though indeed afterwards in the same long Oration, because he would not be wanting to his profession in any kind; he takes in both Nature, and Art, or Learning too; and would have them to belong to Rhetorick, though not to all Orators, as he maintaineth

neth of immediate inspiration. Such another as *Aristides*, for matter of superstition, but more dangerous for craft and subtilty, and a great Magician too, if all be true which even by ancient Christians is recorded of him, was *Apollonius*, that wandering Philosopher; (opposed by ancient Heathens, who adscribed Deity unto him, to Christ:) who being asked by the Governor of *Rome* under *Nero*, *Τίς ἡ σοφία*, *what was his profession*; gave him this bold answer; *Δεῖται σπὺς, καὶ ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν χεῖρσι, καὶ οὐκ ἐν σοφίᾳ*, that is, *Inspiration* (by *inspiration* understanding chiefly, as in all likelyhood, his perswasive and bewitching rhetoric, whereof he gave such proof in all places:) and how men should pray, and sacrifice unto the Gods; or, by what prayers and sacrifices the Gods are best served and pleased. But *Apollonius* was an extraordinary man, that cannot be denied: and it is not impossible but that he might be inspired indeed; but by what power, may appear by all his deeds and endeavours: of which *Eusebius* in his Treatise against *Hierocles*, that had written of him of purpose to preferre him before Christ, hath taken a brief survey, shewing great moderation (which is not ordinary,) in his Censures. Not to meddle then with such extraordinary men and examples: That it was a common opinion among the Scholars of his time, that Rhetorick and good lines came more by *Enthusiasme* then otherwise, may appear by *Quintilian*; who having elsewhere described the phantastick, or rather phrenetick gesture and

Philostr. in vita Apol. lib. 4. edit. Ald. quatern. d. 4. initio pag.

and behaviour of divers, when they were to compose; in his tenth book & twelfth chapter, he hath these words: *Vt possimus autem scribere etiam plura celerius, non exercitatio modo præstabit, in qua sine dubio multum est; sed etiam ratio: si non resupini, spectantesque lectum, & cogitationem murmure agitant, expectaverimus quid obveniat; sed quid res possat, quid personam deceat, quod sit tempus, qui iudicis animus, intuiti, humano quodam modo accesserimus.* This, I think, is the reading of most editions: which I will not warrant to be perfect; though more perfect, I believe, and correct, than that of *Aldus* his edition, which in this place, certainly, goes furthest from the true. A little labour perchance might help the businesse. My opinion is, that one, and but one word is wanting, which by reason of the affinity with the former, might very well *excidere*, or be passed over: as is very frequent in all Manuscripts. But since he may be understood without it, I will spare my further labour.

But it is well worthy our observation, that *Seneca* the Philosopher, so learned a man, doth seem to have been of that opinion too: *Non potest grande aliquid, & supra ceteros loqui, nisi mota mens. Cum vulgaria & solita contempsit, instinctuque sacro surrexit excelsior; tunc demum aliquid cecinit grandius ore mortali. Non potest sublime quicquam & in arduo positum contingere, quamdiu apud se est. Desciscat oportet à solito, & efferatur, & mordeat frenos; & rectorem rapiat suum;*

Senec. de tranquill. cap. ult.

eoque ferat, quo per se timuisset * *ascendere*. Here is perfect *Enthusiasme*, with allusion to the *Sybills*, and such others as were generally conceived to be posselt. Yet whether *Seneca* himself did believe so much, as his words seem to import, is a question: it being his manner, to be very high and tumid in his expressions; which neverthelesse a sober reader will not alwayes take to the utmost of what they will bear. But to his reasons and arguments. I believe *Aristotle*, here quoted by *Seneca*, that all transcendent wits are subject to some mixture: neither do I believe that ever any great work, that was a fruit of the brain, and that begot admiration, was atchieved, but was also the fruit of some naturall *enthusiasme*; if all elevation of the mind above ordinary thoughts and conceptions, (to which, among other helps, a generous contempt of the world doth much conduce;) must be so called. But if *Seneca* thought really, as *Aristides* did; what he chiefly grounded upon, shall be examined in due place. In the mean time, before I leave *Seneca*, the Reader may take notice of his inconstancy; who, what he doth here so gloriously set out, doth not stick elswhere to adscribe unto savagenesse and immanity: the proper temper of Tyrants, & bloud-thirsty men. *Ac nescio quomodo*, saith he, *ingenia immania & invisa, materia facundiori, expresserunt sensus vehementes & concitados. Nullam adhuc vocem audiivi ex bono lenique animosam.* For his *Sensus vehementes*

* It is so in best
edu. not, ascend.
lest any should
think it a mistake.

Sen. 2. de Clem.
c. 2.

& *concitati*, to be naturall enough to such a disposition, we would not quarrell with him. But that no man, naturally good and mild, ever spake courageously, or never was the author of any *apophthegme*, that resented of a gallant spirit: which is in effect as much as to say, that goodnesse or meeknesse, and a gallant spirit, are things incompatible: is a speech that resenteth little of either a Philosopher, or a sober man. The contrary, quite contrary to this, is divinely asserted, and proved by the Prince of Philo-

*Arist. 3. *Ethic.*

c. 8. *Polit. lib. 9.*

c. 4. 8' *ὁ πόλεμος τὴν ἀνδρίαν, &c.*

sophers, divine *Aristotle*, both in *his *Ethicks* and *Politicks*. But we need not, in this, appeal to any other then *Seneca* himself, *Epist. 85. Non est enim fortitudo, &c.* & elsewhere. We must therefore conclude, that *Seneca* in this place was, against reason, overswayed by his own *genius*, being a man of a violent spirit naturally, as appears by him in many places; and would have appeared much more, had not Reason and Philosophy moderated it: and that by *animosam vocem* we must understand, rather *violent* and *furious*, such as he hath sometimes, then truly *magnanimous*.

I think this is enough to my first point, to satisfy the Reader not versed in ancient Authors, that it is so as I have said. Yet I must crave the liberty to consider of a notable passage in *Plato*. Not that I think it very needfull; nor perchance, if well understood, very pertinent: but because it may seem, by reason of the words, so pertinent unto some others that shall light upon it, that I may be blamed, for the confi-

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derableness of the Author, if I should leave it out. In a *Dialogue* of his, inscribed *Menon*, wherewith he treateth of vertue, whether it may be taught, &c. in the end of it he hath these words, Ὅρθως ἂν καλοῖμεν θεῖος τε εἰς τὸν δὴ ἐλέγμεν χρησιμὸς δὲ καὶ μάντις, καὶ τὸς ποιητικὰς ἀπαντας· καὶ τὸς πολιτικὰς ἐχθίστα τέτων φῶμεν ἂν θεῖος τε εἶναι, καὶ ὀρθοστέλει, ἐπίπνυς ὄντας, καὶ κατεχομένους ἐν τῷ θεῷ, ἵταν καταρῶσι, λόγοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα, μηδὲν εἰδότες ὧν λέγουσι. that is, *As we rightly call all Oracle-Priests, Prophets, and Poets, divine; so may we as rightly style divine and divinely-agitated, all civill Orators: these also, whensoever they speak publicly, as they ought to speak, of great matters and with like eloquence, being certainly inspired by God, and plainly possesse [at all such times,] as not understanding any thing themselves, of those things which they speak and deliver.* Here first of all I will suppose, that the Reader not read in *Plato*, will stick at those words, *as not understanding any thing, &c.* It is true indeed, that as he compares them to *Oracle-Priests* and *Prophets*, who for the most part understood not what they said themselves, the words may be thought pertinent enough: but how truly either *Poets* or *Orators* may be compared unto such, (if the comparison be so strictly pressed,) will be the question. Yes, rightly enough, according to *Plato's* doctrine; who distinguisheth (in that very *Dialogue*) between εῖθεός δόξας, *right opinions*, and ἐπιστήμην, that is, *the science or knowledge of right opinions*, grounded upon cleare demonstrations of sound reason. Which untill a man have attained unto, *Plato's* opinion is, that whatsoever he doth,

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though

though right and just, according as his present opinion and apprehension leads him, yet he doth it ignorantly; and is still liable to do the contrary at another time, and to think that just and right, untill his *opinion* be turned into *science*. Though therefore, if things be strictly examined, there is great difference between Poets, or Orators, and those Oracle-Priests and Prophets, in point of knowledge, generally; because these did not so much as grammatically understand, what they did utter: yet in point of true knowledge, which presupposeth the consideration of causes, &c. they are said by *Plato* to know nothing, no more then those. But now to the point of Inspiration. Had not *Plato* so joyned Poets and civil Orators together; though it may be he did not intend an absolute conjunction of these neither, in all respects, no more then his similitude of Poets and Orators, with Oracle-Priests and Prophets, will hold in all respects; but had not he so joyned them, I should have made no question, but that his assertion herein had been very sound and orthodox: to wit, that when great States-men, Princes and Senators make publick speeches unto the people about great matters, as peace or warre; (for of such men and matters especially his words are to be understood, as appeareth by the persons by him mentioned before, *Themistocles*, *Aristides*, and the like;) and such other things; that God, whose providence hath an influence, more or lesse, upon all events, doth move them to speak those things, which may conduce to those ends Himself hath fore-

forecast, or condescended unto: whether by permission only, or by approbation; to punish, or to bless; or any other way, best known unto himself. Which is no more, I believe, then was intended by *Solomon*, when he saith, *The preparations of the heart are in man: but the answer of the tongue is from the Lord*: Proverb. 16. ver. 1. I vary somewhat from our English Translation, which herein varies much in sense (though the words seem to be the same,) from the best, both Translators and Expositors. But we have warrant enough from the ninth verse, where the same thing in other words is repeated, and well expressed, there, in our English; *A mans heart deviseth his way: but the Lord directeth his steps*. But I have done with *Plato*.

II. Our second point is, a consideration of the efficacy of ancient Rhetorick. I will not insist upon *Demagogie*, so called anciently, though it be the chiefest, and almost only Oratory in most places, either used or desired. But I will not meddle with it, because it may be conceived, that divers other things, in such matters of State and Government, might concur to produce those bewitching effects, for which it became so infamous, where most used. I remember a witty passage (if I may so farre digresse,) in *Thucydides*, where an ancient Orator gives this character of the *Athenians*, (*Athens* being the place where Rhetorick had it's first birth, and was brought to an height greater then it ever had in any other place,) that they were a people, *that did hear*

*Thucyd. Hist.
lib. 3.*

with their eyes, and see with their ears: meaning thereby, that they gave ordinarily, in matters of greatest concernment, more credit to the smooth bewitching language of their Orators and Demagogues, being led by them to many actions contrary to all sense and reason, yea and their own proper interest; then they gave to their own eyes, which otherwise, if not so mightily overswayed and clouded by their ears, would easily have discerned the truth of things, and their own folly. But if that were not worth a digression, this now to be added may, perchance; that the Greek Scholiast, upon that very place, (who by some learned men is thought very ancient:) hath a character of the *Athenians*, which agrees *verbatim* with that of S. Luke's, *Acts* 17. ver. 21. λέγει τὴν καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ αὐτὴν.

I will confine my self, as near as I can, to such examples & instances, where nothing but bare language, all other interests laid aside, (nay sometimes bare language, against all other interests,) can be suspected to have been operative. Neither shall I, for the same reason, insist upon some notable effects of some philosophical Discourses, by which some extremely vicious in their lives, were suddenly reclaimed, and so much changed, as that they became great examples of vertue to all after-ages. We could produce the testimonies of ancient Fathers of the Church, as well as of heathen Writers for it, if need were. But I should do true Philosophy much wrong, to adscribe that unto Rhetorick, which was her proper work, though not without some Rhe-

Rhetorick perchance. I fhall rather fay with *Seneca*, *Rapuit illos, infligavitque rerum pulchritudo, non verborum inanium sonitus*; that is, *Not the foud of vain [or empty] words, but the excellency of the matter delivered by thofe words, was it that wrought upon them fo powerfully.* who nevertheffe fhews very well afterwards the good ufe of skilfull compofure, as we fhall in the progreffe of this Difcourfe, have occafion to fhew more at large. That we may keep our felves therefore within the bounds of Rhetorick, and yet not fuch Rhetorick neither, that fhould be *verborum inanium sonitus*; but fuch, wherein all artificiall ornaments of good language are moft eminent; we will pitch upon them efpecially, whofe very *profeflion* and proper *character*, by which they were known from others, whether Philofophers or Orators, was *ὄψις*, that is, *oftentation*; and their end, (as themfelves profefled,) and work, in reference to others, *ἐκπληξις*, *amazement*. And thefe were the *σοφισταί*, or *Sophifts*, then called, as by others commonly, fo by themfelves; who thought that title more honorable, then that of either *Orator* or *Philofopher*: and in very deed, raifed it to that height of eftimation, under fome Emperours, that even Princes and Noble-men were ambitious of it themfelves; and thought it no difparagement to their greatneffe, to feek unto them that were fuch really, for their friendship, and to repair to their Schools and Oratories, to be their Auditors.

But before I fpeak of them, becaufe my fubject

is *Rhetoricall Enthusiasme* in generall, I must not do those famous, and truly incomparable Orators (for no Age we know of, ever brought forth the like, or will in haste, probably:) *Demosthenes* and *Cicero*, that wrong, as to passe them in silence. For *Demosthenes*, I shall say no more of him, neither need I am sure, then this, that *Dionysius Halicarnassens*, a man of great abilities himself in point of eloquence, and of great judgement (his chiefeft praise, and profession) to judge of the abilities of others, rather severe, then favorable in most of his Censures, doth very soberly deliver and protest of himself, that when he did set himself to read any of *De-*

Demosthenes his Orations, he did plainly
Dion. Halicarn. Περὶ τῆς Δημοσθένους ὁμιλίας : that is, that he was really be-

sides himself, being filled with strange passions, & amazement, not able to keep one place, nor knowing what he did, or how to expresse himself. Whereby, saith he, we may guesse how those of his time, that heard him, and were interested themselves in those businesses, (the subject of those Orations,) were affected: when the bare reading hath such operation upon us, so little concerned in them, and so long after. But may my Reader ask, perchance, Will the reading of *Demosthenes* work the like now, upon every one that reads him, in his own language; or did then, in those dayes, when this *Dionysius* wrote, as it did upon him? No; it did not, I believe, not even then; nor will now, certainly. For I have been present at admirable ravishing musick, as I have thought,

thought, and most others that were there; and yet have heard some then and there also present professe, that they were not at all affected with it: who neverthelesse, did also profess to be much delighted with some other kind. And he that should set a three-peny Bauble, in comparison, varnished with many curious colours, set out with gold and silver; and some old decayed piece, of some ancient Carver, Painter, or Statuary, of great fame and reputation; both these before some Country-man, or any other not skilfull: it is a great chance, if the Bauble be not preferred before the other, though perchance by men of judgement deemed invaluable; and *de facto* purchased at a great rate. This may be one reason why all men are not equally affected with such incomparable pieces: but we shall have more of that, before we have done with this Chapter. However, though not all equally that heard him, neither, I believe; yet certain it is by the testimony of all Histories, that most that heard him when he lived, after they had heard him a while, would be so affected with it, that they had not power of themselves, but were carried by him whether he would, and forced to do many things against their own judgements and resolutions: as *Æschynes*, his great enemy and profest antagonist, doth himself acknowledge; who therefore doth plainly charge him of no lesse then *γοητεία*, that is, *Sorcery*, or *Enchantment*, but yet such *Enchantment*, as he doth acknowledge merely to proceed from the excellency of his Language, and artificiall Composure.

Quintil. lib. 10. c. 1.

sure. As for *Cicero*, of whom judicious *Quintilian* doth passe this judgement, (which was *Pliny* the later his judgement also, and of all the learned Ancients:) that he may think well of his own proficiency, who begins to relish *Cicero* above all other Authors; yet for all that, is very fearfull to equall him to *Demosthenes*: of him, besides what he writes of himself, that not only the parties themselves accused by him, when they should have spoken for themselves, but even their Advocates, though bold enough, as appro-

Cic. in Oratore.

ved and exercised Orators otherwise, have been struck by his Oratory into such amazement, that they could not speak one word; in so much, that some complained openly, *venenis ereptam sibi memoriam*, that they were really bewitched: I shall content my self and my Reader, I hope, with a relation that I find in *Plu-*

Plut. in vita Cic.

tarch, (though not upon his own credit, but upon common fame,) which is this. In the Civile warres between *Cæsar* and *Pompeius*, among many others of the better fort that had followed *Pompey*, one was *Ligarius*: who not only had followed *Pompey*, but stuck to his party after his death, to the very last. In so much that *Cæsar*, though (as naturally very clement) he had pardoned and restored many others, yet was resolved concerning *Ligarius*, and had already been heard to speak of him, as of a condemned man, before ever *Cicero* appeared to his defence. However, partly out of respect to his person, and

and partly good opinion of his parts, he was willing to hear what *Cicero* could say. But when he had begun, and was now pretty well entered in the busineffe, using his best art, as, by patheticall expressions, and commemorations of those sad times, and doubtfull events of fiercest encounters, and otherwise, to move; so, to insinuate, by graceful words: *Cæsar* was so affected, that his very face suffering many changes in a little time, sufficiently bewrayed the inward commotion of his soul: untill at last, passion and amazement had so wholly possesst him, that his whole body began to tremble; so that he let some papers fall to the ground out of his hands, because he was not able to hold them. and in conclusion, *Cicero* had no sooner done speaking, then *Cæsar*, without any further deliberation, acquitted him for whom he had spoken.

Well; of *Demosthenes* and *Cicero*, so famous in all Ages, and so much admired by all the best Wits of all Ages, haply so much as we have said, may passe without any great difficultie: but now we come to the *Sophistæ*; of whose profession generally, (having no other end, most of them, but the praise and admiration of the people;) I professe myself to have little better opinion, then of ordinary Jugglers and Mountebanks: Of such to tell the world in what admiration they have been anciently, and what wonders they did among men, with their smooth and voluble tongues; although I shall tell nothing but upon good ground, and what I myself believe to be true; yet I do not almost know
how

how to expect from others, not versed in ancient Authors, that I should be believed: neither indeed can I write my self such things, without some indignation and reluctancy, out of a deep sense and commiseration of the vanity of man: whether we consider the *Sophists* themselves and their performances; or those that were so readily bewitched by their rhetorick, and so, set upon their admiration, for what they performed. But I hope, and upon that hope I take these paines, that the benefit unto thee Reader may be considerable, when we come to thee consideration of the causes, by the understanding whereof much error and delusion, very frequent in the world, may be prevented.

The first of the profession was one *Gorgias*, who lived when *Plato* lived. We shall begin with him, and end with him too, as to particular instances, for ought I know: since that by him, (who as he was first in time, so in credit, in all after-Ages;) may all the rest of that sect be sufficiently known. This *Gorgias*, being a man of excellent naturall parts himself, observing how much credit one *Prodicus*, of his time, had got with his tongue, going up and down the countrey, from town to town, and from village to village, with no other passe, nor ware, then somewhat (whether in paper, or memorie,) he had devised and composed at home by way of exhortation to men, to embrace vertue rather then pleasure, by the example of *Hercules*, (the common talk of all men and women in those dayes,) somewhat dramatically and pithily set out; which although it were

alwayes, and every where, but one and the same subject, yet was entertained every where with great concourse of people, and begot him great love and fame, both farre and near: this *Gorgias* observing, was thereby much encouraged to apply himself to the study of eloquent and readie language; and besides continuall exercises, which much improved his naturall abilities, was very happy in devising severall schemes and figures of Rhetorick, that had not been thought of before: though later ages, whether more exact, or more nice, did not approve of all his inventions; as by *Longinus*, *Hermogenes*, and other masters of that Art, may appear. But whatever later Ages thought of him, he sped so well in his own, that encouraged by former successe, he adventured at last to shew himself in the greatest set, or solemn assembly of people, that I think ever was in any part of the world; and that was at the *Olympick Games*, solemnized by concourse of almost all Nations, in a place of *Greece*, every fifth year: from whence also the noblest Computation of time, (among heathens,) commonly called the *Olympiads*, had it's origine. There *Gorgias* appeared among others, that came to make themselves known, and to get immortall honour by their unmatched performances. And he appeared not only in, and with set and premeditated speeches; for which neverthelesse, he got such applause, as if he had been the God of Eloquence himself, rather than an eloquent man: but also, which had never been known before, offered him-
self

self publickly to speak readily, without any preparation or meditation at all, of any subject, or argument, that should be proposed unto him by any man. From that place and time, *Gorgias* departed so glorious, that it might have been thought altogether impossible to make his fame greater in the world, then it was. Yet he got some increase of honour afterwards, when his Statue was made, & erected in *Apollo's* Temple, of pure gold, for a Speech that he had made at one of the *Pythian* Solemnities: and again, when the *Athenians*, for a reward of divers Speeches which he had uttered there, whether by Decree, or a voluntary concurrence of affections, all such dayes wherein he had spoken publickly, they called them *holy dayes*; & all speeches by him uttered, they called *λαμπάδας*, that is, *Tapers* or *Torches*: burning *Torches* being a thing sacred among them in those dayes, and used (though at noon-day) in some of their greatest festivalls; which from that use, as *Harporation* in his *Dictionary*, and others teach, were called *ἑορταὶ λαμπάδος*. I do not expect it should be believed that all *Sophists* since *Gorgias*, were men of such either merits, or fame, as he was. I have already given him the preeminence, as of time, so of reputation. I know not any after him, that came to that height of fame: though I know of some, men

* *Ecclesiast.* ch. 9. v. 11. but time and chance: by which words what is to be understood, hath been shewed elsewhere.

of great fame too, since him, and of the same profession as he was, that imputed his fame to his luck, (which wise

* *Solomon* tells us, hath more power in the world, then

then merit;) more then to his worth. So *Æliand*, a man of elaborate eloquence, in that *Sophisticall* way, doth somewhere judge of him, I am sure. However, there were *Sophists* since that first, many, that attained to so much reputation by their Eloquence, as to be admired every where for it, and to draw men after them, even great ones, by it; and by their favour, to be admitted into places of great trust and authoritie. But I shall avoid to be longer upon this particular, then I must needs: I have given some reason for it already; and another reason is, because one *Cresollus*, a Iesuite, hath taken great pains upon that subject, in a book entituled, *Theatrum veterum Rhetorum, &c.* printed at *Paris*, 1620. wherein he doth prosecute that argument of the *Sophists*, and all things belonging unto them: their beginning, their credit, their wayes, their faults, and the like, out of ancient *Greek* and *Latine* Authors, with great diligence. Some of those particulars, that may be most considerable to our purpose, we shall further insist upon; but no further then to make use of them, either now, or afterwards.

First, for the subject of their speeches; it was various and voluntary. Sometimes the praises of Gods, or Men; and sometimes of Towns, or Countries; yea of Birds, as of a Parrot, or a Peacock. Sometimes exhortations to Vertue; the commendation of Temperance, Justice, Sobriety, and the like. Sometimes pleasant tales, or fables: any thing, wherein they might shew their wit and eloquence; their end, (I speak of the generality,) being

no-

nothing else, but to gain credit unto themselves:: as the end of their Auditors, what ever was the subject, was delight and pleasure.

Now for that faculty of theirs of extemporary speaking upon any subject, it was their common profession, that is most certain: and it was accordingly performed by many of them, with singular dexterity, to the great amazement of all their Auditors. There be in ancient Authors many proofs and examples of it. I remember I have read somewhere, that *Callisthenes*, whom some call *Sophist*, some, *Philosopher*, being invited at a great Feast made by *Alexander* the Great, to say somewhat in the commendation of the *Macedonians*; performed it so gallantly, that he got great praise from all the company. But *Alexander*, who it seems was willing to try him further, and bare him no very good will; & perchance, suspected withall, that he came prepared; excepting, that it was no very hard task for any ordinary Orator to be fluent upon such a subject; if therefore he would give certain proofs of his abilities in that kind, his way would be, to dispraise the said *Macedonians* as fluently: *Callisthenes* undertook it, and performed it so effectually (for which his discretion was not commended by all men:) that though his abilities were admired yet his person grew hatefull among the *Macedonians* for it, and the more he was admired, the lesse thanks he got for his pains. The *Tarsenses* of *Asia*, among the rest, as they are by Ancients for their love to learning in generall, so, particularly noted

to have excelled in this facultie: *ὡς τε ἀπείρους σχεδίζειν
προαχίμους πρὸς τὴν δεδομένην ὑπόθεσιν*, that they could extend
themselves without bounds upon a suddain, upon any
subject that was given them: as Strabo, that faithfull
Historian and Geographer, witnesseth. And that,
not in prose only, but in verse also, *ὡς τὰς ἀποροὺς ἀζόντες*,
as the same Author speaketh; that is, *as men speak-
ing by divine instinct, or, inspired by the God of Po-
etrie*. Strabo, Geograph. lib. 14. In Aulus Gellius
also (lib. 9. cap. 15.) we have an example of a confi-
dent youth, (as indeed it is most given to such to be
confident:) who not content with the applause of
his ordinary light Auditorie, would needs make
shew of his abilities in point of extemporary spea-
king upon any *controverted point* that should be
proposed, before some that were well able to dis-
cern between matter and words, shadow and sub-
stance: a thing, even in those dayes, rare enough.
Whereupon a *controversie* (as they called them)
being proposed, he presently fell to work with
great volubilitie of tongue: for which as he was
much applauded and admired by his common Au-
ditours; so from them that could judge he got this
testimony, that *without controversie* (*adolescens sine
controversia disertus*, in my Author:) he was an able
and eloquent speaker: that is, one that could say
much, very readily and fluently; but pertinently,
and to the purpose, not at all.

But that which moveth me more then all this, to
believe that great matters in this kind were perfor-
med by many Sophists of old, according to their

Quintilian. See
more below, to-
wards the end
of this chapter.

profession, is, that I find even *Quintilian*, a sober, solid man, too make this a chief end and fruit of long pains and exercises in the art of Rhetorick; to attain to such a facultie, as to be able upon any suddain occasion to speak pertinently, without any premeditation. Which being so rare a thing in our dayes, that a man, if he can utter any thing, which may seem to be *extempore*; though perchance it do but seem so, and that it be performed but very meanly; is by many, (who therefore upon that account, swallow down pure non-sense sometimes, with better content, then they will hear much better and more profitable matter, that is delivered with some studie and premeditation:) by many deemed, I say, no lesse then inspired: this would make a man suspect, that as a decay of bodies is maintained by many in this elder age of the world; so, probably, of wits must be granted. But if the matter be well consider'd of, I think it may be granted that the Ancients farre exceeded us in this facultie; but yet not so much through any excessse of Wit, as of Industrie. Who is it of a thousand, or a million, that could take the pains, or scarce believe the relation of the pains that *Demosthenes* took, before he came to that perfection, that made him so famous? Or who would believe, were it not so certainly attested, that Noble-men and Senators of *Rome*, in the greatest heat of the Civill warres, could be at leisure to declame by turnes (for want of all opportunities in that confusion of time,) in their Halls,

Halls, as Boyes do in Schools and Universities; for fear that through the discontinuance of some months or years, they should loose that facultie, of speaking readily, which long studie (for the most of them,) and constant practise, had made them masters of? But besides all this, it may be considered, (is very considerable, I am sure;) that these eloquent men had no strange tongue to learn; or if any, not above one at most: but only, to perfect themselves in the use of their mother-tongue. Whereas now no man can pretend to learning, or very difficultly, that doth not understand two or three tongues, besides that which is naturall unto him: not because learning it self doth consist in the knowledge of tongues more now, then it did in those daies; but because neither of those tongues, then in common use, are naturall now unto any people: the one whereof is now become the common tongue of all Nations, (for this part of the world,) unto such as are Scholars; the other, though not so common, yet not lesse, or more necessary, to make a Scholar, as the proper tongue, by reason of the Authors that have written in it, of all Arts and Sciences; and without which best books cannot be read, if not translated; (as to this day very many are not:) or if translated, few so translated, as to afford the tenth part of that either pleasure, or profit, which they will in their own language. Besides that some are bound by their profession to endeavour the knowledge of some tongues; as all Divines, of the *Greek* and *Hebrew*, because of the Bible, or Rule of Faith,

written in those two languages: for the reading of which in it's proper language, there is the same reason, as for the reading of other books in their own, as to matter of content, or benefit; but much more reason in point of conscience, if a man shall think himself bound, as some may, to make use of his own eyes, that God hath given him, the better to satisfie himself and others, in matters of such trust and consequence; then for want of willingness to take pains, to depend altogether on the skill and fidelitie of others.

With this facultie of extemporary speaking, I find somewhat in *Synesius*, that hath great affinity, and deserveth no lesse admiration. In his *Dio*, that excellent piece, once before commended, but well deserving to be commended more then once, he tells us, at the later end of it, of a way that he had, to exercise his wit and invention, often by him practised. He would take a book; some rhetoricall piece, philosophicall discourse, or the like; read in it a pretty while; then upon a suddain shut his eyes, or turn them another way, and yet still continue his reading: that is, at the same instant invent and utter somewhat, that might be proper to the subject, and so coherent to that which he had read, that no bodie (by the style, or matter) could judge otherwise, but that he was still reading. It is likely that he often practised it by himself, before he adventured to do it before others: but he saith he did it often before others; and that his extemporary conceptions were often applauded, and preferred by his Auditors,

tors, who knew nothing of it, before that which he had really read. Nay more then that, (which indeed may very properly be referred to some kind of *enthusiasme*;) that what he so supplied by his extemporary wit, did sometimes prove to be the very same that he found afterwards in the book. I know, no man is bound to believe him, upon his own testimony concerning himself; neither shall I easily charge any man of infidelity, that professeth he doth not. However, I have that opinion of the man, of his uprightness and sincerity, besides his learning, and that apprehension, upon some grounds, of the possibility of the thing; that I shall not be affraid to profess my opinion to the contrary, that I do believe him. But here again, not to upbraid any man for his good will, but to warn the Reader, that may be the better for it; I must wish that *Synesius* were generally, but in this his *Dio* especially, better translated into *Latine*, (though I could almost wish, that there had never been any translations made of any such Greek book:) then it is by *Petavius* the Iesuite. At the very entrance of this discourse of *Synesius* of this his kind of reading, he translates *πιστις ἀλόγως*, *probationes rationis expertes*: which is very absurd. For by it Greek Authors understand such externall proofs or evidences, whether divine, as Oracles, or civile, as Witnesses, as admit of no Rhetorick, or reasoning: by *Aristotle*, *Quintilian*, and other masters of that Art, called *ἀτέχνως*. Which may be rendred (as by *Tully* somewhere) *artis expertes*, well enough; be-

cause easily understood, as opposed to *artificiall*: but not ἀλόγως, in this sense, *rationis expertes*; which is commonly understood of brutes, in opposition to those creatures which are rationally, or *ratione utentes*, as *Cicero* speaketh. However, I like better, even here, *Quintilian's* expression, *inartificiales*; not so elegant perchance, but more clear. So before, in this very book, αὐτοὶ νόμον ἀνέστησαν, &c. νόμον ἀνέστησαν, is not, *cujus nullaratio adferri queat*; but a Law set out without any ratiocination, to induce men from the reasonableness or equity of it, to obedience; but by way of bare command, and authority, though never so just, and reasonable otherwise: by *Seneca*, *Plutarch*, and other Ancients observed to be the proper style of Laws, and which doth best become them. And therefore, where few lines after that first passage, *Synesius* saith, ἐξ ἡρώδου νόμον ἢ λόγον it should not have been translated, *ut lex in orationem*, but, *in rationem mutetur*. But here again, when *Synesius* saith, πολλὰς, ἐδὲ περιμένετον ἀξίῳ τῷ βιβλίῳ τὴν συμφορὴν, ἐν ἀγαθῶν πῶς μοι γένηται: how absurdly is συμφορὰ translated *calamitas*? Besides what learned men have noted of the originall use of the word, it is so obvious in the contrary sense, (I will appeal but to *Iso- crates*, a very plain Author, in his Oration to *Philip*;) and the coherence in this place, so contrary to that other; as a man would admire how any man could so mistake. And this I speak of the use and signification of the word, which is obvious and known. But there is somewhat more proper and particular, in the use of it in this place, as it is applied unto

books

books by *Synesius*, which I fhall not now infift upon. Yet I would not be fo unkind to *Petavius*, as he hath been to fome, that deserved better refpect at his hands. His tranflation of *Synesius*, for the moft part, is elegant and good enough. I wifh there were none worfe. But I would have no man to truft to it in obfcure places; feeing that in clear and plain he doth often miftake. But I am out of my generall fubject and fcope, to which I muft return; though I cannot call that a digreffion properly, to which the profecution of my firft fubject hath fo naturally led me.

III. We are now to confider of the caufe, or caufes, firft of the opinion, thefe, whether Orators or Sophifts, had of themfelves, as infpired: then, of the effects their Rhetorick did produce upon others. In the firft point I fhall not be long, becaufe I fhall therein but anticipate the confideration of the caufes of *Enthufiasme* in generall, for which we referve a particular chapter at the end, where this particular caufe fhall come in again among others: though here fo farre anticipated of purpofe, (and care fhall be taken, that we fhall repeat as little as may be:) to give the more light to the things here to be handled and delivered. Briefly then: A Heat, a fervent Heat, a Fire; which powerfull Orators found in themfelves, not at the uttering, though then greateft, but upon another confideration; but in conceiving and composing their fpeeches; fo generally obferved and acknowledged, that fome have thought, that no other art or thing

was necessary to make a perfect Orator: that Heat, that fervent Heat, that Fire, hath been the *ignis fatuus*, we say, that hath infatuated many Speakers into that opinion of divine Inspiration. *Ardor* and *Impetus*, are the words used by *Latine* Authors to this purpose. *Nulla me ingenii, sed magna vis animi inflammavit, ut me ipse non teneam*; saith *Cicero* of himself. But this indeed he speaks not of all composition in generall, but of such as is intended properly to move compassion. However, he hath the word *ardor* elsewhere, upon other occasions, often enough. *Aristides* calls it πῦρ, a fire: καὶ ποίας μέχης τοσαύτην θερμὴν φύσιν ἡγεῖσθαι, ὅσην τῶν ἐμφύχων λόγων καὶ ἀληθειῶν; He compares it to that heat, by which Souldiers at the first joyning of the battel, are usually carried and inflamed, beyond all sense of death and danger: of which in its proper place. And few lines after: λόγων αὐτῇ παρὰ μία, τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἰσθῆναι καὶ θεῶν πῦρ, τὸ ἐκ Διὸς εἶναι. Here we have two words: θερμὴ, heat; and πῦρ, fire.

Hippocr. Περὶ σαρκῶν: or, as others more probably, Περὶ ἀρχῶν: initio libri.

Now according to *Hippocrates*, to whose writings *Aristotle* was much beholding, not only whatsoever doth rule and govern in man, called Wit, Iudgement, Wisdome, or whatever else, is a heat, or fire: (τὸ θερμώτατον, καὶ ἰσχυρότατον πῦρ ----- ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, νοῦ, σθένος, &c. but even God himself is θερμὸν, heat: Δεῖται δὲ μοι ὁ καλέσμεν θερμὸν, εἰδέναι τι εἶναι, καὶ νοεῖν πάντα, καὶ ὁρᾶν, καὶ φρονεῖν, καὶ εἰδέναι πάντα, καὶ τὰ ὄντα, καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα εἰσεῖναι. It is not therefore so much to be wondered, that heathens should mistake herein; as that such a one as *Ben Maimon*, a man so skilfull in the Law of God,

God, and so profound a Philosopher, should not distinguish between that *influentia divina*, or that *ignis ardens*, that *burning fire*, that inspired, or inflamed, if you will, holy Prophets, as *Ieremie* and others; and that partly naturall, and partly supernaturall (we shall explain our selves more fully afterwards, in some other chapter:) *heat*, or *fire*, common, or incidentall at least, unto all men by nature, by which Arts and Sciences have been brought forth to light and perfection; nay all Books in generall (for so he teacheth) by all men written and composed. Just so *Philo Iudæus*, a man of the same race, (but much more ancient,) & worth, in his kind; because sometimes when he purposed to compose somewhat, though he earnestly (he saith) endeavoured it, and thought himself sufficiently prepared, nothing would come; and at other times he found himself so full and fluent, that he could not hold himself, but was as it were transported by the vehemencie of his operative wit and phansie, so that he would even forget himself, and the place where he was: he deemed this a sufficient ground, to think himself immediately inspired by a higher power.

I have met with an observation in *Ribera* the Iesuite; as considerable a man, for what he hath done upon the Scriptures, as most of that profession. I do not like his words, though I believe his meaning is right enough. His words are: *Ita & aliarum rerum, sive bonarum, sive ma-*

More Nev. lib.
2. c. 37.

Phil. Jud. De
migrat. Abrah.

Ribera in Com.
in Hos. cap. 5.

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larum, spiritus dicuntur; ut spiritus Zelotypia, avaritia, superbia; qui solet Latinorum consuetudine, ardor animi dici, &c. That the word *spirit* in the Scripture is adscribed to divers evils, as his effects, (whether by immediate operation, suggestion, ministerie, or otherwise,) who amongst other names, is styled sometimes, *the Evil Spirit*, I know: but that when *any good things* are adscribed to the spirit, the same is meant, which by *Latine Poets* (for out of them doth *Ribera* produce his examples;) is designed by this word *ardor*, or *ardor animi*, I do not know how it can be made good; is somewhat ambiguous, I am sure. Neither indeed do I mention it as an error in the man; but of his expression only, which by some other may be mistaken for his meaning. But if a man will make an observation upon words and language, he might further observe, that Heathens did not only use the word *ardor*, to expresse their heat in this kind; but even the word *Spirit*. So *Ovid*: *At sacri vates, &c. Seditibus aetheriis spiritus ille venit.* And again; *Sic ubi mota calent sacro mea pectora thyrsos; Altior humano spiritus ille malo est.* And this *spirit* is no lesse then a very God unto him, elsewhere. *Est Deus in nobis &c.* as afterwards, in its proper place, out of him, or some other of greater authoritie then he, shall be declared. But we give it place here, because this *ardor*, heat, or spirit, that possesseth Orators and Poets, yea Souldiers and others, was by divers heathens deemed but one and the same, in its nature, though working so differently, as hereafter shall be shewed.

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Now on the other side, that *ardor mentis* is sometimes used by Christian Writers for *spiritus sanctus*, is observable too: but we keep it for another place. However, I think that expression very improper, and dangerous. And whereas the word ζήλος, or *zeal*, according to the Scriptures, is oftentimes an effect of the holy Spirit; but often too, according to the same Scriptures, of the evil: as for example, 1 Cor. 3. 3. 2. Cor. 12. 20. and elsewhere, frequently: In all such places, I wish the word *zeal* had been left in the translations, as well as in other places, where used in the best sense; that every reader might have understood that ζήλος, *zeal*, or *fervent heat*, in desires and prosecutions, is of it self no more to true godlinesse and religion, then a good voice, or an eloquent tongue, or any thing else of the same kind; which being naturall, if it be sanctified by Grace, or some degrees of Grace, and good intentions, may be called ζήλος θεῶν, (as Rom. 10. 2. the Apostle speaketh;) that is, a *zeal of God*, or rather, *for God*, as ζήλος οἴκου (Iohn 2. 17.) *zeal for the house*: but not absolutely good and godly, for all that; yea sometimes very pernicious, (Philip. 3. 6. and Iohn 16. 2.) untill it be guided by a true light, that is, by sound and orthodox principles: but if, as very commonly, the instrument of carnall ends and affections, and misguided withall by false doctrine, then ζήλος τοῦ διαβόλου, or δαιμονιώδης, a *devillish zeal*, as S. James teacheth, chapter 3. 14, 15. Now for the *spirit of God*, or *true godlinesse*, what be the effects and properties of it; no man needs to mistake, that will, and
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can read the Scriptures, without either prejudice, or partiality. S. *James* is plain enough in that very place; but S. *Paul* more copious and emphaticall, upon the same subject, 1 *Cor.* 13. and elsewhere. So much here of this *ardor*, or *heat*, as the cause of Rhetoricall Enthusiasme. But being a generall cause, we shall have occasion to speak of it again, which makes us here shorter upon it.

IV. Now for the causes of those wonderfull effects of Rhetorick, (our fourth and last particular,) such as can be given, that are merely naturall; before we enter into that enquiry, we must lay down by way of foundation, or necessary supposition, that that which so much affected the generality, or greater part of Auditors, when those Orators & Sophists shewed themselves publicly, was not the matter it self, that was treated of, or *rerum ipsarum pulchritudo*, as we had it before out of *Seneca*: but somewhat else, what soever it was. I said the generality, or greater part, in that state of corruption, as hath been in all places, ever since *Adam's* fall. For otherwise, why *λόγος*, that is, sound reason, well delivered, should be powerfull with all, or most men, no further reason need to be given, (as at the beginning of this Chapter was observed,) then this, That man is a creature naturally rationall. But it is very absurd, in my judgement, that is, much against reason, to believe that such a one as *Nero*, living as he did, and doing what he did; after he had killed his own Mother, *in omnes libidines effusus*, saith *Tacitus* of him; (I forbear more particulars, because his name

is sufficiently known :) should relish any sober discourse, as either of Justice, Temperance, or Clemency, or the like, for the matter it self: who nevertheless in the heat and height of all his Cruelties, and Villanies, *sapientia doctoribus tempus imperiebat post epulas*, as the same *Tacitus* doth record; that is, *was wont after meals, to spend some of his time, to hear the exhortations of Philosophers*: Or that such a one as *Dionysius* the Tyrant, as of him by *Plutarch* in the life of *Timoleon*, (*τὸς τῶ φιλοσόφων διατριβῆς αὐτογεννών ἔχαιρε, &c.*) is recorded, should do the same. Or in case it should be supposed of *Nero*, & such as he, that he had some politick end in it; (which nevertheless of either of these two, all circumstances well weighed, I think more plausible, then true :) yet, that either the great ones of *Rome*, rich Citizens, who had the estates of Princes, and their Ladies, in the corruptest times of that Commonweal, should be so studious to get to themselves some domestick Philosopher, one or more, that had fluent tongues, and hear their *διαλέξεις* or *Discourses*, so willingly, which were almost nothing else but of vertue, and the commendations of a sober life; or that the meanest of *Rome*, poor Shop-keepers, and Tradesmen, that lived by their dayly labour, should leave their Shops and their work, by which they hardly subsisted, and flock together by multitudes to a Sophists, or Philosophers auditory, to hear the praises of *Hector*, or of *Hercules*, or the commendation of some particular vertue, or of some brute beast per chance, or of Rhetorick it self, or of Philosophy, or
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the like: if there were not somewhat else that did draw them, besides the matter it self, I think it were much against reason to believe it. Which nevertheless by the attestation of truest histories, and other ancient Authors of those times, we know to be so certainly true, as no rationall man, that hath been acquainted with them, can make any question of it. *Seneca* the Philosopher, he alone would afford us store of passages to that purpose: but I shall content my self with one, because we shall meet with divers from other Authors, as we go on, which may give further light and satisfaction, if need be. *Quid ergo*, saith he, in one of his epistles; (having before insisted upon this, that much benefit, in point of life, might accrue unto men, by their daily conversation in the Schools of Philosophers;) *non novimus quosdam, &c.* But what? Do not we know some, that for many years together, have been very diligent Auditors, without any the least tincture; or, as it were, so much as alteration of colour? Yes, I know there be; not diligent only, but even assiduous and indefatigable: whom we may call rather domesticks, for their assiduity, then Auditors. [But then you must know, that all come not for one end.] Some come, that they may hear, not learn; as men are drawn unto publick Theaters, to please their eares, whether with good language, or sweet voices and melody, or to see playes. And of this rank be the greater number, to whom a Philosophers school is as it were a place of entertainment, for their pass-time, and leasure houres. It is no part of their thoughts or aime to grow better there,

there, or to learn some good rule, or precept of life, to which they may conforme themselves for the time to come: but only and barely this, to meet with somewhat that may please their eares. Yea and some come with Table-books too, not so much for the matters sake, as for the words, that they may repeat them unto others, with as little profit, as themselves did hear them. So far Seneca: and then proceeds to another kind, who are marvellously affected (at least, as Seneca would have it,) with the very matter and excellency of the things spoken and delivered: and for the present, are even ravished, and become quite new creatures, as it were, in their purposes and intentions; but are no sooner out of the School, then they are out of their fit, and still come home the same men as they went. For which he doth give some reasons; both how they come to be so affected, and how to soon changed. But these be not the men

that we have here to do with. *Plinius*

*Epist. lib. 1.
epist. 22.*

Secundus, where he sets out a friend of his, for many excellent parts; *In summa*, saith he, *non facile quis quemquam existis, qui sapientie studium præ se ferunt, &c.* that is, *In conclusion*, even amongst those that openly professe wisdom, (that is, chastity, piety, justice, magnanimity, &c. as himself afterwards expresse himself:) by their habits, take whom you will, you will hardly match him. It is true, that he doth not frequent publick schools and cloisters, (*porticus*) and there with long discourses (*disputationibus*; and so is the word often used by Latine Authors of best note:) entertain himself and others that
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have nothing else to do: (or, are disposed to be idle:) No, &c. These two passages give light the one to the other: and I make choice of these Authors, who, both, were grave sober men, of great authority, and vertuous in their conversation; that by their testimony may the better appear, what use ordinary men made of their hearing in those dayes, when hearing was in such high request, amongst all sorts of people: and not only what use, (which may sometimes prove contrary to the proposed end;) but what end they proposed unto themselves, which was merely the pleasure of their eares. Ancient books are full of such complaints and observations: I shall therefore be the more sparing.

Two things I have to shew: what pleasure the eare, first, and then the eyes, find in words and language. Both, I know, contrary enough to the common profession; it may be, and belief, of most men: who not used to search into the nature of things, are carried in most things, more by appearance and conceit, then by any reality of judgement. Who is it that thinks so meanly of himself, but if he be pleased with a sober morall discourse, be it more or lesse rhetoricall; will not rather ascribe it to his reason and judgement, but especially goodnesse, then to his senses? But our businesse is not to enquire what most men think; but what most true and reall: and we shall go on the more boldly, because besides manifest reason, we shall not want good authority for what we are to say. Two things then there be, which I am now principally

pally to consider of: Musick, and Picture: the one, (to say somewhat of them more generally, before we come to particular observation;) the proper object and pleasure of the Eare, the other, of the Eyes; and so, opposed to purely rationall, & intellectuall: yet so sensuall, as that both presuppose reason and understanding, without which they are not pleasures. Brute beasts take no pleasure in musick, except it be some great chance, (as in the case of Dolphins, & the like,) & upon some particular consideration: much lesse in Pictures, and curious imagery. And again, as we say commonly that the eye seeth, and the eare heareth, (of which in the former chapter :) so we say, that the eye is delighted, & the eare pleased; though in very truth, neither eye, nor eare properly know what belongs unto pleasure, but the soul only. The consideration of this hath bred many doubts, and curious speculations amongst Philosophers: and learned *Fracastorius* (himself professeth it,) is much put to it, to find out what it is that makes good musick and harmony to please. Nothing easier to be understood, till a man think of it rationally: nothing that affords more doubts and scruples, if you come to treat of it philosophically.

We shall begin with musick, and shew how it is applyable, or incidentall unto speech; and that by authority first, before we come to reason. And though we meddle not here with any thing that is properly called a Scripture businesse; yet why may not we make use of the Scriptures, from which some would have us to fetch all good Arts and

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Sciences, as well as all sound Divinity. I am not of their opinion, I confesse, nor any sober man, I hope. yet that many things in all Arts and Sciences, by sober and well-grounded men in humane literature, may be learned; & some deep questions of philosophy resolved by the Scriptures, though given us for a greater good, & a more sublime use; I my self make no question. I shall therefore here set down the words of the Prophet *Ezekiel*, observable unto many uses, but not intending to presse their Authority, as Sacred, as to this particular use and purpose, further then any man shall think fit in his own reason and judgement. I called them the words of *Ezekiel*: but indeed, they are the immediate words of God himself, by the Prophet *Ezekiel*: *Also thou, son of man, &c. And they come unto thee, as the people cometh, &c. And so thou art unto them as a very lovely song, of one that hath a pleasant voice, & can play well on an instrument: for they hear thy words, but they do them not.* Ezek. 33. 31, 32, and 33 verses. I question nothing in the translation of the words, but that in the first verse, where it is here, *the children of thy people still are talking against thee*: not only *Iunius*, but other Interpreters of best account, translate, *of thee*, not *against thee*; by way of commendation, not of crimination: *vicatim & ostiatim*, &c. that is, *at every door and in every street*, every where, commending thee: as *Iunius* there in his Notes. This similitude of the power of Speech, to please the ear with Musick, whether vocall or instrumentall, is very frequent in ancient Authors, upon divers occasions. It is in

Plato,

Plato, Cicero, Seneca, Dio Chryſt. and divers others: and much to the ſame purpoſe, as here in *Ezekiel*, in ſome of them; as in *Muſonius* the Greek Philoſopher. whoſe words, as tranſlated by *Aulus Gellius*, were; *Cum philoſophus hortatur, monet, ſuadet, ob- jurgat, &c.* that is, *When a Philoſopher doth exhort, admoniſh, adviſe, reprove, or any thing in that kind, tending to reformation or inſtruction; if they that hear him, out of their open and ſuperficiall breſts, bring forth obvious and vulgar praiſes; nay if they break out into loud acclamations; if with his choiſe language, ſweet cadency and collocation of words, and his warbling voice, [frequentamentis; of which learned Budeus, and others:] they be affected, inflamed, and even tranſported: then may we certainly know, that both ſpeaker and hearer have loſt their labour; and that he was not heard as a Philoſopher; but as a ſkilful Harper, [or player on the Lute.]* *Muſonius* goes on in his diſcourſe, how a true hearer, that hath a right aime, ſhould be affected. I wiſh there were no worſe Doctrine ever heard out of our Pulpits: but it is out of our purpoſe here, and therefore I leave him there.

But from theſe bare ſimilitudes, we can inferre no great matter to our preſent aime and buſineſſe; becauſe there may be a likeneſſe of effects, upon which a compariſon may be grounded; though not affinity of nature, or perchance a direct contrariety, (as for example, extreme cold and extreme heat ſometimes produce the ſame effects:) in the

causes. To proceed therefore to some more direct proofs. Amongst other secrets, and mysteries of the art of good speaking, one is, that which is commonly called *σύνθεσις*, that is, the placing or collocation of words in a sentence, or period. There is not any part of Rhetorick more subject to scorn and contempt, & not without cause. For what (apparently) can be more contrary, either to solidity of reason, or sharpnesse of wit, or vigour of spirit; then for a man to busie himself about the placing and ordering of words, and syllables, when in a serious matter, either to write, or to speak? And in very deed, as the matter is commonly handled both by ignorant practitioners, and by unskilfull masters of that Art, it proveth but a ridiculous businesse: far more likely to bring all Rhetorick out of request, then to gain that credit to that one part, at the hands of any truly sober and wise, to which some Ancients of best account have endeavoured to raise it, to be accounted the choicest and most usefull part of all Rhetorick. Not without great cause therefore some Ancients, that have written of it, with equall both diligence, and dexterity, make this profession about it; *μυστήριος μὲν αὐτὴ ἔσκεν ὥδῃ τεύεται, καὶ οὐκ εἰς πολλοὺς οἰά τ' ἐστὶν ἐκέρχεται*: and that, *εἰς γέλοιον γὰρ ἐγγίγει λαμβάνουσι τὰ ἀπορριπτὰ δι' ἀπειρίαν*: that as these things must needs sound unto many, as mere mysteries, or incredible paradoxes; so neither are they for the knowledge of many: and that it cannot be expected otherwise, but that they that have no experience in such things, should judge other wise of them, then as

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ridiculous trifles. But however men may judge, before they understand, because they will not take pains, as most; or because they have taken pains, and cannot understand, because *non omnia possumus omnes*, and that, *non ex quovis ligno &c.* as many: yet certain it is, that not only the most famous Artists and Orators, that ancient times have produced, as *Demosthenes*, *Æschines*, *Cicero*, *Dion. Halicarn.* *Quintilian*, *Longinus* and the like, have adscribed unto it as much as unto any other power or faculty, which belongeth unto Rhetorick, and accordingly treated of it (some of them) with all exactnesse and diligence; but also divers Philosophers, as *Aristotle*, *Theophrastus* and others, have taken it into their consideration, and said enough of it, they that say least of it, (as *Aristotle*) to make it considerable unto all, unto whom his judgement is considerable. *Cicero* in his eldest days, and in that book of his, which he confesseth to contain the pith and marrow of all his former labours in that kind, grounded upon so many years continuall experience, treateth of it very largely. *Longinus*, not inferiour to him in point of judgment and reputation, had written two large *συντάγματα*, or volumes about it: which though not extant now; yet what reckoning he made of it, if that be not proof enough, that he wrote of it so largely, may appear by what he saith of it, in that Treatise of his, *περὶ ὑψους*, yet extant; in few words, as to any direction or instruction; but so full in point of commendation, as may seem rather exuberant, then otherwise.

He compares it to divers kinds of musick, as others before, but disputes it in point of reason and nature, that words well ordered, well chosen, and otherwise qualified, as they ought in a speech, must of necessity, and that by reason of their good ordering especially, be more powerfull, either to ravish or to amaze, then any musick can be. *Quintilian* saith not much lesse of it. I omit divers others whom I could name. But of all men, whether *Romans* or *Grecians*, now extant, none hath taken more pains, either to set out the worth of it, or to search the secrets, and to make them plain unto others, then *Dionysius Halicarnassens* hath done. There is a good large Treatise of his extant, among his other Works, *περὶ ὁμοειπειῶν καὶ ὑπομνημάτων*, in the second Tome, but there in Greek only; since that, set out both in Greek and Latin, by a learned man, one *Simon Bircovius*, who also hath illustrated it with very usefull Annotations; all printed *Samosci* (in *Polonia*) anno dom. 1604. He gives him, and this his Treatise, high commendations in his Preface, and is very angry with the Rhetoricians of later ages, for abusing the world with such frivolous impertinent trifles, as have passed amongst men for books of Rhetorick; whenas such incomparable pieces (in his judgement, wherein I think he is not altogether out;) have been neglected. This *Dionysius*, in that Treatise, (as *Demetrius Phalereus*, and some others: but none so copiously :) doth produce divers choise passages out of best Authors, both Poets, Orators and others: puts the words (still keeping the same sense,)

sense,) in severall formes; endeavouring thereby, as the most plain and convincing way, to shew to the eye, what the power is of this mysticall, or artificiall collocation. I do not expect that all men should be of his judgement, in every particular: but I think they may yield themselves to have no very judicious eare, in point of Rhetorick and good language, that are not convicted by the generality both of his reasons and examples, that there is such an art indeed, and such a mystery, in point of Eloquence & Rhetorick: which is as much as we need here. Neither would I have any to mistake, as though it were intended by any, that none have ever been eloquent or powerfull in speech, that have not either studied, or understood these mysteries. *Quintilian* may sufficiently satisfie for that. Certainly, Quintil.lib.9.c.4. whatsoever it be that is so called, it is as naturall (though not so common,) as speech it self: and comes as naturally to some without any study, as other parts of eloquence, which are the common subject of all written Rhetorick. Neither is it necessary, that men most powerfull in language, should understand (philosophically) the nature of language, more then they that feel the effects, should be able to give a true account, what it is that worketh upon them so mightily: wherein I believe, it is as ordinary for men to mistake, as it is not ordinary for them to enter into such doubts or speculations. Neither will it follow (to prevent another mistake,) that if right collocation of words be an Art,

or a great secret of nature, which hath been reduced by some to some kind of precepts; that therefore there is no right or powerfull collocation, but such as is according to those precepts: since it is granted, that naturally some Tunes are very sweet & musickall unto some eares, which are not unto others; and though some musick every where, yet not the same, in request amongst all nations. Wherein besides the consideration of the diversity of particular natures, and of different climates: use and education also (which in time becomes nature ;) is very considerable. Nay it shall be granted too, that contrary faculties, as in divers other things, so in this art or craft also, may have sometimes the same

Cicero in Bruto.

operation; not only upon different men, but even the same: as Cicero observes in two famous Orators of his time, *Catulus* and *Cotta*. In the first wherof, *Suavitas vocis & lenis appellatio literarum* (that is, a smooth pronunciation,) *bene loquendi famam confecerat*, (that is, had gotten him the reputation of an eloquent man.) *Cotta, quia valde se dilatandis literis à similitudine Græcæ locutionis abstraxerat, sonabatq; contrarium Catulo, subagreste quiddam planeq; subrusticum, alia quidem quasi inculta & sylvestri via, ad eandem laudē pervenerat*: that is, in few words, that this *Cotta*, quite contrary to *Catulus*, got himself the same reputation by a kind of broad, neglected, rustick pronunciation. But this doth not belong to the collocation of words, of which we have spoken. It doth not, I confesse; but to the musick of words (our chief subject and
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aimed at this time,) it doth. For he plainly adfcribeth the eloquence of both (that part of it at leaft which made it popular,) to their pronounciation: as broad in the one, as it was fmooth in the other; and yet both equally fweet. We need not make a miracle of it: we fhall fooner fhew a reafon for this, how it may very well be naturally; then we can give a reafon, or underftand the nature (as already obferved) of mufick in generall. But I may not ftand fo curioufly upon the examination of all particulars: which as it would not be for the content of all readers; fo neither am I provided at this time with all neceffaries for fuch a task. However, I cannot but take fome notice of thofe Philofophers mentioned by *Plutarch*, in the firft of his *Problems*, and the firft chapter; who contrary to what we have faid, maintained, *τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰσθημασιν ἢ δαίμασι, μὴ τοῦ τὴν ὀφθαλμοῦ, μηδὲ τοῦ τὴν ἀκοῆς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν ἡμῶν*: that is, That neither the pleafure of curious fights, nor of pleafant founds, (or voices,) doth properly belong unto the fenfes, but unto the mind or underftanding. I will not meddle with his inftances, upon which he chiefly grounds; fome of which, though he doth not name him, he had out of *Aristotle*. As for this particular of eloquent language, enough hath been faid already, to prevent that cavil or miftake, as though it were intended by any, that bare words or bare collocation, without any refpect to the fenfe or fignification, did affect any, be they never fo fenfuall. For fo, if generally true I mean, (for I believe that even fo it is not without fome truth,) then a man,

man, though he understood not a word of *Greek* or *Latin*, would equally be affected, if he heard them read, acted or repeated; which for any man to imagine, is too ridiculous. And then againe, if it be remembered, that when we say the pleasure of the eyes, or eares; we mean such as through the eyes or eares doth passe unto the soul: we may grant it the pleasure of a rationall soul, properly, which only is capable of it; & yet as properly sensual, as it receiveth its first birth, & breeding as it were, from those senses.

Though I do not propose to my self (as I have already said) to go further into the search of these things, then I must needs, to avoid too much exactnesse, for which all men I know are not fitted: yet for their sakes that are more curious and capable, I will adde here some further directions, as they offer themselves to me by the way, how they may come to the perfect knowledge of Words and Speech, and so may give their reason (if they please) more full satisfaction, concerning these effects which we speak of, when they understand their causes. They must begin first of all with the consideration of single Letters, and enquire, not from Grammarians only, but from best & choicest Philosophers, what is their naturall power and property; which letters are naturally smooth; which are rough, or sharp; what Vowels grave and stately, what quick and nimble; what effects and operations to the conjunction of such with reference either to the Eare, and the nature of it, or to the instruments, the Teeth, Tongue, Nose, Throat,

Throat, &c. by which they are formed, and to their motions in forming, are naturall. *Aristotle* hath done somewhat in this speculation here and there, in his *Rhetoricks*: but *Plato* in his *Cratylus*, much more; more copiously and more profoundly, tracing nature to her very cradle, as it were, then any that I have seen. Many have laboured in it; all almost that have written of Rhetorick, either ancient or late: but among the Ancients now extant, *Dionys. Halicarn.* with more exactnesse then any other of that profession. There is no part of Nature more obscure, where there is so little suspicion of obscurity: no wonder therefore, if they that have laboured in this search, are not alwayes of one judgement. It is enough, that by clear demonstration of unquestionable precedents and instances, (except a man be *valde agresti & hispida aure*, as *Aulus Gellius* in a place; or somewhat else, that is not ordinary, doth alter the case:) out of *Homer* especially, who of all men that have been known unto the world, whether by art, as some have thought, or by nature, and by the advantage of a judicious care, and plentiful wit, as most likely, made most use in his writings of this craft; but by clear demonstration of unquestionable precedents, whether out of *Homer*, or any other, most certain, that all letters, both Consonants and Vowels, have some naturall and distinct propriety in speech, if thus and thus used, towards such and such effects and operations.

Next unto Letter's, if we consider Words, there
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is no word that consists of Syllables, but is measurable; it hath some *ῥυθμὸν*, or dimension: and there is no *ῥυθμὸς* or dimension, but hath some naturall property; or influence (especially when many together artificially joined,) upon the soul of man, towards such and such operations. I may be thought to speak Riddles by some: and I know very well, that not only they that never read of such things, may think so; but even some that have taken great pains and read much, to satisfie themselves, have found this speculation more intricate and curious, then usefull and necessary. This very word *Rhythmus* in matter of speech, what it is, how it differs from *ἄριθμος*; the one *numerus* properly, the other (though I made bold to confound them for want of a proper English word;) *dimensio*; what is the nature, and what are the properties of each; though so many have written of it, would be neverthelesse a long and difficult businesse to make it plain. Without some skill in Musick, if not practicall, yet speculative, I think it is not to be done. But it is enough for my purpose, by such hints as these to let the Reader know, that as in all Poetry there is somewhat of Musick; so in ordinary language too, (though not so apparent,) let it be never so ordinary; much more in that which is elegant, and (whether by art, or by nature only: for so in this subject we must be allowed to speak :) artificiall.

Then for the Organs of Speech, what analogy they have with divers instruments of musick, there is much to be said, if a man go about it, rationally and

and philosophically. *Gregory Nyssen*, for so much as he hath done, not offset purpose, but occasionally only, both in his book *De Opificio*, and *Contra Eunomium*, hath done it very well. We have his words at large, in a more proper place and task, but not ended, nor very likely to be. They that have *Cassianus De vocis & auditus organis*, may finde somewhat there about it, if I be not mistaken: but whether out of *Nyssen* any thing, who well deserveth a place in that argument, I know not. And whereas I said but now, that the word *ῥυθμός*, was a hard word to be explained; I meant it of the naturall speculation of the thing signified by the word; not of the Grammaticall exposition of it: in which sense nevertheless, it seemeth that it hath proved a hard and difficult word to some. *Nyssen* useth it in this rhetoricall sense, in his first *Δίῳ* (that is, *book*; not as some translate it, *Oration*;) *contra Eunomium*: καὶ δαὶνὰ γὰρ ὅτι τῶν καλλιγερόντων τὸν λόγον, &c. where the Jesuite that translateth him, because he understood it not, hath perverted the whole passage, and hath not one word of the Fathers meaning. I believe they that read Greek Authors, will find this word elsewhere too misinterpreted, and therefore I thought this caution would not be unseasonable.

Now for the pleasure of the Eyes in good language, our next consideration, though it may seem more remote (at first hearing,) from probability; yet that we have to say will be much plainer, and, as I apprehend it, with no lesse reality of truth. I will not insist upon *Plato's* reasoning in his *Cratylus*,
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that words rightly imposed, are and must be *μυθηματικα*, that is, artificiall and picture-like imitations: nor upon *Aristotle* his comparing of speeches made to a multitude, unto Landscaps, which shew best afar off; and being looked upon near, are little regarded. Though both have good reason for what they say; yet as not before, so neither here, do we hold bare similitudes a sufficient ground for us. Many such we may find in divers Authors, used by them, to set out the excellent beauty and amiableness of an eloquent piece. But for the reality of the thing, which is our businesse; The first thing I shall take into consideration is, the use of those Figures of Speech, by which Speech is adorned as much as by any other kind of ornament, which we call *Metaphors*, and *Similitudes*, and *Allegories*. Of their use and excellency in point of Eloquence if well used, and of the right use of them, no man need to read any other then *Aristotle*, who as in all other points of humane learning, so in this particular, hath behaved himself, not as an excellent Orator only, but as a Philosopher, that is, as one that had the perfect knowledge of Nature; without which knowledge, nothing else, though it seemeth never so remote, can rightly be understood. Now what it is that maketh such Figures and Ornaments of Speech so pleasant, and so taking; I shall answer in the words of one, who could both judge and speak very well himself; but it is the sense of all that have written of that argument: *Quod omnis translatio, quæ quidem ratione sumpta est,*
Cic. 3. De Orat. ad

ad sensus ipsos admovetur, maxime oculorum, qui est sensus acerrimus: that is, Because every Metaphor, (and so of the rest,) that is proper and naturall, exposeth the things that are spoken of to the senses; especially to that of the eyes, which of all senses is the quickest sense. Which makes me wonder that S. Augustine in his book *De Doctrina Christiana*, should make it such a difficult businesse to be resolved; why the same thing delivered in plain and perspicuous language, should not be so pleasing, as when it is set out with Metaphors and Allegories: whereof he gives some examples there; *difficile est dicere*, saith he, & *alia est questio*. But I know that S. Augustine was so good a Naturallist, and an Orator too, (which he once professed;) that he could easily have found the reason of it himself, though none had found it before him: but *difficile est dicere*, in reference to his Reader he might say: such speculations of nature are not for every capacity; nor that perchance so seasonable a place, (in his judgement) for such a speculation. But this very reason that makes them so pleasing in ordinary language, hath brought Metaphors out of credit with Philosophers, that seek not the pleasures of the senses, but the naked truth of things. Aristotle, in his *Topicks*, condemneth them: Plu-

Plutarch. Περὶ τῆς
μὴ χρᾶν &c.

tarch saith they are children, for the most part, or sensually given, that are so taken with such Figures of Rhetorick. I would produce his words, but that there is somewhat to be amended in them, (ἐνατὸν for δευτὸν, as in all editions I have seen;

a vast difference :) which I have done elsewhere in another work, which may one day see light perchance, and therefore will spare that labour here.

Seneca, *Epist.* 59.

Seneca allowes them to Philosophers, not as commendable off themselves, nor as Poets use them, for a shew, and to delight; *sed ut imbecillitatis nostræ adminicula sint: & ut discentem & audientem in rem presentem adducant.* that is, because of humane infirmity; that by the help of such figures, the teacher may bring his hearers to the knowledge of those things, by a kind of present sight, which otherwise they cannot understand. *S. Chrysostome* hath the same thing, and is very large upon it, upon the seventh *Psalme*: ἡ δὲ παρχύτης τῆς ἐκείνων οὐκ ἐστὶν καθ' ἑαυτὴν τῆς ἡμετέρας παρχύτης. Therefore, saith he, (speaking of Metaphors and Allegories,) the Scripture doth use such grosse (or course) expressions, that it may fit the coursenesse (or dulnesse) of our understandings.

But besides such Figures, as *Metaphors*, *Allegories*, and the like, there is a certain propriety of speech, w^{ch} they commonly call, ἐνέργειαν (some ἐνέργειαν, though there be that make a difference) or lively representation: others, φαντασίαν, & εἰδωλοποιίαν, that is, a phantasie or a representation of shapes and images. It is so called saith *Longinus*, ὅταν δὲ λέγῃς, καὶ ὀρθροῦσιν καὶ πάθος βλεψῶν δοκῇ, καὶ ὅτε ἔλθῃ πρὸς τοὺς ἀκούοντες: that is, when by a kind of *Enthusiasm*, and strong apprehension of the mind, you think you see what you speak of, and so set it out by words to those that hear you, that you make it in a maner visible. Of this property or faculty, common *Rhetoricians*

cians treat largely, and bring divers examples out of best Authors. Many excellent places out of *Homer* and *Virgil* (the two Poets that have been the admiration of all Ages, which have afforded men of judgement,) compared together may be found in *Macrobins* his *Saturnalia*, and *Iulius Caf. Scaliger*, in the fifth of his *Poetices*. I have read fomewhere, that *Phidias*, an ancient famous Statuary, adcribed, eſpecially, that ſo much renowned, and almoſt adored piece of his, *Iupiter Olympius*, to the reading of *Homer*. How farre the reading of excellent poets or Orators, may conduce to painting or carving, I know not: it is out of my profeſſion to judge. This I can ſpeak of my ſelf: that when I read any ſuch paſſage, in any of thoſe principall Poets or Orators, I do not only phanſy to my ſelf, that I ſee thoſe things that they deſcribe; but alſo find in my ſelf (as I phanſy) the very ſame content & pleaſure, that I ſhould, if my eyes beheld them in ſome whether coloured, or carved representation of ſome excellent Artiſt. As for example; when I read *Laocoon* his tragicall end and ſtory, ſet out by *Virgilius* in the ſecond book of his *Aeneids*, I do not think I read it with much leſs admiration or pleaſure, then they receive, that go a hundred or a thouſand miles perchance, to behold that incomparable *Laocoon* now at *Rome* to be ſeen; which was an admiration to the beholders, even when Artiſts were at the higheſt of eſteem and perfection, (as by *Pliny*, and others that write of it, may appear;) ſo many hundred of yeares above a thouſand ſince: how much more now, to all that

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can judge, since that noble Art hath suffered so notable declination? Not with much lesse admiration, I say: saving that (which much derogates from admiration,) I have a *Virgil* alwaies at command, and can turn to it when I please; the other I never saw, (but in paper picture, and even so, not without some admiration;) nor can hope ever to see for many reasons. But there is more in *Virgil*, then in that carved piece: the description of the two Serpents, (which I most admire:) their gliding pace & motions (or what should I call it?) upon the Seas, towards the place of execution. Now if any body shall think much of this, that a man should be made to see without eyes, and should by the benefit of his eares, really compasse pleasures that properly belong unto the eyes; I would have him to remember what he hath read before, if he have read from the beginning, that a man may see inwardly, as well as outwardly: without eyes, though not without visible *species*, (whether materiall, or spirituall, we will not dispute:) and that those pleasures we commonly adscribe to the eyes, or eares, are properly the pleasures of a rationall soul.

There was a way of painting, or rather imagerie, very curious & costly, but very frequent among ancient *Romans*, who stood not upon any cost, either for pomp or pleasure; which was by inlaying variety of small stones, or small chips of severall kinds of wood; of both kinds the beautifullest that could be gotten for such a purpose; in such order and coherence, that they might represent to the life severall shapes

shapes of Flowers, or Birds, or any other thing that was a fit object for the pleasure of the eyes. I believe it is used to this day in some Churches: but then very ordinary for Sielings and Pavements, in great Houses. Any man may imagine, what care must be taken in such work, to bring it to any perfection, in setting and ordering every little scrap or parcell in it's right place: and how quickly the eye of any Spectator would find it out, if any thing were misplaced. It was called *opus emblematicum, vermiculatum, musivum, asarotum*, besides divers other names. Answerable for all the world (in point of ordering or placing,) to this artifice, was some kind of style, devised by the ancient *Sophistæ*, and very exactly observed by some of them, for which they have been much admired. It is a very pleasing kind of language, it cannot be denied, to any that have either eares, or eyes, or souls sensible of any kind of harmony or symmetrie; whether in point of Sounds, or of Structures: better (if exquisite indeed) to be read, then to be heard: because the current of speech doth not give leisure to either eares, or eyes, to take notice of the art or care, where not a word is, or a syllable, but hath, as it were, its naturall order, to compleat the harmonic. Of this kind of speech, or style, rather in derision of it, then in commendation, were those verses in an ancient Poet, mentioned by *Cicero*.

*Quam lepide lexis composta, ut tesserula omnes,
Arte, pavimento, atque emblemate vermiculato.*

Cicer. in Oratore.

I know it is the course of the world, and it is the occasion of much wrangling among men. *Homine imperito nihil iniquius*: Most judge of things, not out of any knowledge, or consideration of the things in themselves; but by their own temper and disposition, whether altogether naturall, or partly contracted by long use and custome: without any regard to other men (who probably may as much differ from them in temper of soul, as they do in feature of body,) their different *genius* and inclination. If therefore any give lesse credit to these things, because they find not a disposition in themselves to be taken, or affected with such composition; nor any other perchance, that is extraordinary: that they may the better know how to value their own judgement, or experience in such speculations, I shall first propose to their consideration the words of *Dion. Halicarnassens*, of whom we may very probably suppose, that he might have as much experience in the world, & as much insight in the tempers of men, as themselves. In the very beginning of his Treatise *περὶ συνθέσεως*, &c. or *Collocation of words*, he layeth down for a ground, or grounds upon it, as a common principle, That all that is considerable in good language, is either *τὰ νοήματα* or *τὰ ὀνόματα*: that is, either *Words*, or *Conceptions*. As for *Conceptions*, he saith they require great maturitie of judgment, especially in politick Speeches. but of *Words* his assertion is; that *ἐπὶ τῇ ἀπασί νῆς ψυχῇ περὶ τὸν τῆς ἑρμηνείας ἀγαθὸν μὲν, ἀλόγος πῶς καὶ ἄσπερ ἐν θεοσιώδεις ὅτι τὰς λαμβάνετα ὁρμάς*: that is, *That every younger man, or youth his soul, by some*

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kind of naturall, or enthusiastick instinct, is ravished with the beauty of well-framed elocution. This may be thought by some, a bold speech: and by some, perchance, not so bold as absurd. But what will they say to *Hadrianus* the Cardinall, a man, besides his age, and dignitie, of very profound learning, as appeareth by what he hath written of the fundamentalls of Christian Religion: who in his book *De sermone Latino*, in a place where he treateth of the proper and elegant use of the Latine word *alius*, is not ashamed to professe of himself, that he valued such Observations more then (*Vniones*) choicest Pearles and Jewels; and that he had received such contentment in his own soul, when ever he met with such in good Authors, as no words of his could expresse: and doth not stick to adscribe some kind of *Divinitie* or *Deitie* to those men, that were able to expresse themselves in that kind. Yet it is farre from me to believe, that solid learning doth consist in such things: but much lesse do I think, that the contempt of those things to which our selves have no *genius*, though highly esteemed of by others, is an argument of much solid learning, as some would gladly perswade themselves and others; nor yet of much wit, or judgement.

I have done with all those particulars that I proposed to my Reader, at the beginning of this Chapter: and yet I shall not end it here. There is somewhat else, which I find, by some referred to Rhetoricall *Enthusiasme*, and doth indeed, in some particulars, very properly belong unto it. But we

must take the liberty (for methods sake,) to consider of all that is reducible under one head, though not altogether of one nature, as to matter of Rhetorick.

Quintil. Institut.
lib. 10. c. 7.

Quintilian (as was before observed,) was of opinion clearly, and his reasons for it are very considerable, that no man should take upon him the profession of an Orator, that is not able to speak as an Orator, upon any emergent occasion, without any premeditation. But the same *Quintilian* is as much against them, that do adventure upon extemporary speaking, as it were by Enthusiasme; that is, without a good foundation laid, able to beget such a facultie: which he will not allow to be called speaking, but twatling, or prating, or any thing else, that doth not pretend unto Reason. Against this his opinion, he doth object, that there have been some sometimes, who without any such foundation or premeditation, have been known to speak very well; yea so well, that their crude extemporariness hath been thought by men able to judge, to surpass the care and premeditation of others. For which, those crude and rude Orators of the old time, when any such thing did happen unto them, were wont to say (he quotes *Tullie's* authoritie for it:) *Deum tunc assuisse*; that is, that God had assisted them. *Quintilian* doth not deny, but that such a thing may happen sometimes, that some may happen to speak as well, or better *extempore*, without any such foundation as we have spoken, as others, upon premeditation, &c. & he gives a good reason for

for it, which he fetcheth not from the heavens, (to make a miracle of it,) but from nature: but still keeps to his conclusion, upon this ground, (though he doth not expresse himself so plainly:) that that which happeneth but sometimes, uncertainly, cannot be called a faculty; nor that man be reputed very rationall or wise, that makes profession of that which he hath not at command; and hath so little ground to presume upon, that himself makes a miracle of it, when it doth happen, adscribing it unto God: so that nothing^l lesse then a miracle can save him from shame and confusion, except he have the good luck (which indeed might happen without a miracle: *Stultorum plena, &c.*) to speak unto such, or before such, who are as ignorant, as himself is impudent. Of their opinion that adscribed all Eloquence, in generall, to *Enthusiasme*, I have considered before: but this is quite another thing; when not the facultie it self, but some extraordinary successe, upon some distresse of time, or suddain danger, is adscribed unto God; which makes me to consider here of it by it self.

Now this will bring me upon a more generall consideration of this *Deus*; this un-named God; more commonly styled, *Aliquis Deus*, or, *Nescio quis Deus*, by ancient Heathens: more generall, I mean, then to belong to this particular chapter of *Rhetoricall Enthusiasme*; but not so generall, as to carry me out of my generall subject, which is *Enthusiasme*. I will call it, for distinction sake, a tem-

porary *Enthusiasme*; when a man, whether in matter of speech, or answer, or any other occasion, being put to it, more or lesse, meets with some suddain help, or evasion; or hints of direction, for the time to come, to avoid dangers, or to compasse deliverances: whether by inward suggestions, as it were, or by some outward signes and encouragements, or the like. In all which cases we shall find this *formula* of *Aliquis Deus*, or, *Nescio quis Deus*, frequently enough used by ancient Heathens. Before I come to some instances, whether ancient or late, I must professe, that even among and to heathens, my belief is, that many things, in point of deliverances and otherwise, did happen by the immediate hand of God. I have ground enough to say so, from the 107. *Psalme*: as we have shewed at large, against some sottish and phanaticall Expositions, upon that very Psalm. I believe there is no part of the world, where any creatures be, that can be called Gods creatures, from which Gods providence, not generall only, but even particular, upon some extraordinary occasions, is excluded: But neverthelesse, as better understood, so much more to be seen, where God is worshipped as he ought to be. Farre be it therefore from me to doubt, much more to deny, but that some things in that kind among Christians may happen extraordinarily: though I am very confident, that as among Heathens, so among Christians, the matter is often mistaken, through grosse ignorance or superstition. But that is not it which we are now upon, how imposture in
that

that kind may be prevented: how to prevent offence by being mistaken, was my businesse here, and no other. And so we go on.

First then, in matter of speech, ancient Heathens had their warrant from *Homer*, to whom, for the most part, as well Philosophers as others, adscribed little lesse then divine authority: who in his 3. *Odyssie*, maketh the Goddesse *Minerva*, President of Wit and Counsell, to appear (though in the shape of a man well known unto him,) to *Telemachus*, and to advise him to repair unto *Nestor*, set out by *Homer* as a Prince of great renown for his wisdom and long experience: and upon *Telemachus* his reply and exception, that being yet so young and raw in the world, he should be ashamed to speak to so reverend a person; *Minerva* doth encourage him, with these words;

Τηλέμαχ' ἄλλα μὲν αὐτὸς ἐνὶ φρεσὶ σῆσι νοήσεις·

Ἄλλα δὲ καὶ δαίμων ὑποθήσεται, ὃ γὰρ οἶον

Οὐ σὲ θεῶν ἀέκητι γένεσθαι τετραφέμεν τε.

I am not so good a Poet as to render him in verse: neither do I hope to live to see either him or *Virgil* so translated, that a man may truly say, translated. It is well, if the sense be fully and faithfully expressed. Their other * perfecti-
 ons, for which most admired anciently, imitated they may be perchance by some rare Wit, so farre as the language will bear; equalled they can never be, in any translation. But the effect of the words is this: That upon such an occasion, to enquire of his Father, who had been
 fo

* See more in
 the Chapter of
 Poeticall
 Enthusiasme.

so long expected, &c. he should not be afraid to speak. That his own wit perchance, might serve him beyond his expectation: and what he wanted himself, he might hope that God (*ὁ δαίμων*, of which word we have treated elsewhere very copiously;) would suggest unto him: for that it was not likely (by what might already be observed of his carriage in those years,) that he was either born, or brought up, even to that age, without a particular providence.

Of these words of the Poet, superstitious *Aristides* treateth at large in his Oration against *Plato*. And *Cicero* in his Epistles *ad Atticum*, applyeth them very pertinently to his case: being then in great perplexity, how he should carry himself towards *Julius Caesar*, so that he might not wrong his conscience or credit; himself being a grave Senator, who had alwaies stood for the common liberty; nor yet offend him by his liberty, who had invaded the Empire by his power, and was now coming towards him, having sent him word before-hand, that he should shortly come that way, and would visit him at his house, making great reckoning of him, (as he professed, and I verily believe he did;) because of his approved integrity; besides wisdom, moderation, and other good qualities. *Cicero* being then in that strait, writeth to his friend: *Ita subito occurrit, ut ne Trebatium quidem, &c. omnia nobis imparatis agenda: sed tamen* ἄλλα μὲν αὐτῷ &c. What event that meeting had, himself relates in another Epistle to the same *At-*

*Cic. Epist. ad
Att. lib. 9.*

ticus, which may be seen there; because it is not to our purpose here. Iust such another case as this, between Conscience on the one side, & present Danger of no lesse then Life it self, doth *Plinius Secundus* relate of himself in his E-

Plin. Epist.
lib. 1.

pistles. It was upon a question, that was put to him of purpose to catch him. It was a good while before he could tell what to say: which is some argument, that nothing else (though that too, in a more generall consideration, reducible to providence;) but his own good wit and discretion freed him. Yet at last he lighted upon such an answer, as avoided both those precipices, and confounded his malicious enemies. *Plinie*, according to his Religion, thanks his Gods for it; *Non possum dicere aliud tunc mihi quam Deos affuisse*. And I think it were want of Religion in any man, not to thank God in such a case: though it be liable to much inconvenience in point of Providence in generall, to make a particular providence of all such cases, without any regard to persons or circumstances. *Plutarch* in his *Coriolanus*, takes it into his consideration, and doth endeavour, grounding upon *Homer* especially, to set down some rules, whereby, in such cases, we may discern between humane providence, and immediate divine suggestions. But if according to his rule, we shall ascribe all ungrounded, and seemingly rash attempts and resolutions, that produce unexpected successfull events, to immediate inspiration: though it may be plausible enough in the case of goodmen, and

and good ends; yet generally received and applyed, it will prove such a stumbling-block, that it is farre more likely to produce Atheisme, then any true sense of Godlinesse. Besides daily experience of such cunning foxes, as *Phormio* is set out by the Comœdian, who have nothing to trust to in all the world, but their craftinesse and their wit, and go further with that, to bring their ambitious ends about, and to get themselves credit & reputation in the world, then many honefter men, with the advantage of a farre better Purse, and greater relations can do: what Age of the World, what People, or Nation, that hath been made known unto the world by any Historie, doth not afford store of examples of successfull Wickednesse; not only to the amazement of weaker worldlings, (if I may so call them, that have yet seen but little of the world, or have not yet profited so much by what they have seen, as they ought to have done;) but even beyond the actors and adventurers their own expectation? Which things, though we acknowledge upon such and such grounds and foundations, necessary to be laid by every man that undertakes that subject, easily to be reconcileable with providence: yet according to *Plutarch's* rule, must of necessitie prove destructive unto it. *Aristotle* in his *Rhetoricks* hath an observation, that great men that have good luck, amongst many bad, have one good qualitie, that they are commonly *φιλῶντες*. They love God, he saith, (after a sort;) and seem to be religious: as supposing their good luck to be an effect of Providence, and
by

by consequent, an argument of Gods love and favour towards them. Whether it be so or no, that such, ordinarily, love God and Religion, *after a sort*; I will not here argue: but of many bad, I should think it the very worst of their qualities, (if *Aristotle* meant it of such, as became great by unlawful means; which I think he doth:) that they should love God and Religion upon such an account. For so to be religious, is to make God the author of Wickednesse, that our selves may be thought good: and whilst we affect to be religious, *after a sort*, to undermine (to our power,) all true Religion; a main fundamentall whereof is, that God is not pleased with any Wickednesse, neither doth suffer it at any time to prevail, but as a means either of greater Iudgement, to them that are past Correction; or of advantageous suffering, to them to whom he intends greater Blessings. We might be much larger upon this argument; but it shall suffice to say here, that in such a case, as either *Cicero's* or *Plinie's*, who were men of singular naturall parts, and through long experience much improved; though they did very well to be thankfull, and all men should, though upon lesse occasions: yet there is no need at all, that we should go further then humane wit and wisdom, for a reason of their wise and successfull answers. Surely, Wisdom had not been so much commended unto us by all sorts of Authors; nor so much paines taken by our Fore-fathers, for attainment of it; nor men that have been thought wise, so much admired; had it not been a thing

thing of very good use in the world. It is the privilege of God, that he can infatuate and confound the highest wisdom of man, when he pleaseth: but if God doth not interpose, we need go no further than our first creation, if strange things sometimes be brought to passe by the wisdom of man, (though much impaired, we know, by his Fall,) who was created *after the image of God*. And if wicked men bring strange things to passe too, in that kind; it may be a question, whether a wicked man may be a *wise man*, properly so called: (*Aristotle* saith no; and there is good reason for it, if it be well understood:) but that one that is wicked, if wise, should have good successe (in point of humane reason and judgement,) in the world, is neither to be doubted, nor wondred at: nay, reasons are given by good Authors, why unconscionable Craftinesse, oftentimes, in the prosecution of worldly businesses, hath had great advantages above wisest Integrity.

It would trouble a man more, to find a reason for those many Cures, whereof so frequent mention is made in ancient Authors, supposed to have happened by particular Revelations in Dreams of the night. Their manner was, (they that wanted help, and had any confidence in those things,) after some preparations, to go to a Temple; there, some Rites and Ceremonies performed, to lye and expect some Revelation. *Pellibus incubuit stratis, somnosque petivit*, &c. *Virgil*, and they that have written upon him, will inform them concerning many

many particulars, that have not taken notice of it
 elsewhere. *Aristides* the Orator relates strange
 things of himself, which I neither know how to
 believe, as whom I find every where so blindly su-
 perstitious; nor how to disprove, writing with so
 much confidence, and appealing to the testimony
 of so many others, as he doth. Insomuch, that
 grounding upon this pretended common Experi-
 ence; both of Medicine it self, as an Art, (by others
 accounted of all others the most necessary;) and of
 them that professed it; he speaketh in a place as of
 things, in his judgement, not very needfull in the
 world. But a Greater man, and a Wiser man, and
 which is above all, a farre better man
 then *Aristides*, *Antoninus* the Roman
 Emperour; so wise, as not easie to be
 cheated by any others; and so good, (I
 think I have said enough of him elsew here, to make
 good all I say here:) that I am perswaded he would
 as soon have parted with his Empire, as to have
 been the author of any Cheat towards others: he
 also in his divine *Meditations*, mentioneth those
 Cures by Dreams and Revelations; not only as ap-
 proved unto himself, by his own, but unto others
 also, by frequent experience. It is not improbable,
 that conceit might do much in this businesse of
 Cures. It is granted by Physicians, that bare Con-
 ceit sometimes, as it may cause Diseases, so reall
 Cures also. But to adscribe all to Conceit, that hap-
 pened in that kind, I cannot. I will further grant, as
 very probable, that among some such reall Cures,
 whe-

M. Aurel. An-
 ton. *Meditat.*
 lib. I. 5. & 9.

whether by Conceit or otherwise, many more, through juggling and devised impostures, were talked of, then were true and reall. But then supposing withall, that some happened very really; of such as *Antoninus*, I should make no great question, but the same God, who sent to *Naaman* the Syrian an *Hebrew* Maid, to tell of the Prophet in *Israel*, that would cure him, might send them Dreams, (in their Houses, not in their Temples,) that might help them. As for others, that received reall help in the Temples of Idols, and with the solemnities of such and such rites; I am most inclinable to believe, that such Cures were done by Evil Spirits, the further to engage men in that Idolatrous kind of Worship. And not only in the veneration of Heathenish Gods in generall, but in the veneration of those Temples also, where they were worshipped, and of those *ἐγκύβητοι*, or sacred (as supposed) *obdormitions* of men and women in Temples: by the means whereof, what horrid pranks were sometimes brought to passe, we have a notable instance in *Iosephus*; and of the execution, just and due, upon the actors & contrivers of it. As for other Dreams, upon other occasions, whereof the books and relations of Ancients are so full, imputed by them to Revelations; I see not any thing, in most of them, but may very well be adscribed unto mere Conceit and Superstition. It is the more to be wondred at, I confesse, that not ordinary men only, as divers Poets, and some Orators, and Philosophers, should tell us of such: but that

even

even learned Physicians should adscribe so much unto such phantasies. *Hippocrates* in his Epistles (if *genuinus Hippocrates*, which I can scarce believe;) hath a large relation of the God *Æsculapius*, how he appeared unto him about *Democritus* his businesse: *Galen* often, how that he had a Dream, to write such and such a book; to go, or to forbear such a journey. If men give their minds unto such things, there is no question but they shall phantasie sometimes, nay often, much more then there is just ground for; and sometimes it may be, somewhat may happen extraordinarily: but men (I think) were better want it by far, if it come by Superstition, and not by immediate Providence; as out of doubt, unto some sometimes, that are not superstitious.

The ancient Heathens had their *sortes Homericae*: and even Christians anciently, some, their Observations not much unlike unto them: Observations, I say, upon the first words that should offer themselves unto them, at the first opening of some part of the Bible; but of the Psalms especially. What S. *Augustine* his judgement is of such, what is the determination of some Councils, hath been observed by them that have written of that subject: we shall but touch upon it here. It is a common story that *Franciscus Junius*, that translated the Old Testament (with *Tremellius*) out of the *Hebrew*, and lived to be a great Writer in these later times, was not a Christian heartily, untill the first words of S. *Iohn's* Gospell were offered unto him by a strange

providence, as he apprehended. I have read somewhat of *Ignatius Loyola* too, the founder of the Iesuites, not much unlike. *Sulpicius Severus*, in the life of *Martinus*, that holy Bishop, hath some observations upon the Psalms, that were read in course when he was consecrated: He makes a particular providence of it, as I remember. A thousand such relations a man shall meet with in all kind of books, if he think them worth his observation. But as in Dreams, so in this, I make great difference, between those things that offer themselves without any seeking, and those which upon destinated seeking and curiosity. In the first kind, there is no question, but God, if he please, may use that way sometimes, as well as any other, to reveal some things extraordinarily. But for the other, as it is a mere tempting of God, and little differing (as is disputed at large by learned *Peucerus*, in his books *De Divinatione*;) from direct Witchcraft: so if any thing happen in that way, that is extraordinary, and may resent of some kind of revelation or prediction; I should much suspect the author, and be more afraid of the end, as rather tending to draw a man to farther mischief, by degrees; then out of any good will, or for any present advantage, to be reaped thereby.

I know one very well, (I mean it in a vulgar, not philosophicall sense, which would be too much presumption:) who from his child-hood having alwaies been (though staied and sober enough in his ordinary conversation,) somewhat boisterous and violent in his play, and ordinary recreation,

on,


on, for which he had suffered many times, & sometimes had been in danger of his life, and yet could not leave it in his elder years; at a certain time, when he was playing with a child of his, (which he loved very well,) it was his luck, to run his forehead against a plain pillar : but with such vehemency, that he was almost felled with the blow, and was stupid for a while. As the place began to swell, (the skin being broken in divers places, but without bleeding ;) and to grow blue ; whilst his forehead was a binding, somewhat having been applied unto it, as soon as it could be made ready ; he was carried by a strange instinct, up many staires, to his Study, making them that were about him, much against their wills, to follow him, and not without some wonder. In his Study (a long room,) at the farthest end, out of a case of shelves, that contained above 5 or 600 small books, he took down one, himself not knowing to what end ; which happened to be *Lactantius* : and at the very first opening, cast his eyes upon these words, (which he did not remember ever to have read in him before, nor any like in any other Author :) *Summa ergo prudentia est, pedetentim incedere*. He read no farther ; and it made so much impression in him, (when he remembred what he had partly escaped, and partly suffered,) that he could think of little else all the day : and he did think (especially when he had heard what had happened unto a very good friend of his,) that he had fared the better afterwards, for that


*Lact. De Opif.
D. c. 1. ed.
Crisp. in 16.
p. 672.*

warning; and perchance escaped somewhat, that might have been his death, not long after.

I make no question but many such things do happen unto many, both good and bad: but either not observed, (and better not observed, then turned into superstition :) or soon forgotten. Wherein there may be some danger of Unthankfulnesse, I confesse, as well as Superstition in the excesse: that is, when either (not contenting our selves with God's ordinary providence, grounded upon his Holy Word;) we think too much of such things, before they happen of themselves; or too well of ourselves, when they have happened.

CHAP.





C H A P. V. Of Poeticall Enthusiasme.

The Contents.

Poeticall and Rhetoricall Enthusiasme, how near in nature; though the faculties themselves, (Oratorie and Poetrie,) seldome concurring in one man. The perfection both of Poets and Orators to proceed from one cause, Enthusiasme. The division of Poets, according to Jul. Cæs. Scaliger. Poets by nature, and by inspiration. Plato his Dialogue concerning that subject. Not onely Poets, but their actors also, &c. according to Plato's doctrine, divinely inspired. Plato not to be excused in that Dialogue; though more sound in some others. Much lesse Scaliger, a Christian, for his expressions in this subject, if not opinions, as some have apprehended him. Homer (the occasion of Plato's Dialogue,) how much admired by the Ancients: by Aristotle, particularly. His language: his matter: and why not so much admired, and so ravishing in our dayes, as he hath been formerly. Some use to be made of him, for confirmation of the antiquitie of the Scriptures of the Old Testament. No Poets (true Poets) made by Wine; disputed and maintained against Scaliger: though it be granted, that Wine may contribute much towards the making of a good Poem; and why. So, some other things, proper to stirre up (in some tempers) the spirits, or the phansie, to Enthusiasme; as Musick, &c.

OF Poeticall Enthusiasme, (the subject of this Chapter,) there is so little to be said particularly, besides what hath been of Rhetoricall; that I needed not to have made a distinct head of it, but that it hath been a common *Maxime* in most Ages, approved by sundrie pregnant instances, That a good Orator and a good Poet, are things, if not altogether incompatible, yet seldome or never meeting in one: how then

should they be led and agitated by one spirit, or *enthusiasme*? Yet certain it is, and it is the opinion of best Orators, and Masters of Rhetorick, *Cicero*, *Dionysius Halicarnassens*, and others, that Oratory and Poetry, though so seldome concurring in the Professors of each, are very little different in their causes and nature. It might prove a long businessse, if I should take upon me to examine all reasons, and all instances, on both sides, for, or against this common *Maxime*. For the difference of their style and language, *Aristotle* may satisfie any man, in his *Περὶ Ποιητικῆς*, and *books of Rhetorick*: though even in that difference so much affinity perchance might be found, as might argue rather different wayes, or effects of the same faculty, then different Faculties: but that it is not our task here to examine particulars. However, there is no question, but in divers respects, their parts may be as different as their style: and where the end in generall, (the one to please, the other to perswade,) is not the same; how should particular endeavours, which produce abilities, be? And yet after all this, though we allow some difference in their parts & proprieties, such as are more common and ordinary, which may make the difference between ordinary Poets and Orators the greater: my opinion is, that scarce ever was (so I speak, because some accidentall circumstance may alter the case in some particulars:) that scarce ever was any excellent Poet, but might have been (which in *Virgil's* case we know to be most true:) as excellent an Orator; or excellent Orator, but might have

have attained to equall excellency in Poetry; had they applied themselves to the means in time, and externall provocations and encouragements equally concurred for the one, as for the other. But how the same *Enthusiasme* (originally and in it's nature,) may be the cause of very different effects and faculties; we shall have a more proper place to consider and examine.

Iulius Caesar Scaliger, whose authority is such with most men, that whatsoever he saith, passeth for current with them without any further consideration; in that work of his, where he treats of all things belonging unto *Poetrie*, and of all *Poets*, whether ancient or late, that he thought worthy the mention; in the first book of it, and second chapter, reduceth all *Poets* into three severall divisions, as it were: from their *Spirit*, their *Age* (or time when they lived,) and their *Argument*. For *their Spirit*; he delivers it at first as out of *Plato* and *Aristotle*, that some are born *Poets*; by Nature, without Art or Study, endowed with all parts and faculties necessary to that profession. Others, though born simple and ignorant, yea dull and stupid; to become *Poets* by immediate inspiration. As for matter of inspiration, it is *Plato's* doctrine, I confesse, in more then one place; but disputed and maintained at large in a peculiar *Dialogue*, inscribed by him, *Ion*, ἢ περὶ Ἰωνος. where he doth not onely dispute, that all true *Poetrie* is by immediate inspiration; immediate divine inspiration, in the most proper and literall sense; using all the words that the Greek

tongue could afford, to expresse *inspiration*, and repeating them often; but that the *ῥαψωδοὶ* also, that is, *actors* or representators of Poets, so reciting their words, that they imitated the nature of the things by their pronounciation, and action of body, (an art in those dayes in great request,) yea and the Auditors, all, or most, were inspired in some degree. which he doth endeavour to illustrate by the example of the Load-stone, which infuseth vertue, first upon one ring, and from that upon another, and so to many iron rings: though still with some abatement; yet so neverthelesse, that as long as there is any vertue to draw, it must be acknowledged to have proceeded from the same beginning. So that *Plato*, nay God himself, he saith, would not have us to doubt, but that it is (*ἀλλ' ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ὁ λέγων, διὰ τῶν δὲ φθέγγεται πρὸς ἡμᾶς*; and again, *ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ δὲ μέγιστα δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς εἰσεῖξαται ἡμῖν ἵνα μὴ διαΐζωμεν, ὅτι ἔκ ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ, &c.*) God himself, (not they,) that speaketh unto us in, and by *Poets*. But that any are born *Poets*, distinct from those that are inspired, I do not find in that *Dialogue*; nor remember any where else in *Plato*.

As for *Aristotle*, I wish *Scaliger* had quoted the place. I know more then one place, where *Aristotle* likewise upon the by, doth affirm that *ἐνθεον ἢ ποιήσεις*, Poetry comes by *inspiration*; or rather, is not without *inspiration*: but where he doth so positively avouch it, as that a man may call it his doctrine, or a resolved case of his upon debate, I know not any place. Indeed I am not at this time (the more is my grief,) master of all *Aristotles* Works: and thereby

of

of neceffity am eafed of the labour of seeking it in him. But even of *Plato*, though we find it in that one *Dialogue* fo pofitively maintained; yet whether we may call it abfolutely *Plato's* Doctrine, I make fome queftion, when I remember (as is obferved by many) what he writes elfewhere of *Poets*, and of *Homer* particularly, whom he would not allow to be read in a well-governed Commonweal, (which I would not have any ignorant Zelot take any advantage of, as though it concerned us Chriftians as much, or rather, at all: for they had no other *Bible*, then *Homer*, in thofe dayes, fuch was the common opinion of him; and the reading of him with fuch an opinion, muft needs be very dangerous;) becaufe of fo many false, abfurd, yea impious Fictions, concerning the Gods. However, I cannot excufe *Plato* for that *Dialogue*; a moft irrationall piece, I think, as ever was written by any Philofopher.

But neither can I well brook *Scaliger* his words, (for I would not queftion his meaning; God forbid:) which I take notice of, of purpofe to prevent, that I fay not to reprove, the miftake of fome others. After he hath fpoken of *Plato* and *Aristotle* their opinion, he feemeth to deliver his own in thefe words: *Horum autem* δεοῦ νεύον *duo adhuc genera animadverti: unum cui cœlitus advenit divina illa vis; aut ultro, nec opinanti; aut simpliciter invocanti. Quo in numero feipfum ponit Hesiodus: Homerus autem ponitur ab omnibus. Alterum acuit meri exhalatio, &c.* They do him great wrong certainly.

tainly, that make this to be his opinion. No man pretending to Christianity, can entertain such foolishness. However, so censorious a man (witness

Joan. Fabricii
Specimen Arab.
pag. 174. Statu-
it idem Scal. &c.

his bitter *invectives* against *Erasmus*, for lesse matters;) should have written more warily. That *some* became Poets by *immediate inspiration*, without any thought, or seeking; others, upon immediate request and prayer, without any further endeavours: what more can be said of the truest, and most holy Prophets? But if all this were intended by him (as most probable,) in reference to those Philosophers their opinion: Yet he should have used some of their termes rather, (whereof *Plato* afforded him so much choice;) then that Scripture word *θεοπνευστων*: though not proper to the Scripture perchance, yet seldome used by any profane Author.

As for *Homer*, (the chiefest subject of those extravagancies,) there is no commendation can be given unto man, as to point of nature, but I should be more ready to adde to it, then to detract. Neither do I wonder, if Heathens, that had so many Gods, when they found themselves so transported above their ordinary temper by his verses, when either judiciously read, or skilfully acted; did really perswade themselves, that he must be somewhat above a man, that was the author of such ravishing language. I have alwaies thought of *Aristotle*, in point of humane wisdom and sound reason, rather as of a *Miracle*, then a man: yet when I consider how

how much he was beholding to *Homer*, and how much he doth in all his writings adscribe to the wit and wisdom of that one Poet; I must needs think very highly of him, that was so much admired by such a one as *Aristotle*. And though I do easily grant that his language, of the two, is the more ravishing; as may easily appear by such translations as have been made of him in any language, wherein so little of that charming power is to be found, that the reading of them is rather a task of patience, then an object of any admiration: yet allowing him to be a *Poet*, that is, one whose chief end (and probably his best subsistence,) was to please; and a very ancient *Poet*, that is, one that was to fit himself and his expressions for such as then lived, when such a religion, such opinions, such fashions, were in use; these things taken into consideration, which I doubt many that read him little think of, his matter, in my judgement, for the most part, doth deserve no lesse admiration.

Of the mysteries of bare language, that it may ravish, and what it is that makes it so, hath sufficiently been discoursed in the former chapter. And if *Rhetoricall*, how much more (in all sense and reason) *Poeticall*? And if good language may ravish, how much more excellent matter, delivered in ravishing language? But as every eare is not fitted for all ravishing language, when barely read, especially, not acted; so neither is every capacity, for excellent matter. Though in this particular of *Homer's* case, it is not so much want of wit and capacity, that maketh

keth so few in these daies to admire his wisdom; as ignorance of former times. Who would not at a Market, or Fair, if suddenly such a sight should offer it self, look upon either man or woman, though very beautifull otherwise, if dressed in old apparell, such as was worn but two or three ages ago; rather as a Monster, or a ghost, then such creatures as they would have appeared, when such apparell was in use? An old Hat will alter a mans countenance; and many both men and women, whose only ambition and employment in this world is, to dresse themselves, that they may be thought fair or proper, would think themselves undone (so ridiculous would they appear,) if they were seen in those fashions, which but ten or twenty years ago were their chiefest both pride and beauty. No wonder therefore if so ancient a Poet as *Homer*, appear ridiculous unto many, who are better skilled in the fashions of the times, then they are read in ancient books; which by long use of reading, would make the fashions of those times to which they are strangers, not only known, but comely; and so lead them to somewhat else, more observable then the fashions of the times. However, this use (to a learned and hearty Christian not inconsiderable,) any man may make of *Homer* and his antiquity, that by reading of him, many passages of the *Old Testament* relating to certain fashions and customes of those ancient times may the better be understood, and the antiquity of those books, among many other arguments, by the antiquity of such whether ex-
pres-

pressions (which we may call, the fashions of language,) or manners, both publick and private, the better asserted. Somewhat hath been done, I know, by some learned men, to that purpose, by collation of some passages: but not the tenth part of what may be done, I dare say: not by any, at least, that I have yet seen. But now I am gone from my Text.

So much for the first kind of *inspired Poets*, whom *Scaliger* doth call *θεοπνευστοι*.. Though he name *Hesiod* too, from *Hesiod*'s own testimony of himself; (*quo in numero &c.*) yet he passeth no judgement on him: *Homer* is his only instance; and *Homer* the occasion and only subject, almost, of that *Dialogue* in *Plato*, of this argument. I thought it therefore necessary that somewhat should be said of him: but that he should be thought inspired, truly and really, or otherwise supernaturally agitated, then as of Oratours was determined; notwithstanding all that hath been, or might yet be said of his so much admired excellency, I see no necessity at all.

The second kind, according to the same *Scaliger*, are those, *quos acuit meri exhalatio, educens anime instrumenta, spiritus ipsos, à partibus corporis materialibus*: that is, *whom the vapours of wine, freeing the spirits of the body from all materiall entanglements, and bodily functions, to serve the soul, do quicken and stirre up*. No wonder indeed, if such be stiled *θεοπνευστοι*, by those by whom *Bacchus* was worshipped for a God. But where *Bacchus* is not a God, but a fruit of the Vine, of the earth, and no more;
how

how can they think it reasonable, to adscribe divinity unto *Poets*, for those effects, which not reall *inspiration* only, as they seem to say, but even the *vapours of wine*, as themselves acknowledge, can produce? But let us consider of it soberly, and philosophically. It may be, we may find in this, though lesse danger of Blasphemy, yet as little reality of truth, as we have found in the former. Can the *vapours of Wine* make *Poets*? Truly I think not: I see no ground at all for it in nature. I have read what *Aristotle* doth write of *Wine*, where he compares the severall effects of it with the effects of *Melancholy*. I think he hath said as much of it, as can be said by any man, with any probability of reason, Yet I find not any thing in him, to perswade me that any *Poets* are made by *Wine*. I easily believe that the *vapours of wine* may dispose a man to make somewhat, that may be called a verse, or a rime, or a strong line: but that every one that makes verses, or rimes, or strong lines, is a *Poet*, I believe no more, then that an Ape is a man, because of some likeness in outward shape; or a Parrot, a man, because of some words of mans language, which he is taught to utter. To make a *Poet*, that may deserve that title, is, as I take it, a work both of Art and Nature; but more of Nature then of Art. A divine wit, naturally, is the first ingredient in that rare piece. and though I allow not any reall *inspiration* to any *Poet* (as a *Poet*,) more then to an *Orator*: yet of all kinds of naturall *Enthusiasme*, I allow to *Poets* that which is the purest, and hath most of heaven in it.

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An Oratour must not alwaies ravish. If he affect it in every part, it is likely he doth it in no part: he is a Fool, or a Child; not an Oratour. But if through exuberance of wit and good language, he happen without affectation, to ravish every where; he is not an Orator, but a Poet. We admire *Plato*, as a *Philosopher*: but they that read him with the same judgement, as many Ancients did, will find that it is his Poetry, that he professeth not, that is admired; more then that Philosophy, that he professeth.

But is *Wine* nothing then towards the making of a *Poet*? Not toward the making, as to the faculty it self: but toward the making of a *Poem*, I think it may conduce not a little. It may lighten the heart, as of sorrow, so of care, the bane of all sublime thoughts: it may raise the spirits, when they want to be stirred up; and those spirits may work upon the faculty, which oftentimes is more at the command of such helps, (by a secret sympathy,) then it is of the will, though never so much endeavour be used. They are seldome good *Poets*, that can be *Poets* when they will. But all that are good, are not of one temper of body: and as they vary in temper of body, so may these accidentall externall helps be more or lesse requisite. I do not think it impossible, though it be much against the authority of some, and practise, I believe, of most *Poets*, that one that drinketh water, (the ordinary drink of many nations,) should be a good *Poet*. But he had need to have good store of good bloud, or a very strong phansie; which alone is able to raise spirits, and of
all

all spirits, those especially, that have most power on the wit; that is, the purest and most abstract from materiality.

That *Wine* doth not work upon the wit, by any particular property or sympathy, but only by heating, or raising the spirits, I am the more apt to believe, because there be other things besides *Wine*, that have no lesse operation upon the wit and invention, (the fountains of all good language,) of which no such suspicion can be, that they can add or increase, but only stirre up and quicken. There be strange things written of the effects of Feavers, in that kind: few men, I think, that have been acquainted with feavers, or feaverish fits, not very violent, but can speak somewhat of their own experience. But this will have a more proper place, where we shall consider of the causes of *Enthusiasm* in generall; and among other things, of that *ardor* particularly, as one of the chief: of which somewhat already hath been anticipated in the former chapter; which makes me the more willing to forbear any further prosecution of it here. I believe *Musick*, some kind of it, may have the same operation in some tempers, upon the wit and phantasie, as *Wine* hath: not by heating, or infusing any spirits, that can have any such operation of themselves; but by stirring up by a secret sympathy. But of that also, more in its proper place.



C H A P. VI.

Of Precatory Enthusiasme.

The Contents.

The Title of the Chapter justified. Precatory Enthusiasme, not supernaturall onely, (whether divine, or diabolicall,) but naturall also. Praying used not by Christians onely, but by Heathens also: by Christians sometimes, misſ-led by a wrong zeal; whether naturall, or supernaturall. Naturall Enthusiasme, in praying: 1. By a vehement intention of the mind. 2. By powerfull language; apt to work upon the Speakers, as well as Hearers. Dithyrambicall composition affected by Heathens in their prayers. Extemporary praying, no difficult thing. 3. By naturall fervencie; by the advantage whereof, some very wicked in their lives, Hereticks and others, have been noted to have excelled in that faculty. John Basilides Duke, or King of Moscovia: his Zeal at his Devotions: his Visions and Revelations; and incredible Cruelty. Ignatius Loyola, the founder of the Iesuits; strange things written of his zeal in praying: the same, in substance, written of the ancient Brachmanes of India: both, with equall probability. The Messaliani, or Prayers, anciently, so called: what their heresie or error was. Their earnest, intent, continued praying; raptures and Enthusiasmes; visions and revelations: how all these might happen naturally, without an supernaturall cause. Haron a Mahometan Prince, a great Euchite or Prayer, in his kind, not to be parallel'd. ¶ A consideration concerning faith, whether besides that which is truly religious and divine, there be not some kind of naturall faith or confidence, which by a secret, but settled generall providence, in things of the world, is very powerfull and effectuall. A notable saying of Heraclitus the Philosopher: Some Scriptures, and S. Chrysostome, to that purpose. An objection made, and answered. Ardor mentis, in S. Jerome, how to be understood. Best Christians liable to undiscreeet Zeal. Nicol. Leonicius his Discourse, or Dialogue of the efficacy of Prayers. Antonius Benivenius, De abditis m. causis, &c. of what credit amongst Physicians. A strange relation out of him, of one incurably wounded, and almost desperat; who by ardent pray er was not onely healed, but did also prophesie

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both concerning himself, and divers other things. Some observations upon this relation.



His Title perchance of *Precatory Enthusiasme*, may seem unto some inconsistent with what we have professed more then once, and our generall title doth bear; that we meddle not in this *Treatise*, with any thing that is truly religious. It is possible it may seem so to some: but unto such, I doubt, as in matters of truth, are better acquainted with things that seem, then with things reall. Such may be jealous, without cause: and yet may have cause enough too, perchance, to be jealous, if they would not have any thing meddled with, that themselves phansie to be Religion. Of all duties of Religion, I easily grant *Prayer* to be as the chiefest in necessitie of performance, so the highest in point of access to God. If we may believe *S. Basil*, our prayer is not right, or we not right in our prayer, untill the *intention* of our mind so farre carry us out of our bodies, that God (after a more then ordinary manner) possesse our souls: and if we cannot so much as say, *Abba, Father*, without the *Spirit*; how much lesse can we pour out our Souls or spirits unto God in prayer, but by the spirit of God? But yet for all this, Christ himself hath taught us, that Heathens were wont to pray too: not by the spirit of God certainly, when they prayed unto Idols; nor yet with a right faith, without any warrant from Scripture; though with a strong confidence, upon their own presumptions, that they should be heard, because of their *long prayers*: (Matth. 6. 7.) But:

But we may go farther, though this be enough to juſtifie our title. Not Heathens only, but Chriſtians alſo may erre in their Prayers, unto the true God, (elſe not Chriſtians;) but by a falſe ſpirit, an erroneous Zeal; as Chriſts own diſciples were once about to do: (*Luke 9. 54, 55.*) As therefore there is a true, religious, ſupernaturall *Enthufiasme*, that belongeth unto Prayers; and a falſe, diabolically, ſupernaturall, (directly oppoſite unto the former;) neither of which we deſire to meddle with, more then of neceſſity, for diſtinction ſake, and where the matter is doubtfull, which in ſo abſtruſe a buſineſſe cannot be avoided: ſo there is a naturall, between both, and different from both theſe, the proper ſubject of this Chapter. I know there is no error in matter of Religion; no falſe *Worſhip* and *Idolatry*, I am ſure, without ſome intervention of the Devil. But if our diſtinction which we have in the Chapter of *Contemplative Enthufiasme*, between a generall concurrence, and immediate *inſpiration* or *poſſeſſion* be remembred; we ſhall be the better underſtood.

The cauſe of naturall *Enthufiasme* in point of *Prayer*, may be referred either to a *vehement* and continued *intention of the mind*, or to the *power of the language*, or to the *naturall temper* of the perſon.

For the firſt; that *vehement intention of the mind*, is naturally apt to breed an ecſtaticall paſſion, that is, transport a man beſides himſelf; to make him believe that he either heareth, or ſeeth things,

which no man else can either hear or see; and upon this illusion of the imagination, to frame in his understanding strange opinions, and strange confidences; both by reason, and by Examples, in the chapter of *Philosophicall Enthusiasme*, hath been treated of, and fully discussed.

Of the *power of Language* in generall, we have treated in the chapter of *Rhetoricall Enthusiasme*. And that it hath the same power, to raise the same passions and affections upon the speakers, or bare utterers, as it hath upon the Auditors; as there is the same reason, so there be so many instances and testimonies out of ancient Authours, that no question of it can be made. All writers of *Rhetorick* insist upon it largely, and conclude generally, that he can never be a perfect Oratour, whose speech hath not the same, or greater power upon himself, as he

would have it to have upon others. *Ip-
cicer. 2. De Orat.*

sa enim natura orationis ejus que suscipitur ad aliorum animos permovendos, oratorem ipsum magis etiam quam quenquam eorum qui audiunt, permovet. that is, *Such is the nature of speech, that though it be intended and undertaken to move others; yet it worketh upon the speaker himself no lesse, (if not more) then it doth upon any that hear it:* as a grand master of that Art, in point of speculation, and no lesse a practitioner, (both concurring to make him a perfect Oratour,) delivers it. It was very good counsell that the same Cicero gave his brother, when Governour of Greece, a man naturally passionate; that when he was pro-

voked to anger, he would forbear to speak, lest his words should be a farther incentive. Ancient heathens in their solemn prayers affected a *dithyrambicall* composition, as we learn by those collections out of *Proclus* his *Chrestomathia*, made by *Photius* in his *Bibliotheca*: set out also by learned *Sylburgius*, at the end of *Apollonius* *ἡδὲ συντάξεις*: the propriety of that composition, as is observed by the said *Proclus*, being to stirre up enthusiastically passions. Even a man that is not very fluent or rhetoricall, in his ordinary discourse, may by long practise attain to a great facility, in point of prayer: which though it be a subject of so much latitude, as will admit of good variety of Rhetorick; yet is not so ample, but that a very ordinary man, with some labour, and a good measure of confidence, may attain to an extemporary faculty. He that believeth what hath been written in the former chapter, of the extemporary faculty of the ancient *Sophists* and *Orators*, (which he that believeth not upon those evidences, may as well question whether ever any such men weretruly, as *Demosthenes* and *Cicero*:) will make no great wonder of it.

But that which giveth most advantage, as to all *Rhetorick* in generall, so to *prayer* particularly, is, that naturall *ardor* or *fervency*, wherewith nature hath endowed some men above others. I said, endowed. Some may quarrell at the word. my meaning is, where it is poised with equall discretion, then it is a gift; not otherwise. What that *ardor* is, besides what hath been already said of it, (whereof

see in the Chapter of *Rhetoricall Enthusiasme*:) shall be farther enquired in its proper place. It comes often to be mentioned; which we cannot avoid, having so near relation unto all kinds (almost) of *Enthusiasme*.

The ignorance of this advantage of nature, being unhappily mistaken for true Christian *Zeal*, hath been the occasion of much mischief in the world, and a great stumbling-block to simple people, to draw them into the contagion of pernicious Heresies. *Swenckfeld*, a notorious arch-Heretic in Germany, the father of many Sects; who among other extravagancies, held blasphemous opinions concerning the Scriptures: *Abraham Scultetus*, (a man of precious memory among all Protestants,) in his *Annales Ecclesiastici*, recordeth of him, that he was wont *ardentes ad Deum preces creberrime fundere*. But of blasphemous *Hacket*, who was executed in Queen *Elizabeth* her daies, it is observed by many, that he was so ardent in his devotions, that he would ravish all that heard him: whereof some also he infected with the venome of his opinions, with no other engine, but that very charm of his ardent praying. I have read it in more then one, if I be not mistaken. I must now content my self with a passage out of the writings of a learned man, who though dead many years ago, yet was the memory of his exemplary piety very fresh among many, when I lived at *Canterbury*; *Hadrianus Saravia*: whose words are; *Fertur hic Hacketus in concipiendis extempore precibus adeo excelluisse, ut Dei spiritum*

eum totum ardere, & ab eo ipſius regi linguam, iſti duo crederent : & adeo in ſui rapuit admirationem, ut nihil eum precibus non poſſe crederent à Deo obtinere; proinde quidvis ab eo poſſe perfici. that is: This Hack-
et is reported to have excelled ſo much in praying ex
tempore, that thoſe two { his diſciples } did verily be-
lieve him altogether to have been inflamed, (or, whol-
ly poſſeſt) by the ſpirit of God, and that his tongue was
governed by Him: and ſuch admirers were they of him,
that as they believed there was nothing but he might
obtain by his prayers from God; ſo conſequently no-
thing that he deſired, but he might effect.

But of all things that I have read in that kind, there
is not any thing that would more ſcandalize a man
not verſed in naturall ſpeculations, then what is
written of that horrid Hell-
hound, that incarnate Devil,
to whom *Nero*, *Caligula*, and
the fierceſt Tyrants of anti-
ent times compared, may be
thought Saints, or mercifull
men; (it is not mine, but their

*Nam quæ de Nerone, Cali-
gula, Domitiano, & reli-
quis peſtibus humani generis
ſcripta leguntur, ludum jocum-
que dixeris, præ infana huius
rabie. Paulus Oderbornius
in vita: quatern. L. 2. Wit-
bergæ; an. Dom. 1585.*

exprefſion that have written his life, or of him; and
he lived but in *Q. Elizab.* her dayes:) *Iohn Baſilides*,
Duke, or King of *Moscovia*: of his carriage at his ſo-
lemn devotions; how he prayed, how he faſted, how
ſevere towards others, his ſouldiers and Courtiers,
that did not, at thoſe times, conform themſelves
to his example: I leave it
to every man to read, in
thoſe that have written

*Ibid. quatern. X. 5. & N. 6. b. In
arce Alexandrovia &c. & V. 2. b.
Sed tyrannum fera rabie, &c.*

his life. Who would not admire the providence of God, who hath left us so many warnings in the Scriptures (in the Gospels, and the writings of the Apostles of Christ, especially;) that we should not be deluded by such outward appearances: and so many signes and evidences, how true Pietie might be discerned from false and counterfeit? so that no man that can but read and consider, can have any colour of excuse for his ignorance, if he be deceived. And whereas the same that have written the life of the said *Basilides*, tell us of his feigned Visions and Revelations, by which he deluded the people: that they were feigned and imaginarie, mere delusions and impostures, as to that which they pretended unto, God and Heaven, we are sure enough, and should think them mad, that should make any question: but whether altogether feigned and imaginarie, as to *Basilides* himself; that is, whether the Devil, after God for his incredible wickednesse had once quite given him over, might not take the advantage of his *enthusiastick* devotions, to represent himself unto him in the shape of an *Angel* of light, to encourage him the better in those inhumane courses, the very relation whereof is so full of horror, as is able to amaze the most resolute, and to draw tears from them who delight in bloud and crueltie; some question, I think, may be made,

But we have other *Euchites*, or *Prayers*, to speak of, that will trouble us more then these, in the inquisition of the cause. But before I go from this *ardor*, the Reader will give me leave to acquaint him

him with what I have met with concerning *Ignatius Loyola*, the founder of the *Jesuites*. He had need to have been a very fiery man, that hath been the founder of such Incendiaries, as they have proved (for the most part) in most Nations. But there be many that practise their tenets, yet rail at them: I know not how to call them. But to my storie. I will not bind my Reader to believe it: but he may make very good use of it, if he believe it not; and therefore I am the more willing to acquaint him with it. In the life of the said *Ignatius Loyola*, written by a very eloquent man, (whether as faithfull, as eloquent, I know not:) *Ioannes Petrus Maffei*, we are told, that he was seen at his devotions (*elevante spiritu sarcinam corporis, quatuor fere cubitis à terra sublimem:*) that is, in English; *four cubits almost above the earth; the weight of his bodily lump being elevated by the strength of the spirit*. Here we may take notice of the prudence of the Iesuite, if he had ever read *Philostratus*, Of the life of *Apollonius*; whether to be styled *the Philosopher*, or *Magician*, I know not; but one that was worshipped (in opposition to Christ) by divers ancient Heathens, for a very God: (we have had him once before already, in the chapter of *Rhetoricall Enthusiasme*;) Or in case he had never read him, admire the providence of chance, that two good wits should so punctually jump, not in the substance only of the thing, but in the very name, though not quantitie, of the measure, at such a distance, not of places only, (as probably,) but of yeares, I am sure, more then a thousand

sand by many hundreds. The matter is this: *Philostrophatus* (accounted by some a very fabulous Author, but justifiable enough, in comparison of that libertie some have taken since him, to forge miracles:) in his third book of *Apollonius his life*, relating there his peregrination to *India*, and his encounter with the *Brachmanes*, (who to this day retain the name, and no little portion of their ancient Philosophie:) their entertainment of him, their manner of living in their ordinary conversation among themselves, but particularly, what wonderfull things they did in his sight; among others, one is, their sacred Dances at their Devotions. the manner whereof was; They strook the ground with a mysticall rod; upon which, the ground under them did arise in waves, by which they were carried up in height above all ground (I should make some question whether he meant above the plain ground, or above those mounting surges, but that I find in *Eusebius*, by way of explication; ἵστάναι τε αὐτὸς μετὰ τοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ ἀίει ὄντι π χεῖρε δις πύξαι;) just two cubits. Ἔς δὲ πύξω, both in *Philostrophatus* & *Eusebius*: which I know not why the Latine Interpreter, in *Aldus* his edition, would rather expresse by *duos ferme passus*, (though *passus* I know, there be *minores*, and *maiores*;) then as the Interpreter of *Eusebius*, *altitudine bicubita*. Now if the Jesuite had read *Apollonius*, there was all the reason in the world that he should double the measure; lest it should be objected, that *Ignatius Loyola*, had not he gone above two cubits, did no more, then what by Idolatrous Pagans and Philosophers had

had been done so long before: which would not have been so much to his praise. But if he happened upon that measure by mere chance, without any regard to those heathen Philosophers; I will not repeat what I have said of it already: but it may seem so strange unto some, perchance, as to breed a doubt, whether it be not more probable, that both the one and the other, both *Philostratus* and *Masseius*, when they wrote these pretty things, were not inspired by one and the same spirit, then to cast it upon mere chance.

But now to somewhat that may be more serious, if not more pleasant. There be many things written of the *Messaliani*, I know; and I believe nothing written, but may be true of some of them. It is seldome seen otherwise, but that they that take the libertie to leave the *Common Rule*, to follow some broacher of new doctrine; will also take the libertie to invent somewhat of themselves, besides what was thought upon by their Leader. But that which was generall unto all that went under that Name, from which also they took their names of *Messaliani*, and *Euchite*; what that was, S. *Augustine* tells us in these words: *Messaliani, --Euchite, ab orando sic appellati, &c.* that is, *The Messalians, or, Euchites, so called from praying; wherein they are so assiduous, that it seemeth incredible unto most that hear of it. For whereas our Saviour hath said, that we must alwaies pray, and not faint; and his Apostle, Pray without cea-*

August. de Heres.
cap. 57.

ceasing: (which rightly understood imports, that our set times of prayer should be neglected upon no day:) these men do it so over-much, that for their very excessse herein, they are reckoned among the Hereticks.. Other things are said of them, &c. The same is more fully related by *Theodore* in his *Ecclesiasticall History*: where we read how *Flavianus* Bishop of *Antiochia*, desirous to know the certainty of those things that were spoken of them, found a way to insinuate himself into the good opinion of one of the chief both for yeares and authority; who informed him to this effect; That all men brought with them into the world an evil spirit, by which they were possessed, untill by earnest prayer (the only means effectually, and available for such a purpose,) the evil being driven away, the good spirit of God did take possession of their souls: who also would testify his presence unto them by certain visible signes and evidences. After which, they needed no more; no Sacraments, no Sermons, no Scripture, to make them perfect. That they could also see the holy Trinity visibly, and foretell things to come.

This is the summe of the account given to *Flavianus* by old *Adelphius*, a grand veterane professor of that Sect. That the same did apply themselves, as to prayer, so to revelations, from whence also they got the name of *Enthusiasts*, is the observation not of *Theodore* only, but of all that write of them. Although I will not take upon me to determine, whether all, or how many, in progresse of time, of these

these *Enthufiafts*, became really poffefft by the Devil; and in case it be fuppofed that all, or moft, in progrefse of time, were; yet then to determine the moment of time, or particular manner, be as much beyond my abilitie, as it is befides my task: we may nevertheffe fafely and probably enough conclude, that there is not much in either of thofe relations, that doth evince more, then may well be referred to Naturall *Enthufiasme*. For firft of all, I will fuppofe, which I think will eafily be granted, that every young novice, after he had once entred his name into that family, or feft, was prepared, partly by ftrange relations of Devils and Angels; and partly by the wild and ftern countenance of his Instructors, and all their ghafly crew; and partly by fome other myfticall waies, practifed at this day among the Iefuites in fome places; prepared, I fay, for fome time, before he betook himfelf to thofe exercifes, that were to be the means of his transformation. This very preparation, if we reflect upon naturall caufes and confiderations, was enough to crack the brains of them that were not extraordinarily found. But afterwards, when fully perfwaded that the Devil was in them, which muft be driven out by earneft, affiduous praying; and that the expelling of an evil, would be the bringing in of a bleffed fpirit, who would manifefte himfelf by heavenly foul-ravifhing vifions and revelations; what might not this belief, this expectation, this intention of the mind, and obftinate affiduity of endeavours, upon the moft found and fober? And if once ecfta-
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ticall, that is, out of their right wits, they needed no other enchantment for visions and revelations: it is very likely, except there were somewhat in their naturall temper that hindred, that they would offer themselves in course of nature. I appeal (if any make a question) to those many instances, that have been treated of in the chapter of *Philosophicall Enthusiasme*. But if they came once to foretell things future, as it often happens in such cases: though I allow of some kind of *divinatory naturall Enthusiasme*, as hath been discussed in its proper place; yet withall believing with the best & most experienced Physicians and Naturalists, that it is very ordinary for the Devil, (according to his nature and mischievous ends, to draw men from the worship of the true God, to the observation of such vanities and curiosities; little better in the eyes of God then direct Apostacie, or Idolatry;) to take the advantage of such naturall distemper, to produce supernaturall effects: upon this ground, I should be more apt to referre such divination to supernaturall, then naturall causes. As for the wonderfull increase and propagation of these *praying Enthusiasts*, in those daies, which occasioned the destruction of many Convents and Monasteries, in divers places; as we find in ancient Histories: I have a consideration, or rather a *quare* upon it already in the fore-quoted chapter; neither am I provided at this time, to say more upon it (which perchance I may, at another time,) then I have done there.

I have done with the *Messaliani*: who, as hath
al-

already been said, had their name from their assiduous affected *praying*. But the greatest *Euchite* that ever I read of, was one *Haron*, a *Mahometan* Prince, a *Chaliph* of *Egypt*; who a hundred times every day (whether of his reign, or pilgrimages, which were many, is doubtfull to some by the words; but I think of his reign :) was upon his knees, (*Erpenius*, in his translation, *in-*
geniculationibus; that is, according to
 the proprietic of the *Arabick* word,
 and the custome of many in the Orient, when the
 body is bowed so low, that the hands rest upon
 the knees :) at his devotions. He was a very valiant
 Prince, and mightily prevailed against Christians.
 But this by the way only.

*Hist. Arab. ab
 Erpenio publi-
 cata.*

There is somewhat else here to be considered of: wherein as I shall not peremptorily determine, so I shall desire the Reader not to condemn before he have read and well considered. That there is a *faith* of Miracles distinct from a true, that is, a sanctifying, and justifying faith: that not unsanctified Christians only, (which of the two sorts, are the worst men; but professed Infidels also may do some Miracles; as it may easily be proved by Scriptures, so is acknowledged as well by *Papists*, (who stand upon miracles more then we do,) as by *Protestants*. Whether there be not some kind of *faith*, or trust in God, whereof unsanctified Christians, and many that have not the knowledge of the true God, are capable; which in the course of Gods generall providence, according to his will and appointment
 from

from the beginning, may sometimes (with the concurrence of other causes, best known unto God,) produce great deliverances to the parties, and other strange, and little lesse then miraculous effects; is that I would now consider of, or rather propose to the consideration of others. What may be objected out of Scripture, we shall see by and by. It will first shew what grounds I have to move this question. First for Scripture; that God doth hear sometimes the prayers of all men promiscuously, who fervently call upon him in their necessitie, we have the whole 107 *Psalm* to trust to, and *Calvin's* authoritie (which with some men will go much further then sound reason;) to oppose, if any should studie evasions from such manifest and expresse determination. *Heracitus*, a Philosopher of great antiquitie, highly magnified by *Hippocrates*, was wont to say; τῶν θεῶν τὰ πολλὰ διὰ ἀπιστίαν μὴ γινώσκουσι: that is, (ac-

Plut. in *Coriolano*. The words are quoted by some others; as by *Clem. Alex.* for one, but, neither written (as I remember,) nor interpreted by him, as by *Plut.*

according to *Plutarch's* interpretation and application,) that the greatest of Gods miraculous works were not known unto men, because of their unbelief; which *Plutarch* himself elsewhere calleth, ἀδύναμις, the evil, or infirmitie of unbelief. Certainly they that spake so, had in their time observed somewhat in the course of the world, which led them to this observation, by way of *Maxime*, or speculation. We read in the Gospel, that Christ did not (that he could not; *Mark* 6. 5, 6.) many mighty works in his own country, because of their unbelief: (*Matth.*

13. 5, 8.) And *Acts* 14. 9. S. Peter before he did a miracle upon the lame man, looked upon him first whether he *had faith to be healed*. The poor *Cananitish* woman her faith is highly commended by Christ, and her request therefore granted unto her; who by her profession was yet a mere Pagan, and therefore resembled unto a dogge by Christ himself, in opposition to them that did worship the true God, the God of *Israel*. I mention these places; but whether any thing to be concluded out of them to our purpose, rather then I will stand to dispute it, if any body be peremptory against it, let them go for nothing. Especially, (though I deny the necessitie of the consequence:) if any man shall attempt from hence to argue against the miraculousness of those cures, or extraordinary supernaturall power of the parties, by whom they were done.

S. *Chrysostome* doth seem to ground it upon Scripture: but his own experience and authoritie, who was a man for his zeal and pietie (besides much other worth) not inferior unto any of those whom we call *Fathers*; may be as considerable to us, as that Scripture, which he seemeth to ground upon. In his *Commentaries* upon the *Psalms*, in a place, he earnestly perswades all men, as well sinners, great sinners, as others, to rid themselves of all care and distraction, and to put their trust in God alone, for safety, and protection: *καὶ ὡς ἁμαρτωλὸς ᾖς*: that is, *yea though thou be as great a sinner, as great can be.*

Chrysost. in
Psalm. 10.

Eccles. 2. 10. He quotes the words of *Ecclesiasticus* for it. *Look at the generations of old, and see: Did ever any trust in the Lord, and was confounded? He saith not, (they are Chrysostom's words;) Did ever any just, (or good:) but any: that is, whether good or bad.* τὸ γὰρ θαυμάσιον τούτο ἐστίν, &c. that is; *For this is marvellous indeed, that even sinners, if they once take hold of this anchor, (πάντες εἰσιν ἀχέριστοι,) no man can hurt them; (or, they become unconquerable.)* But S. Chrysostome might have added out of the same, upon whom he seemeth to ground, as Scripture; that it is not a light trust, or confidence that will do it: *Wo be to fearfull hearts, and faint hands, and the sinner* (the craftie Politician, as I take it, that would seem to do all by God; and yet doth work more by *cunning*, then by *confidence*;) *that goeth two wayes: Wo unto him that is faint-hearted; for he believeth not: for he shall not be defended.* But then it may be objected, that the same Authour hath other words; as, *Order thy way aright: and, Did ever any abide in his fear, &c.* which seem to restrain it unto such, who though they have been great sinners, perchance, formerly; yet for the time to come, propose to themselves to lead a new life. This may be objected: and somewhat as easily, perchance, (as to the drift of that Author) answered. But I have said as much as I mean, because whatsoever his meaning be, I cannot ground much upon it. If other known and certain Scriptures be objected; as particularly, *Iohn* ch. 9. 21, 22, 23. *Now we know that God heareth not sinners, &c.* it is answered by some, That:

That that is no Scripture; but a simple report, or testimony of the common opinion: by others, That the words are not intended as an absolute *maxime*, or proposition extending unto all generally; but unto such only as take upon them (without a right commission,) the office of Prophets, and would do Miracles, for a confirmation of their vocation: that in such a case, God will not hear, &c. I will not warrant either of these answers to be satisfactory: I need not: I will make use of neither, but take the words as Scripture, as knowing, that there be other Scriptures enough to make that sense very Canonically. But is there any Scripture almost, so absolutely intended, but is liable to some limitations? God will hear them that are godly, even when he doth not hear them. If he do not sometimes grant unto them what they earnestly pray for, it is for their greater good, that he doth not. He is not a Christian, not so sound a Christian, I am sure, as he should be, that doth not believe this as verily, as he doth believe that there is a God. If God doth hear such sinners sometimes; (as such a faith, I believe, though merely naturall, is a very rare thing; especially, if the concurrence of some other cause, as we said before, be requisite:) though he grant them what they desire, as the avoiding of some present great evil, or the achieving of some great exploit, or the like: yet it may be doubted, whether alwayes for their good; who perchance are thereby the more confirmed in their wickednesse, which will bring them in the end, to eternall misery. *Sonne, thou art ever with*

me, &c. *Luke* 15. 31, 32. though it be not altogether the same case; yet are the words so applicable to this, as able, in my judgement, if well thought upon, to take away all scruples and risings of thoughts in that kind.

But what (if any man object) is this to *Precatory Enthufiasme*? Yes: For I conceive that wherever this naturall confidence is found, there is that naturall *ardor*; which is a principall thing in the causes of naturall *Enthufiasme*, as already more then once hath been observed. S. *Ierome* upon those words of the Gospel, *The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak*; (but upon which of the Gospels, that hath the words, I cannot tell, except I had the book;) hath these words: *Hoc adversus temerarios, &c.* that is, *This is to be noted against some rash men, (or, Christians,) who perswade themselves that whatever they believe, they shall obtain. But let us consider, that as we have confidence from the fervency of our spirits, so have we as much occasion to fear, because of the weaknesse of our flesh.* Whether he intended this *ardor mentis*, of a naturall, or supernaturall *zeal*, for want of other circumstances, is not easie to judge. For as among them that professe Christianity, and seem to be zealous, as zealous as can be, there be many that are nothing lesse then Christians: So amongst them that are true, sanctified, orthodox Christians, some may be found, that have more *zeal* then they have *discretion*, to discern between time and time, persons and persons, and other circumstances, by which they that intend to do good,

good, ought, as by the word of God they are directed, to guide their zeal. But it is more likely that he intends it of true zeal: for not long after he useth the same words of S. Peter; (*eodem mentis ardore, quocatera:*) whose zeal though it were not alwaies seasonable, and therefore sharply reprov'd by Christ in a place; yet alwaies true and sincere. God forbid that we should make any question.

I had rather be silent then not to speak well. But because my silence may be misconstrued, where so much opportunity doth invite, as well as my judgement: I will rather expose my self to censure, then to disappoint my reader of his expectation. There is one that calls himself *Nicolaus Leonicus Thomæus*, an *Italian* of no small credit in his dayes, (and I wish no man had done worse upon *Aristotle*, then he hath done:) who hath set out some philosophicall *Discourses* or *Dialogues*, as he calls them; the title of one of which is, *Sadoletus, sive De Precibus*. The subject of the *Dialogue* is, what it is that maketh Prayers available. I have read it more then once: I am sorry I can make nothing of it, whether I consider him as a Christian, (especially having interest'd two Cardinals and one Bishop in the businesse; the one by his Dedication, the two other, as Interlocutors;) or as a mere Philosopher, his chiefest undertaking. The Reader may quickly satisfie himself: It is no long discourse. And when he hath done, if he judge otherwise, let him condemn my dulnesse, not my malignity: I shall think my self much beholding to him for it.

I shall conclude this Chapter with a relation. I have read some things, and heard of many, that I have thought strange, in that kind; but never met with anything of that nature, that I took more notice of. My Authour is one that I have named already more then once, as I take it: *Antonius Benivenius*: whom I find often quoted by learned Physicians, without any exception: which makes me to give him the more credit, though I find my self often posed with his relations. However, the very circumstances of this relation, if judiciously considered, are such, as can admit of no suspicion. But the Reader may believe as much, or as little as he pleaseth. It may be some ease to him, (*Quanto expeditius est dicere, Mendacium, & fabula est?* as *Seneca* somewhere: just as he that confuted *Bellarmino* with three words, in the Pulpit :) if he be resolved to believe nothing, that he cannot understand: it shall not trouble me, who undertake not for the truth of it. I trust him, whom many before me (men of good judgement,) have trusted: more then which, no ingenuous Reader will require of me. And as I undertake not for the truth, so I will passe no further judgement upon the cause. The case out of his Latine, in my English, is this:

Anton. Benivenius de
abd. n. ac mir. morb. ac
san. causis. ed. Basl. anno
D. 1529. c. 10. p. 215 &c.

"A certain *Florentine*, whose
"name was *Gaspar*, having recei-
"ved a wound in the Breast; (or
"about the Heart;) whilest he en-
"deavours to pull out the dart, pulls out the arrow,
"but leaves the point behind. When the Chirurgi-
ons

„ons had done all that could be done by art and
„skill, to get it out, and all in vain, because it stuck
„so fast in one of the inmost Ribbs, that it was im-
„possible to draw it without a larger wound, and
„some danger of breaking the said Ribb: (or, *with-
„out taking away part of the Ribb with it:*) he resol-
„ved to undergo any death, though never so pain-
„full, rather then to submit to such a cure. But at
„last being grown desperate, he attempted to
„hang himself, or to cast himself into the next
„River (*Arnus,*) or into some deep Well; and
„had done it, had not his friends that were about
„him, watched him with great care and diligence.
„Among them there was one, *Marioctus* by
„name; a man of approved piety and integrity;
„who besought him with great importunity, that
„giving over desperation, he would endeavour
„to commit so incurable an evil into the hands of
„God, the authour of all salvation. *Gaspar* being
„at last perswaded by him, betakes himself to God,
„and ceased not, both night and day, to pray; till
„at last he was taken with a spirit of divination: (or,
„*fell into fits of divination:*) so that he would tell
„who were coming to him to visit him, even when
„they were yet farre off. Besides that, he would
„name all men, though never seen before, by their
„right names; and exhort all that came to him, to
„fear God, & to be confident of his help in time of
„need. That himself was now not only assured of
„his recovery, and of the day and hour, particu-
„larly; but by the same light (that assured him,) he
also

„also foresaw many other things that should happen: as, that he was to go to *Rome*, and dy there ::
„the banishment of *Petrus Medicis*, and his flight: the distresses and Calamities of *Florence* ::
„the ruine of *Italy*: and divers other things, which for brevity we omit: the fulfilling whereof (for the most part) we have already seen. As for the point, it came out of the wound of it's own accord, the very day and hour that he had foretold: and when it was come out, he ceased to prophesy; and after a while, being gone to *Rome*, he died there.

I said I would passe no judgement upon the cause: neither shall I. However, did not I believe, that it had some relation to the contents of this Chapter, the Reader may be sure it should not be here. But though here, yet not any thing from thence to be concluded of the cause, if he remember what hath been said of some cases: some mixed cases: of others, so uncertain and obscure, as not (by me at least,) at all determinable. My Author makes it a Miracle; *Miraculo liberatus*, is his argument, prefixed before the Chapter. I oppose it not: and I like it the better: First, because in such an extremity, that seemed as much above the patience, as help of man, there was no other way, that either piety or discretion could suggest, but to be importunate with God. And secondly, because addresse was made unto God immediately. This may relish of *Lutheranisme*, with them that have more zeal for Saints, then they have for God:

God: or at the beft, think they ferve God beft, when they pray to them, who but lately (as to God and Eternity,) were their fellow-fervants. But *Nicolaus Remigius*, I hope, Privy Counfeller to the Duke of *Lorrein*, (as a Duke, fo a Cardinall too, and a great Iudge in capitall caufes, within his Dominions;) was no *Lutheran*. Let any man read the firft, and the fourth Chapter of his third book of *Dæmonolatry*: and let him judge, whether there be not caufe to fufpect fuch addreffes as are made unto Saints in fuch cafes. But this is more then I intended, I leave the reft to the Reader; and fo conclude this Chapter.

F I N I S.

E R R A T A.

Page 130. lin. 4. *illa*. Ibid. lin. 6. *aliquem*. p. 159. l. 23, 24. being whipped u. p. 174. l. 21. *fee G. vifibly, in th.* ibid. l. 29. what to pr.

